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THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS OF EMINENT 
DOMAIN: EXPLORING THE "ARBITRARY AND 
CAPRICIOUS" TEST AND SUBSTANTIVE 
RATIONALITY REVIEW OF GOVERNMENTAL 
DECISIONS 
Zygmunt J. B. Plater* and William Lund Norine** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The day-to-day realities of different systems of government can 
be discerned in the way they handle, in theory and practice, clashes 
between the individual and the collective will. The structure of con-
temporary American democracy is no exception. It is comprised of 
a variegated assortment of judicial formulae for balancing the inter-
ests of the individual and the state, most of these formulae tracing 
back with differing degrees of directness to textual bases in the first 
nine amendments to the federal Constitution or their state consti-
tutional equivalents. 1 One of these basic structural balancings, en-
countered early on by every student of American law and govern-
ment, is the vague limitation against "arbitrary and capricious" acts 
of governmental power. 
* Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. A.B., 1965, Princeton University; J.D., 
1968, Yale Law School; S.J.D., 1981, University of Michigan. 
** Associate, Lord, Day & Lord, Barrett Smith, New York City. B.A., 1975, University 
of Minnesota; J.D., 1986, Boston College Law School. The authors would like to thank Scott 
Jordon, Esq., Boston College Law School Class of 1987, of Howrey & Simon, Washington, 
D.C.; and Rebecca Webber and Mark Cheung, Boston College Law School Class of 1989, for 
their tireless and indispensable assistance. 
I This Article focuses primarily upon review of federal condemnation power, although, of 
course, the states' powers are subject to much the same analysis as they incorporate the fifth 
amendment under the fourteenth amendment. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 
(1947) (enforcing the establishment clause of the first amendment). Several states' constitutions 
incorporate the arbitrary and capricious test in specific terms. See, e.g., KENTUCKY CONST. 
§ 2; WYOMING CONST. art .. l, § 7. 
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The arbitrary and capricious test is a fundamental, but usually 
rather superficially considered, concept of limits upon state actions. 
Modern eminent domain law presents drastic and recently resurgent 
questions about the permissible limits of public power over private 
rights, and therefore invites, necessitates, and facilitates a clarifi-
cation of the arbitrary and capricious test. 
This Article, then, is straightforwardly schizophrenic, developing 
two different though linked inquiries. The analysis presented here 
requires a synthesis of two theoretical propositions: (1) that the 
arbitrary and capricious test can be clarified into a defined and 
judicially workable concept of substantive rationality review, and (2) 
that, if fifth amendment protections for private property rights in 
eminent domain cases are to be meaningful, the courts must be open 
to practical application of a clarified arbitrary and capricious review 
in state and federal condemnations. 
A. Eminent Domain and Judicial Review 
This Article is an attempt to explore and clarify the substantive 
inquiries into governmental action represented by the "arbitrary and 
capricious" concept, integrating these observations with the recent 
debate over rationality review, and applying them to the narrow but 
illuminating field of eminent domain. The analysis begins with a 
consideration of the resurgent police power issue of eminent domain 
condemnation through two analytical paradigms. Not coincidentally, 
deference to official decisionmaking permeates the courts' treatment 
of the field of eminent domain. The power of the public to appropriate 
private property via condemnation is a universal attribute of sov-
ereign governments, clearly necessary to the functioning of a modern 
state. 2 As a result, governmental eminent domain decisions in the 
2 As the Court noted in Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1875): 
It has not been seriously contended during the argument that the United States 
government is without power to appropriate lands or other property within the States 
for its own uses, and to enable it to perform its proper functions. Such an authority 
is essential to its independent existence and perpetuity. These cannot be preserved 
if the obstinacy of a private person, or if any other authority, can prevent the 
acquisition of the means or instruments by which alone governmental functions can 
be performed. The powers vested by the Constitution in the general government 
demand for their exercise the acquisition of lands in all the States. These are needed 
for forts, armories, and arsenals, for navy-yards and light-houses, for custom-houses, 
post-offices, and court-houses, and for other public uses. If the right to acquire 
property for such uses may be made a barren right by the unwillingness of property-
holders to sell, or by the action of a State prohibiting a sale to the Federal govern-
ment, the constitutional grants of power may be rendered nugatory, and the govern-
ment is dependent for its practical existence upon the will of a State, or even upon 
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United States have generally received a most respectful reception 
in courts, both state and federal. 3 Given that the government con-
cedes that it will pay just compensation for a taking, many courts in 
effect declare that they have no further questions. 4 The governmen-
tal agency's assertions of condemning authority, proper public pur-
pose, and rational choice of means are, in practice, "well-nigh un-
assailable. "5 
Nevertheless, this judicial deference is somewhat surprising, es-
pecially in an era of supposed rugged individualism. Eminent domain 
condemnation represents one of the legal system's most drastic non-
that of a private citizen. This cannot be. No one doubts the existence in the State 
governments of the right of eminent domain,-a right distinct from and paramount 
to the right of ultimate ownership. It grows out of the necessities of their being, not 
out of the tenure by which lands are held. It may be exercised, though the lands are 
not held by grant from the government, either mediately or immediately, and inde-
pendent of the consideration whether they would escheat to the government in case 
of a failure of heirs. The right is the offspring of political necessity; and it is insepa-
rable from sovereignty, unless denied to it by its fundamental law. 
Id. at 371-72. Eminent domain thus is analytically a subset and constituent part of the police 
power in the state jurisdiction, and a "necessary and proper" adjunct of the federal govern-
ment's correlative regulatory powers. 
3 See, e.g., Falkner v. Northern States Power Co., 75 Wis. 2d 116, 248 N.W.2d 885 (1977); 
City of Jacksonville v. Griffin, 346 So. 2d 988 (1977); Wilson v. United States, 350 F.2d 901 
(10th Cir. 1965); Swan Lake Hunting Club v. United States, 381 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1967); 
United States v. Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska, 542 F.2d 1002 (8th Cir. 1976); In re Heidelberg 
for Footpath, Alleyway and Bridge Purposes, 53 Pa. Commw. 321, 428 A.2d 282 (1981); 
Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles County, 262 U.S. 700 (1923); United States ex rel. TVA v. Welch, 
327 U.S. 546 (1946); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
4 The general invulnerability of eminent domain appears to exist irrespective of which level 
of condemning authority is involved-federal, state, local, or public utility corporation. Ana-
lytically, as well, there are no meaningful differences between these condemnors. Each must 
have a proper grant of authority and must satisfy the other three categories of tests. 
Judicial review of the rationality of the condemnor's site-selection choice is typically very 
deferential. In most cases, condemnees cannot require a specific showing why a particular site 
was chosen, but rather only a general showing that the choice of some such site was not 
arbitrary. See infra note 125. Cf. Texas Eastern Transmission Corp. v. Wildlife Preserves, 
Inc., 48 N.J. 261, 225 A.2d 130 (1966), where the quasi-pUblic character of the condemned 
parcel encouraged the court to permit review of site-specific rationality. See SAX, DEFENDING 
THE ENVIRONMENT: A STRATEGY FOR CITIZEN ACTION 216-28 (1970); McCarter, The Case 
that Almost Was, 54 A.B.A. J. 1076 (1968). The Colorado Supreme Court, however, has 
suggested that public utility condemnations may deserve more scrutiny than governmental 
takings. Arizona-Colorado Land & Cattle Co. v. District Court, 182 Colo. 44, 47, 511 P.2d 23, 
24-25 (1975). 
5 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. at 35 (Douglas, J.) (as to review of public purpose). Justice 
Douglas also said, as to the choice of means: 
It is not for the courts to oversee the choice of the boundary line nor to sit in review 
on the size of a particular project area. Once the question of the public purpose has 
been decided, the amount and character of land to be taken for the project and the 
need for a particular tract to complete the integrated plan rests in the discretion of 
the legislative branch. 
Id. at 35~6. 
664 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 16:661 
penal incursions into the rights of individuals,6 seizing private prop-
erty, which has probably been more protected in the social fabric 
and legal structure of the United States than of any other country, 
past or present. Moreover, most such seizures expressly override 
the will of the owners subject only to a duty of compensation, which 
is often fundamentally unsatisfying to the condemnee. 7 Deference of 
a high degree seems to extend to all levels of condemnors, including 
even private utility companies. 8 In an Alice-in-Wonderland twist, 
moreover, the courts' basis for constricting judicial review of eminent 
domain takings, practically limiting review to the narrow question 
of whether there is a "public use," appears to be the constitutional 
language designed to extend special protection to private property 
rights in the first place. 9 
Especially today, as local governments are casting about for in-
novative uses of condemnation to hold onto beloved football teams, 
6 Uncompensated regulation is, of course, a major intrusion upon private property, but the 
takings clause and its active development and application by the courts in practice provides a 
protective limitation upon the exercise of such governmental power, always guaranteeing to 
the individual a reasonable remaining quantum of property and property use. See Plater, The 
Takings Issue in a Natural Setting: Floodlines and the Police Power, 52 TEX. L. REV. 206, 
227-33 (1974) [hereinafter Plater, Takings Issue]. Other drastic non-criminal governmental 
powers include deportation and administrative denials of government largesse, but these too 
have developed fairly elaborate constitutional limitations. See, e.g., Wong Yang Sun v. 
McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
7 Indeed, given the unique nature of land, it is in some cases difficult to categorize the 
financial settlement as "compensation." See, e.g., Widen Co. v. United States, 357 F.2d 988 
(Ct. CI. 1966) (sovereign need only pay for what it actually takes, rather than for all that 
owner has lost); United States v. Virginia Elec. Power Co., 365 U.S. 624 (1961) (navigational 
servitude permits government to condemn riparian lands without compensating for value 
arising from riparian location); Winston v. United States, 342 F.2d 715 (9th Cir. 1965) (com-
pensation is measured by what government takes, not what owner loses). 
Eminent domain compensation makes no necessary provision for sentimental or personal 
values in property, for aesthetics except as they are a function of the taste of potential 
purchasers in the real estate market's valuation, for transaction costs such as relocation, and 
replacement values, except insofar as is statutorily required. See 3 NICHOLS ON EMINENT 
DOMAIN § 8.6 (rev. 3d ed. 1985) [hereinafter NICHOLS]. Eminent domain, of course, is not 
directed only toward governmental acquisition of land. See, e.g., United States v. Cors, 337 
U.S. 325 (1949) (condemning a tugboat); Cordova v. City of Tucson, 16 Ariz. App. 447, 494 
P.2d 52 (1972) (condemning historical artifact); Miller Levee Dist. v. Wright, 195 Ark. 295, 
111 S.W.2d 469 (1920) (condemning easement of view). A review of the digests, however, 
indicates that the overwhelming majority of eminent domain actions involve the taking of 
some ownership rights in land, be it short-term or permanent, fee simple or lesser interests. 
8 But cf. Arizona-Colorado Land & Cattle Co. v. District Court, 182 Colo. 44, 47, 511 P.2d 
23, 24-25 (1975). 
9 Taken contextually, the fifth amendment takings clause, in its terms, is drafted so as to 
provide further protections beyond due process rather than constriction of the individual's 
right to property. See infra notes 44-45 and accompanying text. 
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local job-producing industries, 10 and other nontraditional quasi-public 
assets, eminent domain not only deserves further attention from 
legal scholars, but is also likely to get it. And the Supreme Court, 
perhaps without realizing it, has opened the door wider to rationality 
review of condemnation decisions. 11 
B. The Arbitrary and Capricious Test and Rationality Review 
After reviewing the police power issue of eminent domain, this 
Article shifts to broader ground, developing the fundamental prop-
osition of substantive review of arbitrariness. The analysis begins 
with an examination of substantive nonstatutory reviews of govern-
mental police power actions, including eminent domain actions, ar-
guing that all such substantive judicial inquiries can be separated 
analytically into four different diagnostic categories: questions of (1) 
authority; (2) of proper public purpose; (3) of reasonable relationship 
of governmental means to ends as a matter of logic on the merits; 
and finally, (4) of the particular burdensome effect on the individual 
imposed by the governmental actions. Typically, the latter question 
of takings burden reduces in eminent domain cases to the issue of 
just compensation. 12 
These categorical distinctions seem logical, and help to clarify 
much of the confusion in the area. The arbitrary and capricious rubric 
has been applied broadly in all of these categories, to the benefit of 
none. It is in the third area, however-substantive merits review of 
the means-end relationship, asking the question, "is the governmen-
tal action logically designed to achieve a purpose?"-that the arbi-
trariness test has its most useful meaning and application. Unfor-
tunately, this direct sense of the term is in practice rarely explored 
in clear terms by the courts. The courts bob and weave, duck and 
10 See, e.g., City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d 60, 646 P.2d 835, 183 Cal. Rptr. 
673 (1982). Other cities have reportedly considered condemning manufacturing facilities. . 
11 See Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984). See text accompanying note infra 
166. 
12 These analytical categories have been used in similar form before by one of the authors. 
Plater, Takings Issue, supra note 6, at 223-28. With the addition of the initial authority 
inquiry, they provide a useful analytical matrix for review of all police power actions. Although 
these precise categories do not seem to have been so set out previously, they clearly derive 
from the work of many courts and commentators. Note also that this breakdown of inquiries 
serves in other review contexts, as in dormant commerce clause cases where the burden on 
the individual is analogous to the burden on interstate commerce. See, e.g., Pike v. Bruce 
Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970). 
In speaking of the police power here, the authors refer not only to state exercises of that 
power but also to the federal government's exercise of its correlative regulatory powers. 
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shuffle, trying to avoid confronting substantive questions of arbi-
trariness in judicial review of governmental decisions. 
Drawing upon administrative law, this Article argues that an ex-
isting, workable judicial test of arbitrariness ultimately comes down 
to the question whether a rational official could have reached the 
challenged decision on the given facts, a test that is practically 
indistinguishable from Justice Frankfurter's classic formulation of 
the substantial evidence test. 13 This formulation appears to be work-
able, deferential, and useful, linking the present inquiry to the ra-
tionality review debate. 
After examining the rationality review debate, the Article argues 
for the practicality and legitimacy of substantive due process ration-
ality review, properly defined, noting that such review currently 
takes place anyway under different names. The Article also discusses 
the degree of deference appropriate to rationality review. Deference, 
of course, is a proper fundamental inclination of courts when review-
ing the actions of legislatures and their administrative agency cre-
ations. Questions of separation of powers, ideologies of judicial pas-
sivism, political pressures, and systemic efficiency all argue for 
judicial hesitancy in second-guessing the other branches of govern-
ment. If deference effectively comes to mean nonreviewability, how-
ever, the judiciary has abdicated its constitutional duties. 14 Thus, 
the meaning and application of the arbitrary and capricious test 
deserve serious and extensive scrutiny. 
C. A Theoretical Synthesis 
By putting the two inquiries together-"arbitrary and capricious" 
rationality review and eminent domain-the path may be made a bit 
13 "It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 
support a conclusion." Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951) (citing and 
construing Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). See infra note 224 
and accompanying text. 
14 "On issues of substantive review, on conformance to statutory standards and requirements 
of rationality, the judges must act with restraint. Restraint, yes, abdication, no." Ethyl Corp. 
v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 69 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (Leventhal, J., concurring). As to statutes, moreover, 
"courts are not obliged to stand aside and rubber-stamp their affirmance of administrative 
decisions that they deem inconsistent with a statutory mandate or that frustrate the congres-
sional policy underlying a statute." NLRB v. Brown Food Store, 380 U.S. 278, 291 (1965). 
"The deference owed to an expert tribunal cannot be allowed to slip into a judicial inertia 
.... " American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 318 (1965). A similar view is 
expressed by Justice Marshall writing for the Court in Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Seatrain 
Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726 (1973); see also Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Federal 
Maritime Comm'n, 390 U.S. 261 (1968). 
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clearer and smoother toward understanding governmental limita-
tions in the theoretical structure of American tiemocracy. Eminent 
domain offers not only a setting in which to clarify the elements of 
substantive judicial review, but a litmus test of their practical ap-
plicability as well. 
In appropriate cases, courts may increasingly allow condemnees a 
practical opportunity to question the rational basis of particular 
eminent domain decisions. If courts are willing to consider the sub-
stantive rationality of governmental action, they thereby implement 
in practice a longstanding precept of American jurisprudence. If, in 
contrast, courts treat the traditional presumption of validity as ef-
fectively irrebuttable, refusing to listen seriously to the merits of 
arbitrariness challenges, then the long-term consequences to our 
democratic system are likely to be felt far beyond their effect on 
certain parcels of land. 
II. Two PRESENTING PARADIGMS 
A. Background of the "Arbitrariness" Inquiry 
The arbitrary and capricious standardI5 appears to derive from 
both statutory and constitutional roots, although it does not appear 
in the United States Constitution or most state constitutional texts. 16 
15 This Article analyzes the separate constitutional basis for the test, beyond its various 
statutory incarnations such as the federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA), § 10(e)(A), 5 
U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982). 
"Arbitrary and capricious" is referred to herein as one test, not two. "Capricious," according 
to Webster's, means "action arising from unrestrained exercise of the will, caprice or personal 
preference ... based on random or convenient selection or choice, rather than on reason or 
nature ... given to willful irrational choices and demands." "Arbitrary," as noted later herein, 
see infra note 224 and accompanying text, comes down to the same fundamental lack of 
determining principle. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 333 (1981). The 
concepts of unreasonableness and, in some cases, bad faith, also reflect the arbitrary and 
capricious test and are treated here as part of the same standard. See infra note 358 and 
accompanying text. 
This Article focuses on the rationality review of governmental agency actions, rather than 
of statutes. The standards of review are similar for the two settings; but it would seem that 
a difference lies in different degrees of deference. See Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness-
A Reply to Professor Davis, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 783, 785 (1966). 
16 This Article proposes that the arbitrary and capricious test be straight-forwardly recog-
nized as constitutionally-based, as an element of due process. As the Supreme Court said in 
Whalen v. Roe, pending legislative experiments, 
Mr. Justice Brandeis' classic statement of the proposition merits reiteration . . . "We 
may strike down the statute . . . on the ground that, in our opinion, the measure is 
arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. We have power to do this, because the due 
process clause has been held by the Court applicable to matters of substantive law 
as well as to matters of procedure." 
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It is generally understood to constitute a democratic backstop to 
potential excesses of state power. In other words, governmental 
actions should ultimately be reviewable in court under the deferen-
tial but substantive constraint that, if proved to be arbitrary, capri-
cious, or in bad faith, they will be declared void. 17 This principle 
holds great structural and philosophical significance, obviously linked 
to the concept of due process. 
Remarkably, for a test so putatively basic, there are relatively 
few cases, especially federal cases,18 in which the concept is used 
straightforwardly to strike down governmental actions as arbitrary 
and capricious on substantive (as opposed to procedural) grounds. 19 
The phrase flourishes as dicta but seems to wilt as a support for 
judicial holdings, except in the negative sense where courts uphold 
challenged official acts upon the finding that they are not arbitrary. 20 
429 U.S. 589, 597 n.20 (1977) (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 
(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). The Court quoted this assertion specifically despite the fact 
that "Lochner has been implicitly rejected many times." Whalen, 429 U.S. at 597. 
The terms "arbitrary" and "capricious" embrace a concept which emerges from the 
due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States 
Constitution and operates to guarantee that the acts of government will be grounded 
on established legal principles and have a rational factual basis. A decision is arbitrary 
or capricious when it is not supported by evidence or when there is no reasonable 
justification for the decision. 
Canty v. Board of Educ., 312 F. Supp. 254, 256 (S. D. N. Y. 1970) (footnote omitted and 
emphasis added); see also Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 84 (1971); cf. J. NOWAK, R. 
ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 490 n.57 (3d ed. 1986) (citing Van Alstyne, 
Cracks in "the New Property": Adjudicative Due Process in the Administrative State, 62 
CORNELL L. REV. 445, 487 (1977) (asserting that the Court has not clearly accepted the 
constitutional status of the arbitrariness test)). 
17 "[Tlhere is no place in our Constitutional system for the exercise of arbitrary power." 
Garfield v. United States, 211 U.S. 249, 262 (1908). This assertion is given eloquent lip service 
in many cases involving judicial review of legislative/administrative decisionmaking. See, e.g., 
General Protective Comm. v. Securities & Exchange Comm'n, 346 U.S. 521 (1954); Jones v. 
City of Portland, 245 U.S. 217 (1917); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); 
Bush v. Martin, 251 F. Supp. 484 (S.D. Tex. 1966). 
18 This Article notes several areas in which state courts have undertaken substantive ra-
tionality reviews in ways quite different from federal courts, in inquiries as to less drastic 
means, see infra notes 242-58 and accompanying text, legislative "necessity," see infra note 
119 and accompanying text, and eminent domain "necessity," see infra note 106 and accom-
panying text. 
19 A few such cases noted infra do exist, giving a passing mention of the meaning of 
"arbitrary" or even saying that an action is impermissibly arbitrary. See, e.g., FCC v. National 
Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775 (1978); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of United 
States v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983). State Farm, however, is an 
example of how even such cases may cloud the point; the Court held the NHTSA airbag 
rescission "arbitrary" primarily because NHTSA failed to explain adequately the basis of 
decision, hardly a direct substantive judgment on the rule. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 44, 46. 
20 Or remanded for further development of the record, without being nullified, as in Citizens 
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The arbitrariness inquiry rarely functions as an active judicial test 
of the validity of governmental acts. Rather, when a judicial opinion 
begins its review of governmental action by choosing to apply the 
"arbitrary and capricious" level of scrutiny, that fact usually tele-
graphs the likelihood that the official act or decision is shortly to be 
upheld. 21 When courts do use the "arbitrary and capricious" phrasing 
actively, moreover, they almost never define it analytically. Instead, 
they apply it to such a disparate range of analytical inquiries that 
the phrase emerges as an amorphous and scarcely useful evaluative 
concept. Scholars have not done much better. 
A primary reason for the dearth of cases actively applying the 
arbitrary and capricious test may well be that the concept is poorly 
understood. Yet a concept as widely acknowledged as this one would 
seem to deserve critical exploration. The "arbitrary and capricious" 
test is so much a part of judges' accepted notions of judicial review 
that it serves as a useful vehicle for active exploration of theories of 
substantive judicial review. When persons have been severely af-
fected by extreme governmental actions, it seems constitutionally 
fitting-not just a matter of statutory caprice-that they have a 
meaningful opportunity to attempt to rebut the traditional presump-
tion of the validity of governmental acts, with a court willing to 
listen to the merits of arguments that the official decision was arbi-
trary, capricious, or irrational. 
"Rationality review" has enjoyed a fair amount of rather theoret-
ical discussion recently, and is closely linked to the arbitrary and 
capricious test. 22 Little of this rationality review debate, however, 
has trickled down into judicial opinions. In part, this dearth may be 
attributable to the profession's commendable and longstanding av-
to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). The same shorthand works in 
equal protection cases where the choice of arbitrary and capricious review telegraphs the 
lowest level of scrutiny. See infra notes 306-20 and accompanying text; see also United States 
v. Meyer, 113 F.2d 387, 392, cert. denied, 311 U.S. 706 (1940); Fidelity Federal Sav. & Loan 
Ass'n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 169-70 (1982). 
21 On administrative "questions of law," the judicial review is far more likely to be phrased 
in terms of the appropriateness of judicial substitution of judgment than in terms of arbitrar-
iness, raising issues that similarly turn on degrees of deference. 
22 See, e.g., Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197 (1976); Tribe, Fore-
ward: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1 
(1973); Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality, and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123 
(1972); Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 
1205 (1970); Michelman, Politics and Values or What's Really Wrong with Rationality Re-
view?, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 487 (1979); Bice, Rationality Analysis in Constitutional Law, 
65 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1980); P. BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: 
CASES AND MATERIALS (1979). 
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ersion to judicial exercises of substantive due process "Lochner-
ing."23 In part, it may be due to the unpredictable vagaries of the 
concept of reasonableness (one of those universal "weasel words" 
learned early on and regarded skeptically by most Anglo-American 
lawyers because it is so difficult to define how a reasonable mind 
thinks in a complex world). Yet, on both counts, the courts' discern-
ible hesitancy in reviewing rationality or arbitrariness seems anach-
ronistic. Courts and scholars have in fact evolved ways of handling 
the demands of rationality and substantive due process review, al-
though without much semantic clarity or explicit recognition of the 
pro~cess. 
Two not-so-hypotheticals24 illustrate two basic models of ration-
ality/arbitrariness review. These paradigms, the first a means-end 
"factual iJpplausibility" model and the other a "rational alternatives" 
model, could have been drawn from a wide variety of subject matter 
areas-from judicial review of Securities and Exchange Commission 
or Federal Trade Commission regulations, awards of governmental 
contracts and licenses, or different kinds of rulemaking. 25 Eminent 
domain, however, offers a relatively narrow and relatively simple 
field, unencumbered by any elaborate structure of adjectival rules 
and regulations, that nevertheless possesses fundamental impor-
tance and so can serve as a useful lesson in substantive review. 
B. A Means-end Factual Implausibility Model 
In the first paradigm, a governmental condemnation decision is 
made in order to achieve an explicit and proper public purpose, but 
23 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); see infra notes 260-79 and accompanying text. 
24 The examples are based, first, on the Tennessee Valley Authority's two most recent 
reservoir condemnations: for the Tellico Project on the Little Tennessee River and for the 
Columbia-Normandy Projects on the Duck River. See United States ex rel. TVA v. Two Tracts 
of Land, 387 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Tenn. 1974), aff'd, 532 F.2d 1083 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 
U. S. 827 (1976); Plater, Reflected in a River, Agency Accountability and TV A's Tellico Dam, 
49 TENN. L. REV. 747 (1983) [hereinafter Plater, Tellico Dam]. Second, they are based on 
the City of Detroit's condemnation for General Motors (GM) of more than 1000 homes in that 
city's Poletown district. See Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 
304 N.W.2d 455 (1981); see also Michigan Media Services, Inc., Poletown Lives, Ann Arbor, 
Michigan (documentary film 1983); Crosby v. Young, 512 F. Supp. 1363 (E.D. Mich. 1981). 
The first-named author played a substantial role in the TV A litigation and an ancillary role 
in the Poletown and Crosby cases. The eminent domain issue presented in this Article was 
not raised in the Tennessee litigation and received only passing attention in the Poletown 
setting, so this Article does not in effect relitigate old battles. 
25 See, e.g., FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775 (1978); Milligan 
v. Board of Registration in Pharmacy, 348 Mass. 491, 204 N.E.2d 504 (1965); Hornsby v. 
Allen, 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964); Warner-Lambert v. FTC, 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
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the condemnees challenge the likelihood of that taking ever serving 
that purpose because of a basic lack of factual support. For example, 
assume that a federal agency with a clear grant of authority to 
condemn for statutory purposes, and an express statutory mandate 
to "promote regional economic development and water recreation," 
decides to build a public works project centered upon a dam and 
reservoir that will flood 8000 acres of river-valley lands. 26 In rational-
basis terms, there can be no realistic legal challenge to the forced 
sale of these 8000 acres and perhaps another 2000 acres necessary 
for use and operation of the reservoir. Taking those 10,000 acres is 
a direct and rational means for achieving the purposes of creating a 
reservoir. Assume that the agency, however, seeks to condemn a 
further forty square miles of adjacent land beyond the reservoir pool 
and service area, with the avowed objective of "shoreland industrial 
development," promoting the location of new water-based private 
industry in the area and new towns to serve the industrial parks. 27 
26 In this hypothetical, as in the TV A cases, supra note 24, no congressional authorization 
is required for the decision to construct a public works project. Congressional contact is 
limited to the annual appropriations bill, in which lump sums are granted to construction 
agencies without line-item specification. Thus, this eminent domain paradigm does not require 
direct judicial review of a congressional decision, but rather scrutinizes an internal agency 
decision. 
27 By acquiring more than sixty square miles for the Tellico project, only 16,000 acres of 
which would be flooded even during the summer, TVA projected that it could resell up to 35 
square miles of condemned farmlands to a hypothetical industrial city to be called "Timber-
lake," to be built by the Boeing Corporation with congressional subsidies. Timberlake was to 
be named after the first British officer to map the region, and was patterned after a model 
Minnesota city designed by Athelstan Spilhaus which also was never built. Timberlake was 
projected to require between $250 and $800 million in subsidies that were not included in the 
Tellico cost projections. The speculative land profits and the revenues from the hypothetical 
city would provide the project's official shoreland benefits. The other major projected Tellico 
benefit was recreation in the project area, a benefit based upon annual recreation revenues 
and economic activity. See Plater, Tellico Dam, supra note 24, at 754-57. 
These projections reflect the fact that federal projects must be justified as profitable by 
official cost-benefit projections in order to obtain funding. S. Doc. No. 97, 87th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 7-12 (1962). See Plater, Tellico Dam, supra note 24, at 752 n.13. Economic projections 
that accompany pork barrel projects often strain credulity, but courts have strenuously avoided 
review of cost-benefit numbers or the accuracy and logic of agency accounting formulas, despite 
strong objections from economists and citizen critics of government pork barrel projects, on 
the ground that they are internal requirements to which extreme deference is appropriate. 
See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) v. TVA, 371 F. Supp. 1004, 1014 (E.D. Tenn. 
1973), aii'd, 492 F.2d 466 (6th Cir. 1974); EDF, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 325 F. Supp. 728, 
739-40 (E.D. Ark. 1971), aii'd, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973); 
United States v. West Virginia Power Co., 122 F.2d 733,738 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 
683 (1941); Cape Henry Bird Club v. Laird, 359 F. Supp. 404, 412-14 (W.D. Va. 1973); EDF, 
Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 348 F. Supp. 916, 924-25 (N.D. Miss. 1972). But see Montgomery v. 
Ellis, 364 F. Supp. 517, 532-33 (N.D. Ala. 1973). The official cost-benefit ratios are thus not 
a satisfactory basis for general discussion of rational-basis review, although this analysis may 
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This hypothetical is, in fact, the case of the Tennessee Valley 
Authority's ongoing Columbia Dam on the Duck River, as well as 
that of the recent Tellico Dam imbroglio. In these circumstances, 
the 300 families whose forty square miles of farm land are being 
condemned for future non-reservoir shore land development would 
typically voice a barrage of complaints: that this is "a land-grab," a 
taking of private land to be turned over to other private interests, 
a taking of "excess" land, a "socialistic" governmental land specula-
tion, and so on. Defense attorneys in eminent domain cases have 
turned all of these kinds of verbal complaints into defensive legal 
arguments, all focused on alleged improper public purposes, and all 
dead losers. 28 
Assume, however, one more fact: that the agency has previously 
used exactly the same rationale to condemn and hold a total of more 
than 200 square miles of non-reservoir dryland parcels in four other 
neighboring public works dam projects over the past twenty-five 
years, and that virtually no such industrial development has oc-
curred therein. 29 The condemnation defendants realistically cannot 
argue that industrial development is not a proper public policy or 
public purpose, but they do now have available a further argument: 
that they should be able to go forward with an offer of proof that 
condemnation of their lands is not rationally related to the accom-
plishment of the agency's expressed public purpose. That is, whereas 
a court initially could well have deferred to the agency's "experience 
and expertise" or "experimentation"30 as bases for allowing the first 
often lead to similar conclusions. Prior to the 1950s, the courts held to a rough distinction 
between public use and mere public purpose. See, e.g., People v. Chicago Land Clearance 
Comm'n, i4 ill. 2d 74, 85, 150 N.E.2d 792, 798 (1958) (Klingbiel, J., dissenting) (citing the 
thert current 18 AM. JUR. EMINENT DOMAIN § 36, at 663 (1948». 
28 The leading case in which condemnation for redevelopment under private ownership was 
deemed a sufficiently "public" use is Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). See infra note 74; 
see also United States v. 416.81 Acres of Land, 514 F.2d 627 (7th Cir. 1975); United States 
v. 67.59 Acres of Land in Huntington County, Pa., 415 F. Supp. 544 (M.D. Pa. 1976); Gibson 
& Perin Co. v. City of Cincinnati, 480 F.2d 936 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1068 (1973). 
29 The model is clearest when absolutely no industrial development has previously occurred 
in similar projects. If some has occurred, the factual questions of how much new development 
is attributable to the project and how much would have come to the region anyway are 
presented. This complicates the factual analysis, though legally its resolution ultimately follows 
the substance of the general analysis presented here. 
30 Borden Co. v. Freeman, 256 F. Supp. 592 (D. N.J. 1966); Mourning v. Family Publications 
Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356 (1973). The subject of lessened judicial scrutiny for "experimental" 
programs does not appear to have received, but deserves, scholarly attention. See Whalen v. 
Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 597 (1977). 
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shorelands development projects, now that the factual record clearly 
shows the implausibility of ever achieving those purposes, private 
property owners must be allowed at least a practical chance to 
challenge the rational basis of such condemnations in court. 
The private property owners would then attempt to produce a 
substantial quantum of evidence based on actual practical experi-
ence, demonstrating that the condemnation of their parcels did not 
actually serve the purpose of shoreland industrial development. 31 If 
the agency can produce no substantial evidence to the contrary, then 
a court would seem justified in holding, deferentially but true to its 
constitutional mandate, that reasonable, present-day agency officials 
could not have decided that that particular land condemnation would 
serve to accomplish the project's purpose. The court would then 
dismiss the condemnation action. Faced with such a judicial decision, 
the agency would have to abandon the condemnation action, or de-
velop some further express public purpose that could be justifiably 
served by the condemnation. Development of a further purpose 
might achieve only the window-dressing of a new, amended decla-
ration of purpose, but it would have the significant virtue of being 
explicit and open to public scrutiny with the practical results that 
may follow. 
In brief, the private property owners' defense is that, based on 
the factual record, no governmental official could reasonably believe 
that the governmental choice of means-condemnation of these 
lands-would achieve the avowed governmental ends of industrial 
development for the valley. Such a case is not a question of "excess 
condemnation";32 rather, it is a case straightforwardly questioning 
31 Absolute proof, of course, is never possible. The question of "not at all, ever" is so strict 
as to amount to total deference. Rather, this proof would show that no substantial water-
based development was likely to develop over the project's projected life. This involves a 
balance, an implicit cost-benefit comparison, that says that development causally attributable 
to this project is not likely to come in a quantity sufficient to justify the taking. The defense 
is not an "excess condemnation" claim, but rather an attack on the merits. Where minor 
additional increments of land occur as adjuncts to taking, it would appear that, as Justice 
Sutherland said in another context, "[tJhe inclusion of a reasonable margin to insure effective 
enforcement will not put upon a law, otherwise valid, the stamp of invalidity." Village of 
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365,388-89 (1926). 
32 "Excess condemnation," the condemnation of extra adjacent lands beyond those directly 
required for the particular governmental function, is almost universally upheld by courts when 
it is accessory to the basic taking, and avoids split and landlocked parcels, avoiding access 
problems, and even recoupment takings. See Armstrong v. City of Detroit, 286 Mich. 277, 
282 N.W. 147 (1938); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Lux Land Co., 194 Cal. App. 2d 472, 14 
\ 
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the rational basis of the condemnation's basic shoreland development 
premise itself. 
The fundamental problem of modern eminent domain law, how-
ever, is that, at least in practical terms, under the deferential stan-
dard of review applied in condemnation takings the defendants in 
most federal courts today would not be able to take even this first 
step. The agency's discretion and the rationality of its decisions to 
condemn, short of lunacy, are supported in court by a practically 
irrefutable presumption of validity. Many state courts, though by no 
means all, follow the federal courts' extremely deferential example. 33 
C. A Rational-alternatives Model 
The second paradigm requires the reviewing court to apply the 
rationality rule in a contextual setting, reviewing how an agency has 
chosen between several competing alternatives that admittedly 
would each achieve the public purpose. The recent Poletown case 
from urban Detroit illustrates this paradigm. 34 
Assume that a federal redevelopment agency, working through 
the auspices of a city government, decides to encourage the construc-
tion of a new job-creating, manufacturing plant within city limits. It 
decides to condemn and raze an urban neighborhood of fifty square 
blocks, containing 1100 homes, twenty stores, and two churches, 
causing a substantial amount of personal and commercial distress, 
in order to turn over the 500 acre parcel to a major automobile 
manufacturer for construction of a Cadillac assembly plant. 
The property owners might, as usual, attack the taking as based 
on an improper public purpose-a "private use," for example-and, 
as usual, would lose. 35 They might argue further that condemnation 
payments will never provide sufficient funds for replacement of their 
homes and businesses at relocated sites, but, in the absence of special 
Cal. Rptr. 899 (1961); State ex reI. Sharpe v. 0.6033 Acres of Land, 110 A.2d 1 (Del. Super. 
Ct. 1954). 
33 See cases cited supra note 3. 
34 This "rational alternatives" model is essentially based upon the circumstances that gave 
rise to Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 304 N.W.2d 455 
(1981) (per curiam); see also Crosby v. Young, 512 F. Supp. 1363, 1374 (E.D. Mich. 1981). 
For a factual chronicle of Poletown, see Poletown, 410 Mich. at 645-60, 304 N.W.2d at 464-
71 (Ryan, J., dissenting). For an urban historian's description of the case, see Bukowczyk 
The Decline and Fall of a Detroit Neighborhood: Poletown vs. GM and the City of Detrr 0, 
41 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 49 (1984). 
35 See cases cited supra note 28. In fact, aside from a brief attempt to use the state's 
environmental protection act, the entire state appeal focused fecklessly on alleged private 
use. Poletown, 410 Mich. at 637-38,304 N.W.2d at 461 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting). 
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statutory provisions, this argument also fails because just compen-
sation is assessed according to the market value of what is taken 
with no guarantee of relocation or replacement costS.36 
Assume further, however, that, at the time the officials decided 
to condemn and raze the neighborhood, there were four other empty 
industrial sites of 500 acres each available within city limits with 
equivalent access to rail, highways, and utilities. 37 The landowners 
may now make a further argument: that, given the drastic burden 
imposed upon them, and the available alternative sites that cannot 
be rationally distinguished from their neighborhood's site (except 
that they are less expensive to develop given the cost of condem-
nation to the city), no official could rationally have chosen to condemn 
their homes and businesses rather than to go to one of the other 
four open sites. 38 
36 See Winston v. United States, 342 F.2d 715 (9th Cir. 1965). In Poletown, some relocation 
assistance was available. 410 Mich. at 655-56,304 N.W.2d at 469 (Ryan, J., dissenting). 
37 The Poletown environmental impact statement (which was drafted on an irregularly 
expedited emergency basis, see Poletown, 410 Mich. at 652-53,304 N.W.2d at 468 (Ryan, J., 
dissenting); Comment, Emergency Exceptions from NEPA: Who Should Decide?, 14 B.C. 
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 481, 485-90 (1987» identified nine potential sites for the Cadillac factory, 
but, from the beginning, General Motors' site criteria were so particular to the Poletown site 
that only it would fit. The company demanded "an area of between 450 and 500 acres; a 
rectangular shape (3/4 mile by 1 mile); access to a long-haul railroad line; and access to the 
freeway system." 410 Mich. at 636,304 N.W.2d at 460 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting). 
N ever clarified in the legal battle was the fact that others of the nine potential sites were 
basically "green field" sites fitting all but the rectangular criterion. In addition, they were 
also empty of houses, churches, and small businesses and thus available without the massive 
disruption of Poletown; but that all were rejected at GM's insistence, basically because they 
were not rectangular. Was shape a critical or a superficial requirement? When Detroit's 
planning office staffers inquired informally of GM, they were told that the corporation was 
insisting on a rectangle so that it could use the same blueprint layout of parking lots and 
assembly units as at an existing GM plant in Oklahoma. But could not the design of parking 
lots be shifted to fit the shape of the existing Detroit industrial sites? They could, the GM 
staff said, or a parking structure could be built instead of open lots to accommodate the plant 
workers' needs at the less disruptive sites. But GM adamantly refused to consider shifting 
the parking lot layout or building a parking structure. The latter could cause congestion, and 
either would require a modification of the Oklahoma blueprints, which the company simply 
declined to do. "Once we had decided what we wanted, we would not retrench," said one GM 
employee. 
The question of "specific contextual necessity," considered later in this Article, in the 
Poletown setting, then, came down to whether the creation of jobs and tax base (admitted 
arguendo to be proper public purposes) required that a rural Oklahoma factory layout design 
be replicated in an urban Detroit neighborhood without any modifications. 
The authors are indebted to a member of the GM corporate legal staff, and to the late Susan 
Rupe, Wayne State Law School Class of 1980, who was a member of the Detroit municipal 
planning department staff, for illumination of this part of the Poletown story. 
38 In fact, in the Poletown case the actual motivation for the government's particular choice 
(other than bruited reverse racial discrimination issues, the mayor and council being largely 
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Such an argument is not a means-end argument that the condem-
nation of Parcel A will not in fact or logic serve the avowed public 
purpose of industrial development, but rather that, viewed in the 
factual context of drastic costs and available alternative sites B, C, 
D, and E, no rational official could have picked A. This version of 
rationality review is analytically more complex and difficult, dealing 
not with a basic factual implausibility but with a judicial cost-benefit-
alternatives review. In effect, it involves judicial acknowledgment 
of a "less-drastic-means" inquiry in reviews of some governmental 
condemnation actions. Deference to governmental decisions is an 
even greater consideration here, but the fundamental question re-
mains: if to serve the legitimate, expressed public purpose of indus-
trial development a site must be chosen, but in light of the dispro-
black and the neighborhood largely white) appears to have been GM's unyielding insistence 
on the Poletown site so as to be able to duplicate the precise dimensions and layout of the 
Oklahoma plant. See supra note 37. 
Corporations wield great political leverage in making relocation decisions. See B. BLUE-
STONE, CORPORATE FLIGHT: THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC DISLOCATION 
(1981). In the Poletown case, GM straight forwardly threatened to transfer its Cadillac factory 
out of the Detroit area to the Sunbelt if its particular demands were not met. See 410 Mich. 
at 648-51, 653-57, 304 N.W.2d at 465-66,468-69 (Ryan, J., dissenting). The threat appears 
to have been a bluff. At the time, the first-named author checked with the federal Environ-
mental Protection Agency and determined that GM had not moved to secure the basic envi-
ronmental clearances necessary to transfer operations to southern states within the time 
frame necessary to fit the constraints of its construction schedule. Detroit city officials, 
however, knew of this, but apparently dared not question GM's insistence. 
This background defines two further questions: 
(a) In determining the rationality of the choice of site, an inquiring court might have asked 
how the design could have been adjusted to fit other sites. This Article later assesses a court's 
ability to review the asserted "necessity" for particular sites. Would GM's desire "to see the 
river" justify a decision to condemn on the waterfront, with no other distinguishing preference 
criteria? The inquiry would amount to a form of cost-benefit accounting, in light of heavy 
private condemnation burdens, to determine contextual "necessity." This form of assessment 
is common in modem equal protection analysis. See infra notes 121, 307 and accompanying 
text. 
(b) If city officials chose the neighborhood site purely because of corporate insistence that 
otherwise the factory would take its money and go elsewhere-without the hint of a logical 
rationale-would that fact itself not provide a sufficiently rational basis for the choice? Faced 
with an irrational ultimatum, a rational city might well choose to go with the flow. Yet 
ultimately the condemnation power decision is made by the government, not the corporation, 
so, analogous to cases in which courts profess greater scrutiny in cases where power is 
delegated to private corporations, a court should scrutinize the rationality of a vicariously 
delegated choice less deferentially. Justice Ryan, in his Poletown dissent, wrote the only 
opinion recognizing this "corporation-dictated necessity" issue, and found legal grounds to 
reject the assertion. 410 Mich. at 675-81, 304 N.W.2d at 478-80; see also Arizona-Colorado 
Land & Cattle Co. v. District Court, 182 Colo. 44, 511 P.2d 23 (1973). If the government had 
delegated eminent domain power directly to GM, a court might well have inquired more deeply 
into the choice of the site. By co-opting the agency, the corporation should not be able to win 
a lower level of rational scrutiny, in a pass-the-buck cycle of decisionmaking. 
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portionate private and public burdens no rational official could have 
thought that Parcel A was preferable for that legitimate purpose, 
does not a defendant have the right to ask a court to scrutinize the 
substance of the condemnation decision and rescind it if it fails the 
test? 
D. The Paradigms 
In sum, the two paradigms present instances in which private 
property owners would want at least the opportunity to go forward 
with the burden of proving that a governmental decision is not 
rational, in terms showing that a rational official could not so have 
decided. In both these paradigms, however, the "arbitrary and ca-
pricious" standard would be honored in the breach. Federal courts 
currently do not take on a particularized rational-basis scrutiny of 
governmental condemnation decisions, but instead defer in general 
terms to the exercise of official discretion, leaving condemnation 
defendants with no practical substantive review of takings decisions. 
The paradigms are admittedly rather extreme examples of emi-
nent domain condemnation, but such cases permit clearer insights 
into condemnation review. Lest they be thought hyperbolic, more-
over, it should be remembered that both have actually occurred and 
may well occur again. 39 In addition, although both paradigms address 
agency decisions rather than legislative acts, both are set in the 
federal jurisdiction so as to test the most stringent current restric-
tions of judicial review. In both cases, moreover, if defendants are 
prevented by deferential courts from going forward with proof, they 
are left with the hapless prospect of political petition and media 
action, neither of which is very effective in protracted attempts to 
buck the flow. 40 In each paradigm, the hypothetical is constructed 
39 The TVA is currently trying to proceed with the Duck River dam at Columbia, Tennessee, 
condemning 31,800 acres of farmland and 260 farm families, for an impoundment of 12,600 
acres in the summer and 4000 acres in the winter, on the hypothesis that industry will thereby 
come. Even with the hypothetical industrial development, the Columbia dam has, even in 
TVA's own reckoning, never had a positive cost-benefit ratio. See H.R. REP. No. 1533, 96th 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). 
40 The Court is often seen as the last best hope for individual citizens seeking to assert 
fundamental constitutional rights against the potential tyranny ofmajoritarianism. It provides 
a reflective check on the process of legislative logrolling. As Milton Shapiro writes: 
[Tlhe Court can sometimes intervene successfully on behalf of interest groups that 
lack influence elsewhere in government .... It is these marginal groups, who ... 
find it impossible to gain access to the "political" branches, which the Court can best 
serve. 
M. SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF SPEECH, THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 32 (1966). 
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so as not to be so crazy as to constitute obvious official bad faith or 
lunacy.41 Finally, in each case the governmental project has a clearly 
delineated public purpose upon which the condemnation's rationality 
may be assessed; the only question is rationality. 
Ultimately, then, the paradigms are designed to demonstrate sit-
uations in which laypersons would think that judicial review is both 
practical and desirable, but in which court-made rules of deference 
block any such attempt. The examples are designed to present prac-
ticable litigation cases. In each case, the court's deference is the 
problematic element. If a court agrees to take on substantive review 
on the particular merits, the subsequent course of review would be 
relatively straightforward and unremarkable. 
III. ARBITRARINESS REVIEW IN THE EMINENT DOMAIN 
Despite the drastic nature of eminent domain condemnation, and 
the widespread political expressions of aversion it inspires,42 eminent 
domain cases in practice constitute remarkably cut-and-dried judicial 
consecrations of governmental decisions. 43 Aside from occasional in-
effective attacks on the "public use" issue, most condemnation de-
fendants are left with nothing practicable to argue about except the 
amount of the compensation check. In effect, the courts have taken 
the fifth amendment eminent domain language-which was designed 
as an additional protection against the excesses of governmental 
takings by emphasizing the two concepts of public use and 
compensation44-and inverted the clause so as to limit judicial review 
41 A court's invalidation of a statute or regulation on the ground that it was grossly irrational 
or "lunatic," of course, still concedes the legitimacy of substantive rationality review, and also 
clearly constitutes a constitutional review that sounds in due process. It is also useful to note 
that, notwithstanding a deluge of ill-spent judicial ink to the contrary, the terms "bad faith" 
and "arbitrary and capricious" are not synonymous. The term bad faith "is not simply bad 
judgment or negligence, but rather it implies the conscious doing of a wrong, because of 
dishonest purpose or moral obliquity; it is different from the negative idea of negligence in 
that it contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design of ill-will." 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 127 (5th ed. 1979) (quoting Stath v. Williams, 174 Ind. App. 369, 
375, 367 N.E.2d 1120, 1124 (1977». 
42 Reluctance to use the eminent domain power is widespread especially in self-styled 
"conservative" administrations. 
43 See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text. 
44 There is a large body of professional literature devoted to the science of evaluating and 
proving what constitutes "just compensation" in a given case. 3 NICHOLS, supra note 7, § 8; 
4 NICHOLS, supra note 7, §§ 12, 13; J. GELIN & D. MILLER, THE FEDERAL LAW OF EMINENT 
DOMAIN, § 3 (1982); REAL ESTATE VALUATION AND CONDEMNATION (Practicing Law Inst. 
1970). The right to compensation is not at issue in challenges to the merits of a taking. It is 
conceded, and only the particular amount is likely to be contested. 
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of governmental takings by practically restricting it to nothing but 
those two terms (only one of which even addresses substantive 
merits of the taking). 45 The implications of such automatic constraints 
on defendants' arguments are not trivial. In fact, the lingering sus-
picion is that condemnees would have been better off in modern 
courts if the Framers had failed totally to mention their situation, 
as with "privacy" rights. 
Modern eminent domain is a political paradox that mirrors the 
twisting historical currents of substantive due process. On its face, 
governmental exercise of the condemnation power often awakens 
the reactionary rhetoric of the most stalwart conservative defenders 
of private property principles. But, in practice, it is often the power 
groups that call themselves "conservative" that are allied with the 
state in eminent domain actions. These sectors of society are only 
rarely the objects of unwanted condemnation actions. The stubborn 
individuals who resist condemnation, defending their private prop-
erty rights, are often the ones stigmatized as liberal mavericks. 46 
In Professor Stewart's apt characterization,47 the traditionally 
powerful forces of America's economic system-the nation's most 
effective governing structure from before the Revolution through 
this century-have now often joined forces with their erstwhile gov-
ernmental regulators. When freeways, airports, and pork-barrel 
public work projects are built with the eminent domain power, the 
"conservative establishment" and government often constitute an 
indistinguishable bloc. The defendants in reported eminent domain 
cases often appear to be small individual landholders bucking the 
45 In view of such uncritical judicial deference, the argument can be made that, of the life/ 
liberty/property triad, the right to property, particularly the right of the otherwise powerless 
individual to hold his dearest possession, is currently afforded the least protection. Given the 
firm textual basis for the right, this seems unjustified, unless one were to read the intent of 
the eminent domain clause not as a limitation of governmental power, but rather as a particular 
authorization for the exercise of power harnessed only by the compensation requirement. The 
latter interpretation would appear less likely for a clause placed firmly, indeed literally, in the 
middle of the Bill of Rights. 
46 The Poletown case is a vivid example of the somersault of pragmatism over ideology, 
with business co-opting government's condemnation power to its own ends, and Ralph Nader 
acting as the primary defender of private property. See Poletown Neighborhood Council v. 
City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 304 N.W.2d 455 (1987). For the view that public purpose 
determinations are not to be made so liberally, see People v. Chicago Land Clearance Comm'n, 
14 Ill. 2d 74, 84, 85, 150 N.E.2d 792, 798 (1958) (Klingbiel, J., dissenting) (arguing that it is 
not enough to show a general relationship to public health and welfare to satisfy public use); 
see also Meidinger, The "Public Uses" of Eminent Domain: History and Policy, 11 ENVTL. 
L. 1, 44-49 (1981) (arguing for a stricter public benefit test). 
47 See Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667 
(1975) [hereinafter Stewart, Reformation]. 
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inevitable flow of progress; the major public works projects rarely 
seem to be planned for locations inhabited by wealth and power. 48 
In the Poletown case,49 for example, the largest American corpora-
tion accurately presumed that it could enlist the powers of govern-
ment in its behalf to override the private property claims of lower-
income landowners. 50 With a few notable exceptions, like campaigns 
against public land acquisition by private inholders groups,51 eminent 
domain has achieved a comfortable familiarity and usefulness for its 
nominal ideological opponents on the Right. 
Whatever the political sociology of eminent domain, the law of it 
deserves clarification. Recently, moreover, it appears that the 
United States Supreme Court may have opened the door to a more 
articulated form of substantive review, using rational-relationship, 
means-end review language as the basis for testing the validity of 
governmental condemnation. 52 
A. Current Eminent Domain 
Although eminent domain case law presents many questions rais-
ing substantive review issues, current eminent domain wisdom typ-
ically does not articulate the distinctions noted here between au-
thority, purpose, rational basis, and the individual burden. 
Arguments in each of the four diagnostic substantive categories, 
explored further below,53 can be discerned in various condemnation 
cases,54 but virtually never are the inquiries clearly stated or coher-
ently analyzed. Accordingly, most attempts to obtain substantive 
merits review, as in the paradigm cases noted above, would almost 
surely suffer quick dismissal in many state courts despite their com-
pelling merits and, at least until recently, in virtually all federal 
courts. The cases would receive cursory scrutiny focusing on public 
purpose, and then rapid approval of the takings without considera-
tion of substantive rationality arguments. 55 
48 A review of the digests gives the definite impression that most eminent domain takings 
involve relatively small and powerless individual landowners. This intuitive impression seems 
more well-founded given the fact that reported cases do not reflect those takings where 
defendants lack the money to defend, much less appeal. 
49 410 Mich. 616, 304 N.W.2d 455 (1981). 
50 See supra notes 24, 34. 
61 The National Inholders Association appears to be the only substantial lobbying interest 
organization that makes opposition to eminent domain a major feature of its agenda. 
52 See infra notes 174, 178 and accompanying text. 
68 See infra note 191 and accompanying text. 
54 See, e.g., Oklahoma v. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 526 (1941). 
66 [d. at 527. 
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1. Public Use, Public Purpose-Missing the Point 
The trouble with most active legal challenges of eminent domain 
is that they focus on the question of "public use." Consequently, as 
Alexander Bickel used to say, they not only miss the point, but they 
miss the wrong point. 56 
According to the fifth amendment, "private property [shall not] 
be taken for public use without just compensation. "57 Historically, it 
is quite clear that this phrase was thought of as a further individual 
protection, beyond due process. 58 In practice, however, the clause 
has served to narrow the scope of review to the public-use inquiry. 
Within that circumscribed inquiry, modern necessities have made 
that test even less meaningful by reading public use to mean that 
takings must merely serve a public interest. 59 Thus, the language 
intended to be a further protection has itself served to weaken basic 
due process protections of property in the condemnation setting. 
Most lawyers who have actively tried to defend against eminent 
domain condemnations have targeted their efforts on some form of 
the public use issue, which, as we have seen, offers little chance for 
Atkinson represents a missed opportunity for the Court to make a substantive rationality 
analysis. The United States government had begun to condemn more than 150,000 acres of 
state and private lands for the construction of the Denison Dam Reservoir. The government's 
purpose was improved flood control, navigation, and power generation. Oklahoma argued that 
its consequential revenue losses would be larger, and hinted that the benefits (at least as to 
navigation) would be "[i]nconsequential and unsubstantial. " [d. at 515. 
As in so many other eminent domain cases, however, the parties' arguments and the Court's 
decision Ultimately came down to questions of public purpose. Justice Douglas, for a unanimous 
Court, wrote that the question of substantiality of flood control benefits "raise not constitu-
tional issues but questions of policy. They relate to the wisdom, need, and effectiveness of a 
particular project. They are therefore questions for the Congress not the courts . . . . a 
legislative judgment." [d. at 527. This sounds like a comment on substantive review. Douglas 
and the parties, however, were not addressing the means-end question, but rather whether 
the dam's flood control and navigation purposes served the basic interstate commerce function 
sufficiently to be deemed part of the rejected delegated federal power. [d. at 525-26. This 
interstate commerce question was far from a substantive means-end rationality review. 
56 Bickel used the jibe recurringly in classroom perorations in his Constitutional Law classes, 
Yale Law School, Fall Term 1965. 
57 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
58 This is evidenced by the fact that today's Supreme Court frequently cites the 1897 case 
of Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897), as incorporating 
the compensation clause into the fourteenth amendment. See Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, 
Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 160 (1980). The Chicago case marked the end of the twenty 
year reign of Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97 (1877), holding that due process does not 
require an independent restriction on the taking power, that is, the compensation requirement 
is not incorporated into the general notion of due process. While Chicago, 166 U.S. at 234-
35, seemed to hold the contrary, the Supreme Court today seems geared to the notion that 
the compensation clause itself has been strictly incorporated into the fourteenth amendment 
due process clause, which leaves open the academic question whether due process necessarily 
contains the notion of compensation independent of any explicit provision relating thereto. 
59 See Meidinger, supra note 46. 
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meaningful review. 60 When private corporations receive condemned 
private property for subsequent redevelopment, for example, or 
when private corporations exercise delegated powers with or with-
out designation as public utilities,61 the defense argument is made 
and lost in terms of the government's alleged impropriety in using 
the eminent domain power for private rather than public use. 
Beyond questions of the "privateness" of those who will use the 
land, the same rhetoric is also levelled at situations in which con-
demnation defendants wish to dispute the appropriateness and le-
gitimacy of governmental takings purposes. When takings are 
sought for parkland, scenic easements, historical preservation, or 
other "aesthetic" reasons, they may be opposed as "improper public 
uses." By using this latter phrase, the defendants probably wish to 
emphasize the impropriety element: not that the uses are private, 
but rather that they are improper objects of public police power 
activity. The defendants can win if governmental purpose is im-
proper for lack of delegated authority,62 or because it violates some 
particular explicit or implicit constraint on governmental action. 63 
But, absent such specific flaws, the public-use issue offers little 
support for the defense against eminent domain. 
The public-use attack on eminent domain was predestined to lose. 
From before the Revolution, the public-use rubric has been extended 
to allow even private parties, exercising delegated powers, to con-
demn riparian lands of their neighbors in order to construct private 
mill dams and similar economic developments. 64 Through the nine-
teenth century, such grants of condemnation power expanded tre-
mendously, and were upheld by the courts, as a function of tradi-
tional state support for the market economy.65 Direct public use was 
not necessary; the more a court sought out "indirect" public use in 
order to justify such takings, the more it merely was looking for any 
60 See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
61 Scudder v. Trenton Delaware Falls Co., 1 N.J. Eq. 694 (Ct. Ch. 1832); TVA v. Welch, 
327 U.S. 546 (1946); Head v. Amoskeag Mfg., 113 U.S. 9 (1885); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 
26 (1954). In even some cases today, corporations are given the statutory power to condemn 
needed real property, without certification as public utilities. See, e.g., MICH. STAT. ANN. 
§ 13.145(101) (Callaghan 1987) (condemnation power for mining industry). 
62 See United States v. An Easement and Right-of-Way Over Two Tracts of Land, 246 F. 
Supp. 263 (W.D. Ky. 1965), aff'd, 375 F.2d 120 (6th Cir. 1967); United States v. Three Tracts 
of Land, 377 F. Supp. 631 (N.D. Ala. 1974); Rainbow Realty Co. v. TVA, 124 F. Supp. 436 
(M.D. Tenn. 1954). 
6" Brown v. United States, 263 U.S. 78 (1923). 
64 See, e.g., Head v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 9 (1885) (mill dam). 
65 For an excellent historical analysis, see Meidinger, supra note 46, at 43. 
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public interest or public benefit. 66 "[I]f the proposed improvement 
tends to enlarge the resources, increase the industrial energies, and 
promote the productive power of any considerable number of the 
community, the use is public. "67 Those cases where courts did strike 
down particular takings as "private uses" seem to reflect judicial 
disagreement with the social policies being advanced, or disagree-
ments that such takings would provide real public benefits.68 On its 
own terms, the public-use limitation therefore does not seem to have 
much doctrinal solidity; it does serve, however, as a stalking horse 
representing other questions of public purpose. In modern practice, 
moreover, "the main question is not whether a taking is for a public 
purpose, but whether it is for a legitimate purpose."69 
But even if the challenges of the "publicness" of use and purpose 
are reinterpreted as reviews of the legitimacy of an action's public 
purpose, they still miss the point. It should be noted that the real-
life motivations of participants in a condemnation challenge usually 
are focused on quite different issues from the "privateness" of sub-
sequent uses or the abstract legitimacy of a particular public pur-
pose. What they are concerned with are the merits of the condem-
nation action and its effect on themselves. In the case of condemnees, 
they may be motivated by a realistic estimation of how much they 
will lose in the transaction. Just compensation, even in the hands of 
a sympathetic jury, may fail to compensate condemned landowners 
for a wide range of felt losses-sentimental value, some forms of 
ongoing business value, the costs of relocation in financial and emo-
tional terms-these are some of the areas of private loss that go 
uncompensated in eminent domain. 70 
Further, many challenges to eminent domain today are supported 
not only by affected landowners, but also by others whose land is 
not being condemned who oppose particular governmental projects 
66 [d. at 43. 
67 [d. at 49. 
68 As a negative example, only one federal case striking down a state condemnation action 
on public-use grounds appears to exist, and it is actually a case defending a corporate interest 
in prior condemned lands. See id. at 30-31. 
69 [d. at 43. 
70 The number of condemnation cases that go to trial on the issue of compensation would 
seem to reflect an empirical or intuitive conviction on the part of defense attorneys that juries 
are likely to grant more generous assessments of just compensation than are contained in the 
settlement offers based on land appraisals made outside of court proceedings. As to damages 
not compensated, see supra note 7. Cf. Meidinger, supra note 46, at 43 n.161 (citing Stoebuck, 
A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV. 553, 554 (1972) (implying that 
eminent domain condemnees are generally pleased with their lot». 
684 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 16:661 
on various grounds and wish to use the eminent domain forum to 
raise the issues. When the quaintly named Courtesy Sandwich Shop 
decided to fight land condemnation for construction of the giant 
World Trade Center, for example, it was supported by commercial 
property owners who were not being condemned but who felt 
strongly that there was no need for new office space which would 
compete with their holdings. 71 
Both classes of opponents to eminent domain actions-condemnees 
and interested non-condemnees alike-thus would be delighted to 
be able to raise arguments on the merits beyond public use and 
purpose. Pragmatically, any further argument would bolster their 
positions. Moreover, many eminent domain projects are susceptible 
to arguments about the rationality of governmental decisions. Al-
though defendants' arguments about rationality can often be dis-
cerned in the media coverage of such controversies,72 and sometimes 
even in the shadows of eminent domain opinions ,73 in the open judicial 
forum they collapse back into arguments and holdings on public use 
and purpose. 
Berman v. Parker74 provides a superb example of that double 
missing of points. In that classic case, the District of Columbia's 
condemnation power was used to take a large part of southwest 
Washington's rundown land for urban redevelopment. Defendant 
Berman, who owned a medium-sized department store in the midst 
of the tract, was a condemnee who resisted all the way to the 
Supreme Court. His property was not blighted; it would neverthe-
less be taken by the government, levelled, and turned over to a 
private redevelopment corporation to be used for privately owned 
housing units and commercial uses. 75 
71 Courtesy Sandwich Shop v. Port of New York Auth., 12 N.Y.2d 379,190 N.E.2d 402, 
(1962), appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 78 (1963). Even though other parties may be financing the 
litigation, it proceeds, of course, under the name of the condemnees. 
72 See, e.g., Big Utility and Little Town are Battling A Dam Proposal in Vermont, N.Y. 
Times, Oct. 5, 1980, at 56, col. 3; State Seizes Building Site Next to Carey's L.I. Home, N. Y. 
Times, Nov. 10, 1980, at 11, col. 1; see also N. Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1980, at 11, col. 1; N.Y. 
Times, Nov. 12, 1980, at 11, col. 1. 
73 In Courtesy Sandwich Shop, Justice Van Voorhis noted in dissent: "Respondent's brief 
points to the quantity of space occupied in New York City for foreign trade, and the impos-
sibility of condensing it into [an] area of 13 blocks, and questions by what principle private 
firms are to be selected for location there .... " 12 N. Y.2d at 394, 190 N.E.2d at 408 (Van 
Voorhis, J., dissenting). 
74 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
75 Berman was a fifth amendment case because it arose in the District of Columbia. Federal 
courts extended public use reviews to state condemnations, under the fourteenth amendment, 
after Missouri v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403 (1896). 
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As Berman proceeded through the courts, its dominant arguments 
centered around public use, and that is how it is usually remembered. 
Stating what had by then become obvious, the Court remarked: 
The role of the judiciary in determining whether [the condem-
nation power] is being exercised for a public purpose is an ex-
tremely narrow one .... Once the object is within the authority 
of Congress, the right to realize it through the exercise of emi-
nent domain is clear . . . .76 
On those terms, it was hardly surprising that the Court ultimately 
held the taking valid as a matter of fifth amendment due process. 77 
The purported prohibition against private uses was thus a phan-
tom. 78 In a society so characterized by the admixture of private and 
public power, if a project is directed at accomplishing a public pur-
pose or public benefit that lies within the government's scope of 
authority, then eminent domain can be utilized regardless of whether 
private persons profit from or control the subsequent land use. If 
the legislature declared that urban renewal was of direct or indirect 
public benefit in assuring housing for its citizens (clearly a proper 
general welfare purpose within the government's powers), that 
would be enough.79 The same could be said beyond housing, to the 
ends of general economic development. 8o The scope of permissible 
governmental purposes is broad, and, given the presumption of gov-
ernmental validity, the major obstacle to upholding such takings is 
only their novelty of subject matter. 81 
76 348 u.s. at 33. 
77 See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
78 "The role of the judiciary in determining whether [eminent domain] is being exercised for 
a public purpose is an extremely narrow one .... Public safety, public health, morality, peace 
and quiet, law and order-these are some of the more conspicuous examples of the traditional 
application of the police power . . . . Yet they merely illustrate the scope of the power and 
do not delimit it." Berman, 348 U.S. at 32. Some scholars had thought it was alive until then. 
See Comment, The Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain: An Advance Requiem, 58 
YALE L.J. 599 (1949). 
79 "Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the means by which it will be 
attained is also for Congress to determine. Here one of the means chosen is the use of private 
enterprise for redevelopment of the area ... [And] the means of executing the project [is] 
for Congress and Congress alone to determine . . . once the public purpose has been estab-
lished." Berman, 348 U.S. at 33. 
80 The Berman renewal project resulted in a higher level of commercial and office devel-
opment and some housing, though it appears that few of the prior low income residents of the 
district would have been able to remain in the far more expensive units that replaced the old. 
The general economic development purposes, however, were clearly precedented by the mill 
dam and the TVA cases. See EDF v. TVA, 371 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Tenn. 1973), a/I'd, 492 
F.2d 466 (6th Cir. 1974); Head v. Amoskeag Mfg., 113 U.S. 9 (1885). 
81 The difficulty that Oakland, California would have in condemning its wanderlust profes-
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But what did Mr. Berman really want to tell the courts? In part, 
surely he wanted to argue that he considered this a stupid taking-
it did not make sense. It did undoubtedly irk him that someone else 
might reap the future profits of his parcel. A major part of his 
common-sense argument was, however, that, because his property 
was not blighted, it did not logically serve the public purpose to 
redevelop it, especially in light of the costs the public would have to 
pay to buy it, tear it down, and rebuild it. Analytically, this argument 
does not deny that such redevelopment might ultimately serve public 
ends. Rather, it asserts that it was, in one sense of the word,82 
"unnecessary": given the costs to the public and Mr. Berman, it was 
not rational to choose to condemn and redevelop his unblighted 
property rather than just leave it in status quo. If it ain't broke, 
don't fix it. 
This contention, though it might not have been a winning argu-
ment,83 surely got to the guts of the dispute and deserved thought. 
The justices, however, never confronted the question of specific 
rationality, that is, whether the condemnation of this particular par-
cel served the public redevelopment purpose. 84 They might well have 
been able to so find: the needs of area-wide development probably 
explained the Berman taking. But the decision dealt with means-
end rationality in relentlessly general terms, and the argument as 
to specific rationality ultimately was finessed away via the presump-
tion of validity. 85 
The same failure to give due recognition to the central merits of 
a project can be seen in other "public purpose" cases. In Courtesy 
Sandwich Shop,86 the rhetoric of proper public use, purpose, and 
powers dominated the court's opinions and scholarly commentary: 
sional sports teams would be more likely to lie in questions about municipal authority, in light 
of the novelty of the issue, rather than in public use or rationality. 
82 See infra note 105. 
83 Berman would probably have been unable to show a sufficient lack of rational basis, given 
the presumption of validity and the real-life practical demands inherent in redeveloping a 
large sector of rundown urban terrain. 
84 
Property may of course be taken for this redevelopment which, standing by itself, is 
innocuous and unoffending. But . . . it is the need of the area as a whole which 
Congress and its agencies are evaluating .... The argument pressed upon us is ... 
a plea to substitute the landowner's standard of the public need for the standard 
prescribed by Congress .... But ... community redevelopment programs need not 
... be on a piecemeal basis-lot by lot, building by building. 
Berman, 348 U.S. at 35. 
85 Id. at 32-33, 35. 
86 12 N.Y.2d 379, 190 N.E.2d 402 (1963). 
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could the N ew York Port Authority use eminent domain to build an 
office building to be used by private corporations from all over the 
world? The condemnees wanted to make a number of substantive 
arguments on the merits beyond public use, but were largely by-
passed by the court. The Authority had been delegated powers for 
the purpose of encouraging efficient port activity and commerce,87 
which all parties seem to have accepted as a proper purpose. Given 
this specific delegation, the condemnees tried to argue that the 
construction of huge office buildings not directly related to port 
activity did not serve the proper port purposes. 
This claim had two aspects: first, office construction per se was 
too far removed from direct port purposes to be permitted as a 
delegated purpose; second, it would not rationally achieve that pur-
pose-a rational-basis argument. The court defined its way out of 
the first argument by holding that an indirect linkage to the proper 
purpose was enough,88 and avoided the second by merely presuming 
that linkage to exist. According to the court, "[the] improvement of 
the Port of N ew York by facilitating the flow of commerce and 
centralizing all activity incident thereto [is] a public purpose sup-
porting the condemnation of property for any activity functionally 
related to that purpose. "89 This statement is not addressed primarily 
to the purpose, however, but to the "functional relationship" of 
means to ends, a relationship that was presumed rather than ex-
amined. 
Yet the reality of Courtesy Sandwich Shop is that opponents to 
the World Trade Center thought they could show that the project 
would create an office glut. 90 They argued that, even if office space 
served port purposes indirectly, no rational planner would build so 
much new space given the amount of existing office space and the 
private and public costs of building the new. The new space, in other 
words, was "not necessary."91 But, whatever the strength of these 
substantive arguments that constituted the real merits of the con-
troversy, the court never gave the defendants a chance to present 
87Id. at 387, 190 N.E.2d at 403. 
88 Id. at 390-91, 190 N.E.2d at 406. 
89 Id. at 389, 190 N.E.2d at 405 (emphasis added). 
00 See O'Donnell, Skyscraper Controversy, Wall St. J., March 5, 1964, at 12, cols. 2-3. 
91 Implicit in this latter argument is the premise that there was no particular reason to have 
the office space clustered at one site; the relevant office space market was city-wide. See 
Courtesy Sandwich, 12 N. Y.2d at 194-95, 190 N.E.2d at 408-09 (Van Voorhis, J., dissenting). 
The Pgrt Authority did not try to make the counter-argument, instead relying successfully 
on judicial reluctance to review the decision SUbstantively. 
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relevant evidence on them; all arguments had to be played through 
the superficial discussion of public purpose. 
In these cases,92 the challenges do not appear to have been moti-
vated by aversion to the privateness of subsequent usage, or to the 
fact that it was the government qua government that was taking 
the action. Those arguments just provided the issues that courts 
would at least listen to, the issues of public use and proper purpose. 
So the judicial litigation of these major eminent domain cases has 
continued on, somewhat beside the point. 
Courts do, of course, require that eminent domain actions be 
grounded upon a proper public purpose. When a government tries 
to condemn private property without any such defined purpose, it 
will be enjoined. In Cincinnati v. Vester,93 a group of urban land-
owners objected to a condemnation action in which the city declined 
to define the purpose as street widening (which would have been 
valid but which the city did not propose to do), nor would the city 
define any possible rationale for excess condemnation beyond the 
basic parcel required to achieve a project goal. 94 The Supreme Court 
insisted that a valid purpose be defined contemporaneously with the 
taking: 
To define is to limit, and that which is left unlimited, and is to 
be determined only by such future action as the City may here-
after decide upon, is not defined. The City's contention is so 
broad that it defeats itself. It is not enough that property may 
be devoted hereafter to a public use for which there could have 
been an appropriate condemnation.95 
The Vester Court did not strike down excess condemnation or gov-
ernmental recoupment of land inflation values as improper; it merely 
affirmed the necessity of an articulated, valid takings purpose, and 
the vulnerability of condemnations like Vester's that lacked such a 
declared purpose. 
Despite this preoccupation with the public-purpose inquiry, or 
perhaps because of it, judicial discussions often reveal glimmers of 
substantive rationality review behind the purpose language. Like 
the ambiguity lurking behind the word "arbitrary," the lack of ju-
dicial clarity in defining the public-purpose inquiry invited indiscrim-
inate inclusiveness in its application. 
92 Other cases follow this pattern. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 263 U.S. 78 (1923); 
TVA v. Welch, 327 U.S. 546 (1946). 
93 281 U.S. 439 (1930). 
94 [d. at 443. 
95 [d. at 448. 
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In the course of the Vester Court's opinion striking down the 
Cincinnati taking, for example, it is clear that the gravamen of the 
condemnees' defense was not merely that the city had failed to 
declare which particular delegated purpose was being addressed, 
but also that the additional taking did not serve any of the potentially 
relevant purposes. 96 The Court seemed to incorporate that substan-
tive inquiry into its discussion of purposes. 97 Nevertheless, it ulti-
mately restricted the basis of its holding nullifying the taking to the 
simple absence of a declared purpose. 98 Vester thus illustrates how 
the public-purpose inquiry can swallow up straightforward consid-
eration of the substantive issue of rational means and nexus. It also 
demonstrates how the purpose inquiry can be confused with, or 
subsume, the authority inquiry as well. 99 In either case, courts are 
able to avoid the difficulties of discussing difficult analytical questions 
by resolutely keeping their holdings pinned to the misplaced point. 
2. Getting to the Point in State Condemnation Cases 
State eminent domain cases offer significantly more variety than 
federal cases, and in many of them there can be discerned a willing-
ness to review the rationality of the condemnation choices of agencies 
or legislatures. To be sure, in a large number of cases state decisions 
echo the federal courts' severe limitation of judicial review to ques-
tions of delegated authority and public use, both questions to be 
interpreted deferentially in favor of project validity.lOO Some even 
hint that the latter issue is unreviewable.101 But, in many other 
cases, state courts undertake substantive review of condemnation 
takings beyond questions of public use and purpose, including ex-
press inquiries into bad faith, arbitrariness, and "necessity. "102 
The state decisions reviewing condemnations on rationality merits 
fall into both categories defined in the paradigms presented here, 
the factual implausibility, means-end model and the rational alter-
96 See id. at 447. 
97 See id. 
98 Id. at 448. 
99 See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
100 See, e.g., Coastal Indus. Water Auth. v. Celanese Corp., 592 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. 1979) 
(legislature's determination of public purpose is conclusive absent arbitrary or unjust action). 
101 See, e.g., City of Pipestone v. Halbersma, 294 N.W.2d 271 (Minn. 1980); Monarch Chem-
ical Works, Inc. v. City of Omaha, 203 Neb. 33, 277 N.W.2d 423 (1979). 
102 In re Heidelberg for Footpath, Alleyway and Bridge Purposes, 53 Pa. Commw. 321, 428 
A.2d 282 (1981); Brodeur v. City of Claremont, 121 N.H. 209, 427 A.2d 509 (1981); City of 
Atlanta v. First National Bank of Atlanta, 246 Ga. 424, 271 S.E.2d 821 (1980). 
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natives model. In some of these state eminent domain cases, the 
defendant condemnees argued that the particular condemnation ac-
tions would not serve the purported project purposes-a substan-
tive, factual means-end claim. 103 Other cases have raised the second 
question of alternatives, reviewing whether, in light of the injury to 
protesting parties, less injurious governmental choices were avail-
able and preferable. 104 
Many of the state cases in which eminent domain decisions are 
given critical substantive review focus on the concept of "necessity," 
a frequently encountered element of state takings reviews that is 
exceedingly rare in federal cases.105 With or without specific statu-
tory or constitutional limitations, a number of state courts have felt 
at liberty to test and strike down a wide variety of condemnation 
attempts as "unnecessary." They have refused, for example, to allow 
the taking of a particular site for warehousing because it was deemed 
unsuitable, they have forced re-alignment of a particular highway 
condemnation, and they have restricted certain condemnations to 
less-than-fee-simple takings. 106 
Analytically, the word "necessity" is not comprised of a single 
concept. It may raise questions of comparative need for a particular 
parcel in light of alternatives available;107 or doubt whether the 
property is sufficiently needed to accomplish the ends in light of the 
particular private burdens, a comparative weighing remarkably sim-
ilar to that in some regulatory takings cases;108 or questions of 
103 See, e.g., Pipestone, 294 N.W.2d at 274 (holding that evidence of means-end reasonable-
ness would establish necessity). 
104 Madison County v. Elford, 203 Mont. 293, 661 P.2d 1266 (1983) (failure to evaluate 
alternative highway route, in light of private injury, renders condemnation improper); State 
v. Superior Court, 128 Wash. 79, 222 P. 208 (1924) (alternate zone would be less harmful to 
public and private interests); State v. 2.072 Acres, 652 P.2d 465 (Alaska 1982); Schara v. 
Anaconda Co., 187 Mont. 377, 386-87, 610 P.2d 132, 137 (1980) (private mining company's 
delegated use of condemnation power upheld after consideration of condemnee's injuries and 
alternative), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 920 (1981); see also cases cited at infra notes 106, 114. 
105 See, e.g., Knappen v. Division of Admin., 352 So. 2d 885 (Fla. App. 1977); King County 
v. Burhen, 29 Wash. App. 497, 628 P.2d 1341 (1981); Falkner v. Northern States Power Co., 
75 Wis. 2d 116, 248 N.W.2d 885 (Wis. Ct. App. 1977). 
106 See, e.g., Sapp v. Hillsborough County, 262 So. 2d 256,257 (Fla. 1972) (determining from 
aerial maps that road "could and properly should be constructed through [an] unoccupied area 
thereby saving ... [houses] as well as ... money"); State v. Superior Court, 128 Wash. 79, 
222 P. 208 (1924) (voiding as arbitrary the taking ofpubJicly beneficial warehouse for highway); 
People v. Y.W.C.A. of Springfield, 86 Ill. 2d 219, 427 N.E.2d 70 (1981) (taking was "grossly 
excessive" in light of need); see also cases cited infra note 114 (reducing attempted takings 
of fee simple to lesser interests). 
107 Schara v. Anaconda Co., 187 Mont. 377, 610 P.2d 132 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 920 
(1981). 
108 See, e.g., Topham's Petition, 58 Pa. D. & C. 649 (1946) (acquisition of gravel through 
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whether the governmental project is not actually served by the 
particular taking. l09 In some state cases, furthermore, there is also 
a hint that the court regards the governmental project as itself 
unnecessary.110 In each example, such holdings are interesting be-
cause they, except perhaps the last, require the courts to examine 
the nexus between the substantive qualities of the condemnation and 
legislative purposes. III 
In fact, the state courts' substantive inquiries in many cases seem 
to take on the most sensitive kind of judicial review of governmental 
decisions, even questioning whether legislative purposes could have 
been better accomplished by different governmental means. Thus, 
when the potential inquiry to the property owner is severe, the court 
in effect may undertake a "less-drastic-means" analysis as a matter 
of due process. 112 If a road could be re-aligned to minimize a private 
property owner's harm without compromising safety and efficiency, 
it might be so ordered. 113 If the taking of less-than-fee-simple ease-
ments would serve governmental purposes equally well with less 
injury to the condemnee, that too may be ordered. 114 
Such judicial reviews obviously invade the precinct of official dis-
cretionary judgment. They do not necessarily ignore, however, the 
principles of judicial deference to governmental decisionmaking. As 
one court explained, "the scope of review is narrow," but deference 
is not absolute: "[the legislative determination] is not completely 
eminent domain proceedings is only justified if the gravel cannot be obtained by contract at 
reasonable prices); Mayo v. Windels, 255 A.D. 22, 5 N.Y.S.2d 690 (N.Y. App. 1938) (taking 
of property beyond that required for particular purpose is unconstitutional); Stearns v. City 
of Barre, 73 Vt. 281, 50 A. 1086 (1901); Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894) (discussed infra 
text accompanying note 247). 
109 See, e.g., City of Pipestone v. Halbersma, 294 N.W.2d 271 (Minn. 1980); Falkner v. 
Northern States Power Co., 75 Wis. 2d 116, 248 N.W.2d 885 (Wis. Ct. App. 1977); Highland 
Realty Co. v. Indianapolis Airport Auth., 182 Ind. App. 439, 395 N.E.2d 1259 (1979). 
110 See, e.g., Peavy-Wilson Lumber Co. v. County of Brevard, 159 Fla. 311, 31 So. 2d 483 
(1947) (public necessity justifying a taking by eminent domain did not exist where county only 
condemned land for public hunting and fishing purposes); Salt Lake County v. Ramoselli, 567 
P.2d 182 (Utah 1977); People v. Y.W.C.A. of Springfield, 86 Ill. 2d 219,427 N.E.2d 70 (1981). 
111 See supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
112 See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
113 State v. 2.072 Acres, 652 P.2d 465 (Alaska 1982); Schara v. Anaconda, 187 Mont. 377, 
610 P.2d 132 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 920 (1981): "[C]hoice of location ... is to be 
overturned only ... [if there is] clear and convincing proof that the decision was excessive 
or arbitrary, and an abuse of discretion will be found if the condemnor fails to study alterna-
tives." Id. at 137, see also cases cited supra note 106. 
114 See Seadade Indus. v. Florida Power & Light Co., 232 So. 2d 46 (Fla. App. 1970); Silver 
Bow County v. Hafer, 166 Mont. 330, 532 P.2d 691 (1975); State v. Jeanerette Lumber & 
Shingle Co., 350 So. 2d 847 (La. 1977); Hallock v. State, 32 N.Y.2d 599,604-05,300 N.E.2d 
430, 432, 347 N. Y.2d 60, 63-64 (1973). 
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immune from judicial reviews. There is a limit beyond which the 
legislature (or its delegate) cannot go .... "115 Where condemnees 
could marshal sufficient evidence to outweigh the presumption of 
governmental validity, the state courts have often been willing to 
listen, and the test they apply for necessity amounts to a rational-
person standard remarkably similar to the Universal Camera sub-
stantial evidence rubric: courts will strike down a taking decision if 
they believe that the decisionmaking officials could not reasonably 
support the taking on the facts and standards before them. 116 
The remarkable thing about the state court opinions undertaking 
substantive condemnation review is not that this body of cases ex-
ists, in contrast to the relative lack of such cases in federal court. 117 
That disparity may be explained by the fact that some of the subject 
states have some specific constitutional or statutory invitation for 
such review,118 or may also be explained by the fact that state court 
judges are more leery of state bureaucrats than federal courts are 
of the federal bureaucracy. 119 What is more notable, however, is that 
the practice of substantive review has apparently not caused major 
problems between the tripartite divisions of state government. Some 
state courts have entered into substantive review of the merits of 
legislative and executive condemnation decisions, and their state 
governments have survived. Those courts have apparently not 
"usurped" the decisionmaking function; indeed, they generally defer 
to governmental choices, but occasionally reverse, in the same way 
that federal courts handle administrative law cases. Where state 
trial-level courts act excessively, appellate courts rein them in. 120 
115 See, e.g., Knappen v. Division of Admin., 352 So. 2d 885, 891 (Fla. App. 1977) (noting 
that "[ajlthough a 'broad discretion' is vested in the condemnor, ... the evidence adduced 
... was insufficient to withstand the challenge") (citation omitted). 
116 See id. 
117 "It is not for the [federal] courts to review the necessity of a taking." United States v. 
416.8 Acres of Land, 514 F.2d 627, 631 (7th Cir. 1975). Accord Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 
26,32--33 (1954); United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 247 (1946); United States v. Certain 
Real Estate, Nashville, Tenn., 217 F.2d 920,924 (6th Cir. 1954); United States v. 80.5 Acres 
in Shasta County, Cal., 448 F.2d 980, 983 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. 2606.84 Acres in 
Tarrant County, Texas, 432 F.2d 1286, 1289 (5th Cir. 1970). But see Washington Metro. Area 
Transit Auth. v. One Parcel of Land in Square 164, C.A. No. 75-0056 (D.D.C. Aug. 14, 1975) 
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file); United States v. Certain Parcels of Land in Philadelphia, 
215 F.2d 140 (3d Cir. 1954). 
118 See, e.g., State Transp. Bd. v. May, 137 Vt. 320, 322-24, 403 A.2d 267, 269 (1979). 
119 Knappen, 352 So. 2d at 891. "The reason that Florida courts have consistently held that 
a judicial inquiry is permissible into the necessity of taking stems from their awareness of the 
'tunnel vision' that so often plagues a bureaucracy which deems itself immune from judicial 
review." [d. 
120 See, e.g., City of Atlanta v. First Nat'l Bank of Atlanta, 154 Ga. App. 658, 269 S.E.2d 
878, rev'd, 246 Ga. 424, 271 S.E.2d 821 (1980). 
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The experience in the states, then, seems to be that substantive 
review of eminent domain decisions is not an impossibly difficult 
undertaking, nor a slippery slope to judicial usurpation of separated 
powers, even in the more sensitive realm of comparative-alternatives 
rationality analysis. 
3. Of Necessity 
The state cases not only demonstrate the viability of legal systems 
in which substantive eminent domain review occurs, but also that 
the concept of "necessity" deserves further analysis. Semantically, 
the term "necessity" conjures up images of subjective political de-
cisionmaking-terrain that judges well wish to avoid. The determi-
nation of "needs" implies a weighing of varying public priorities and 
factual assessments that is best left to legislative judgment. 
Necessity, though it is a fairly common form of substantive review 
on the merits in state eminent domain cases,121 is rejected as a basis 
for substantive review in most federal condemnation cases. Federal 
courts, unlike state courts, consistently declare their refusal to re-
view questions of "necessity" in condemnation cases: 
The necessity for appropriating private property for public use 
is not a judicial question. l22 [T]he necessity and expediency of 
the taking are legislative questions, no matter who may be 
charged with their decision, and a hearing thereon is not essen-
tial to due process in the sense of the Fourteenth Amendment. 123 
That the necessity and expediency of taking property for public 
use is a legislative and not a judicial question is not open to 
discussion. 124 
The treatises repeat the federal prohibition125 while recognizing 
necessity review in the states, a particularly paradoxical situation 
because both lines of eminent domain jurisprudence derive from the 
same roots. 126 "Necessity" may have several different meanings, 
however, which, upon further analysis, may show that the seemingly 
contradictory state and federal positions do not lie so far apart. 
To examine this spectrum of necessity arguments, consider a va-
riety of possibilities arising from a municipal airport project involv-
ing eminent domain. One necessity argument that a condemnee could 
121 See supra note 105. 
122 Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700, 709 (1922). 
123 Bragg v. Weaver, 251 U.S. 57, 58 (1919). 
124 Joslin Mfg. Co. v. Providence, 262 U.S. 668 (1923). 
125 See lA NICHOLS, supra note 7, § 4.11. 
126 1 NICHOLS, supra note 7, § 1.41; lA NICHOLS, supra note 7, § 4.9. 
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try to make is that the entire project was "unnecessary"; in other 
words, an overall drastic attack on the basic governmental decision. 
This version of a necessity inquiry is not likely to attract judicial 
review in either state or federal court systems. The general decision 
to proceed with an airport so clearly involves such a complex bal-
ancing of so many factual considerations and sUbjective policies of 
planning, growth, transport, and subsidies that it can scarcely be 
made fit for judicial parsing. As an ultimate overall, generic conclu-
sion, it is truly a "legislative question." 
Another type of necessity inquiry would concede the need for an 
airport, but challenge the municipality's choice of the particular site 
because other equally attractive sites were available. This version 
might be called a "preference necessity" argument: the chosen site 
is alleged to be "unnecessary" in the sense that the city could just 
as easily have gone elsewhere. This necessity argument is also likely 
to be a loser in both state and federal courts, not because of its 
legislative complexity but because of the closeness of the question. 
At times, it is the job of legislatures and the political process to 
draw indefensible lines, to make close choices between reasonable 
options that have no clear distinctions on the merits. In order to 
review such close siting choices on the merits, courts would have to 
probe into such intricate detail that reviews would resemble trials 
de novo. When a governmental eminent domain choice is made be-
tween such reasonably close options, it is again a legislative question. 
Both of these examples illustrate exercises of legislative "wisdom" 
which courts understandably refrain from scrutinizing.127 But what 
of a further kind of necessity argument, a claim that a parcel chosen 
for condemnation is not necessary in the sense that it does not serve 
any relevant purpose? Suppose a condemnee's parcel is located two 
miles from the nearest airport runway or terminal. The defendant 
may then argue a lack of "means-end necessity," not attacking the 
idea of an airport itself, nor a municipal preference between close 
choices, but alleging a basic absence of relevant airport-connected 
use for the condemned parcel. 
This latter form of necessity defense would seem to make basic 
common sense, and is far more fitting and ripe for judicial review. 
The question is not subtle. It is not sUbjective. It is not complex. 
All parties would have to agree that the avowed purpose of the 
condemnation is for airport development; the only question would 
127 The "wisdom" inquiry parallels the "necessity" question. When a court avoids reviewing 
"wisdom," it probably indicates these first two types of subjectivity. 
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be whether this particular condemnation serves that purpose. Hav-
ing gone forward with proof of a lack of such factual support in the 
fact of their parcel's two-mile geographical separation from the air-
port, the defendants should be able to shift the burden to the gov-
ernment to justify its choice. The airport authority then might show 
that the parcel is needed for a radio antenna, a weather station, a 
fuel storage dump, a radar scanner, a noise buffer zone, or some 
other airport-relevant use for that parcel. But if there is no such 
articulable use that serves the airport purpose, what peril lies in 
having the court nullify that particular taking? 
In fact, despite their protestations, federal courts as well as state 
courts do undertake this third, means-end version of necessity re-
view. As a District of Columbia court said in reviewing the transit 
authority'S choice of a subway elevator site: 
It is well settled that the "necessity" of the taking is not a 
cognizable defense and is beyond the scope of judicial review 
[citing the standard cases] .... However, where the defendant 
can demonstrate ... "absolute lack of necessity," judicial inter-
vention is proper. 128 
What was the difference in meaning between mere unreviewable 
lack of necessity and "absolute" lack of necessity? It would appear 
that the first phrase referred to close-call preference necessity, and 
the latter to a basic means-end necessity. In reviewing the "absolute 
lack of necessity," the District of Columbia court then moved quite 
matter-of-factly into a variety of rational-basis inquiries. 129 
This pragmatic interpretation of necessity review is buttressed by 
the constitutional connotations attached to it in the treatises. 130 The 
state courts reflect the same distinction in declining necessity review 
for governmental choices between reasonably close alternatives, but 
reviewing means-end necessity situations. 131 
A fourth form of necessity review is also found in the state cases: 
a least-drastic-means necessity test. What if, for example, the air-
port authority has decided to condemn the site of an ongoing busi-
ness, to be razed for an airport parking lot, when another equally 
useful, undeveloped tract lies close at hand? This situation is not a 
128 Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. One Parcel of Land in Square 164, C.A. No. 
75-0056 (D.D.C. Aug. 14, 1975) (LEXIS, Genfed library Dist. file) (citing standard cases and 
NICHOLS, supra note 7). 
129 The court considered the location of elevators as serving the access of handicapped 
persons, as well as alternative designs. Id. 
130 See, e.g., lA NICHOLS, supra note 7, § 4.11[1]. 
131 See supra notes 104-08. 
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mere preference necessity nor a means-end necessity question. 132 
Instead, the condemnees assert that, in light of the drastic effects 
on their business property, and the availability of cheap, nondisrup-
tive takings parcels nearby, a rational governmental official would 
not choose to condemn their site. The government may rebut by 
showing reasons for doing so. If it cannot do so, numerous state 
courts have not hesitated to prohibit the more drastic taking. 133 No 
a priori reason is evident why federal courts could not do likewise. 
The least-drastic-means test in administrative law appears to be 
a creation of the federal courts, deriving in the regulatory setting 
from the Lawton v. Steele Court's declaration that governmental 
impositions upon private rights would be held to judicial scrutiny as 
to whether "the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplish-
ment of the [public] purpose and not unduly oppressive upon indi-
viduals. "134 Federal condemnation courts have been most reluctant 
to take on this fourth form of necessity test. Analytically, however, 
it represents a very different question from the overall project-
necessity challenge and the close-call preference inquiry. In fact, it 
does not seem semantically appropriate to call it a necessity question 
at all. Instead, it resembles a kind of comparative rational-basis 
inquiry that can be posed in classic Universal Camera Corp. v. 
NLRB135 terms, fit and ready for deferential but substantive review: 
given the injury to the affected individual, and the array of less 
drastic available alternatives, could a rational official decisionmaker 
have so decided? 
In sum, some forms of "necessity" inquiry are clearly not appro-
priate for judicial review because they raise legislative questions. 
Others, however, can and do receive court scrutiny because they 
raise important and justiciable questions about private property 
rights. Yet, because they can be defined as "necessity" questions, 
some courts will ignore these latter cases as well. The term "neces-
sity" may not be generally useful; the review process it connotes in 
some cases, however, may be. By asking instead what particular 
form of inquiry is being made, courts can substantially clarify what 
is and what is not appropriate for judicial review. As so often in the 
132 That is, the condemnation will ultimately serve the proper purpose, but at unreasonable 
cost to all. 
133 See supra note 104. This analytically includes cases where courts have compelled the 
zero alternative, that is, the alternative of no taking at all where private loss appeared greater 
thar any governmental need. 
134 Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894). See infra notes 247-49. 
135 See text accompanying infra notes 223-33. 
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murky swamp of eminent domain doctrine, judges must remember 
to practice semantic hygiene in order to accomplish their mission. 
B. Possibilities for the Next Generation of Federal Eminent 
Domain Cases 
The anomaly of eminent domain is that important substantive 
issues of private rights like those raised in the condemnation para-
digms above136 are virtually insulated from judicial review. Condem-
nation takings, with their drastic effects on private interests, are 
even less scrutinized than governmental actions generally. Indeed, 
the judicial insulation of eminent domain only has equivalents in the 
far more portentous fields of national security, international rela-
tions, and political questions. 137 Especially where so many condem-
nations occur in the much less august settings of public utilities 
takings, or at the lower levels of municipal government, it would be 
surprising if the wall of deference surrounding eminent domain in 
federal courts were not developing some judicial review cracks. 
Given the anomalous current degree of insulation, what potential 
exists for more meaningful arbitrary and capricious substantive re-
view in the future? As demonstrated subsequently in Section IV, 
such an extension of review can, in part, be based on a general 
recognition that substantive due process inquiry is not anathema; it 
is an established component of the courts' constitutional jurisdiction. 
Substantive due process occurs in present-day reviews of public 
purposes, authority, and bad faith, as well as in occasional avowed 
arbitrariness reviews. There are, moreover, compelling arguments 
and extensive scholarly and case law foundations for rationality re-
view in general. 
Rationality review appears to be practicable. As recent develop-
ments in the equal protection cases138 and longstanding techniques 
in administrative law adjudication have demonstrated, rational basis 
136 See supra notes 24-41 and accompanying text. 
137 See, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979), vacating and remanding memo 617 
F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en banc per curiam); Curran V. Laird, 420 F.2d 122 (D.C. Cir. 
1969); Crockett V. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1982), afl'd, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 
1983); cf. de Arellano V. Weinberger, 568 F. Supp. 1236 (D.D.C. 1983) (confiscation of Amer-
ican-owned Honduran lands by the United States military is a political question), rev'd, 745 
F.2d 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en bane) (not a political question). 
138 See, e.g., Lindsey V. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 78-79 (1972) (analyzing rational basis and 
striking down a double bond requirement for tenants challenging evictions); Cleveland Bd. of 
Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Personnel Adm'r of Massachusetts V. Feeney, 442 
U.S. 256 (1979). 
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review can walk the tightrope-reviewing, without taking over the 
legislative and administrative functions, and deferring to a measured 
degree without abdicating the crucial structural role of judicial ov-
erviews. Within the field of eminent domain law, as well, there are 
seeds of change that may increasingly produce substantive reviews 
of governmental condemnation decisions. 
1. Seeds of Change: The Historical Argument 
If eminent domain in the federal courts has been regarded as a 
citadel of governmental immunity from judicial review, there are 
nevertheless some weaknesses in its defenses. In the Constitution, 
eminent domain was not reserved as a prerogative power of the 
states. Quite to the contrary, its only appearance in the Constitution 
was in the middle of the Bill of Rights, which would seem to em-
phasize its links with the affirmative due process protections that 
regularly receive active judicial protection. Moreover, eminent do-
main does not appear to have held any particUlarly important place 
in the minds or deliberations of the Framers that would imply a 
power insulated from judicial review. Exercises of eminent domain 
in the nineteenth century appear to have been occasionally subjected 
to forms of substantive review beyond public use questions. 139 
Traditional statements about the eminent domain power over the 
years have frequently asserted, at least in theory, the substantive 
limitations of bad faith, unreasonableness, and necessity.140 The un-
deniable practice of abject deference may best be explained as prag-
matic judicial accommodation to the needs of a rapidly developing 
society in which government played a critical facilitating role. Given 
the serious constitutional interests thereby eroded, however, and 
the historical background, it may have been more appropriate to ask 
what constitutional basis exists for insulating questions of condem-
nation takings from substantive review. 
2. Developments in the Federal Courts 
The federal courts that hold to such a strict line on eminent domain 
review came late to the condemnation game. For years, the federal 
government only used the seconded power of the states to obtain 
139 See Ligare v. City of Chicago, 139 Ill. 46, 28 N.E. 934 (1891); New Central Coal Co. v. 
Georges Creek Coal & Iron Co., 37 Md. 537 (1973); Shick v. Pennsylvania R.R., 1 Pearson 
262 (Pa. C.P. Dauphin 1867). 
140 See lA NICHOLS, supra note 7, § 4.9, at 4-52. 
1989] EMINENT DOMAIN 699 
needed land, and it was not until the 1875 case of Kohl v. United 
States that the Supreme Court established the validity of federal 
eminent domain power. 141 When they conflicted, federal jurisdiction 
overrode state jurisdiction,142 and, as we have seen, the federal 
holdings gave much less free rein to the courts than their state 
counterparts. 143 
Nevertheless, there were indications over the years that federal 
courts too, at least theoretically, can undertake review of arbitrari-
ness and bad faith.144 In a variety of appellate cases, federal courts 
applied those tests as proper components of judicial review. The 
Supreme Court, however, several times declared the opposite, re-
peating that review of public purpose exhausted the judicial func-
tion. 145 
If those opinions attempted to close the door on substantive re-
view, however, it was somewhat reopened in the case of United 
States v. Carmack146 and has remained so since then. A series of 
lower federal courts and the Burger Court have subsequently ap-
peared to be open to Carmack's invitation. In the notable Carmack 
case, involving the condemnation of several acres of town land in 
Cape Girardeau, Missouri for a new post office, the Court raised and 
reserved the question whether the federal site choice could have 
been attacked as arbitrary and capricious. 147 The site chosen by the 
Postmaster General was not the recommended choice of the agency's 
site inspector (it was the runner-up, out of twenty-two sites); it 
required the taking of land already dedicated to public use as park 
and townhall; and it was slightly more expensive. 148 
Analytically, the Carmack challengers were making a comparative 
rationality or preference-necessity attack by arguing that the chosen 
site was not the best one, rather than making a means-end argument 
that the site would not serve its purpose. In any event, based upon 
141 Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 371 (1875). 
142 See Oklahoma v. Atkinson, 313 U.S. 508, 534 (1941). 
143 See supra notes 106-17 and accompanying text. 
144 See United States v. 1,096.84 Acres in Marion County, 99 F. Supp. 544, 547 (W.D. Ark. 
1951); Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. Whatcom County, 123 F.2d 286, 290 (9th Cir. 1941); 
United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 30 F. Supp. 372, 379 (D. Md. 1939); United States 
v. Eighty Acres of Land, 26 F. Supp. 315 (E.D. Ill. 1939); Fox Film Corp. v. Trumbull, 7 
F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1925); United States v. Parcel of Land, 32 F. Supp. 718 (D. Del. 1940). 
140 See Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282 (1893); Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles, 262 
U.S. 700 (1923). 
146 329 U.S. 230 (1946). 
147 [d. at 243-44. 
148 [d. at 233-45. 
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a thorough analysis of the particular facts,149 the Court said that "it 
[was] unnecessary to determine whether or not this selection could 
have been set aside ... if the designated officials had acted in bad 
faith or so 'capriciously and arbitrarily' that their action was without 
adequate determining principle or was unreasoned [citing the dic-
tionary definitions thereof]. The record [presented] no such issue 
.... "150 The Court, in other words, said it didn't reach the issue of 
voiding the condemnation for arbitrariness because, having scruti-
nized it for arbitrariness, they found it substantively nonarbitrary. 
This logical syllogism seemed to undertake the very inquiry it said 
it was avoiding. 
A number of subsequent courts of appeal and district court deci-
sions have in fact taken Carmack's lead and, albeit deferentially, 
have actively applied substantive review. To be sure, even such 
courts declare that it is "only with reluctance" that they will review 
questions beyond ultra vires and public use,151 but they will then 
proceed to do so in an extended range of circumstances. For exam-
ple, when the United States Department of the Interior wanted to 
take property five years in advance of its proposed active use, the 
Third Circuit reviewed whether that timing was reasonable. 152 When 
a naval air field sought to condemn mineral rights as well as surface 
rights, the Ninth Circuit applied the arbitrariness test,153 as it had 
in other cases, questioning the form of estate that had been con-
demned. 154 Meanwhile, the Eighth Circuit reviewed the desirability 
of a particular parcel to the practical operation and maintenance of 
a proposed reservoir;155 the Tenth Circuit reviewed the choice of how 
much land to condemn;156 the Fifth Circuit analyzed whether a parcel 
actually served project purposes;157 the Second Circuit considered 
whether a federal taking of state lands for railroad purposes could 
be justified beyond its original wartime uses;158 and the Seventh 
149 I d. at 232-36. 
150 ld. at 243-44. 
151 See, e.g., United States v. Certain Parcels of Land in Philadplphia, 215 F.2d 140, 147 
(3d Cir. 1954). In this case, the court said that "only with reluctance [would it] review any 
. . . decisions . . . such as the desirability of the particular property . . . the quantity of land 
necessary ... or the particular estate required .... " ld. (citations omitted). 
1521d. 
153 Southern Pacific Land Co. v. United States, 367 F.2d 161, 162-63 (9th Cir. 1966). 
154 ld.; see also state cases cited in supra note 114. 
165 United States v. Willis, 211 F.2d 1, 1-4 (8th Cir. 1954). 
156 United States v. Kansas City, Kansas, 159 F.2d 125, 127-30 (10th Cir. 1946). 
157 United States v. 2606.84 Acres of Land in Tarrant County, Texas, 432 F.2d 1286, 1290-
91 (5th Cir. 1970). 
158 United States v. New York, 160 F.2d 479, 480 (2d Cir. 1947). This decision has been 
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Circuit reviewed, in terms of arbitrariness, condemnations of land 
by the United States for use in connection with a dam in the Missis-
sippi River. 159 
The compromise these Courts of Appeal have struck between 
review and deference is nicely set out in several Seventh Circuit 
opinions. The courts will not put the government to the substantive 
test in cases in which defendants merely make "broadside allega-
tions" of arbitrary and capricious action. 160 Such unsubstantiated 
arguments would not overcome the presumption of deference. But 
when defendants make detailed allegations that raise credible sub-
stantive arguments of arbitrariness, a court will occasionally proceed 
with particularized substantive review. 161 
The federal courts have treated the strong federal precedents 
rejecting substantive review, particularly the refusal to review "ne-
cessity,"162 by acknowledging such holdings, and then going beyond 
them. They do not review in terms of "necessity," but in terms of 
"absolute necessity, "163 "impossibility, "164 or various arbitrariness-
rationality reviews scrutinizing condemnations for "pervasive decep-
tion, unreasoned decision, ... will of the wisp determination," where 
"no reasonable man could conclude that the land sought to be con-
demned had some association with the authorized project."165 
The Burger Court appeared to join this parade of post-Carmack 
decisions in its Midkifj166 opinion. Hawaii's Land Reform Act of 1967 
interpreted as a substantive merits review case. See Southern Pacific Land Co. v. United 
States, 367 F.2d 161, 162 (9th Cir. 1966). It may, however, also be seen as another kind of 
purpose inquiry, deciding that salvage of investments was a legitimate federal purpose. See 
United States V. New York, 160 F.2d at 481 ("[TJhe 'public use' which is said to justify the 
continued operation of the railroad is to get the greatest salvage for the Treasury, which no 
doubt will be by a sale for the full term.") (Hand, J., dissenting). 
159 United States V. 58.16 Acres of Land, 478 F.2d 1055 (7th Cir. 1973) (court said it would 
consider detailed allegations of arbitrariness). A number of district courts have echoed the 
willingness to review for substantive arbitrariness. E.g., United States V. 23.9129 Acres of 
Land, 192 F. Supp. 101 (N.D. Cal. 1961); United States v. 18.2 Acres of Land, 442 F, Supp. 
800, 812 (E.D. Cal. 1977). 
160 See, e.g., United States V. 416.81 Acres of Land, 514 F.2d 627, 631 (7th Cir. 1975). 
161 See United States v. 58.16 Acres of Land, 478 F.2d 1055 (7th Cir. 1973). Of course, at 
the same time, other federal circuit courts were flatly refusing to review arbitrariness ques-
tions, repeating the standard rubric of absolute deference beyond review of public use. 
162 See, e.g., United States V. Meyer, 113 F.2d 387, 392 (7th Cir.), eert. denied, 311 U.S. 
706 (1940). 
163 Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth. V. One Parcel of Land in Square 164, C.A. No. 
75-0056, at n.1 (D.D.C. Aug. 14, 1975) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file). 
164 [d. at n.6. 
165 United States V. 2606.84 Acres of Land in Tarrant County, 432 F.2d 1286, 1290 (5th Cir. 
1970). 
166 Hawaii Housing Auth. V. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984). 
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had provided that residential lessees on large private estates could 
force estate landowners to sell them fee simple title at fair market 
value. The Bishop Estate's trustees had argued in the Ninth Circuit, 
with surprising success, that this process violated the public-use 
limitation because the lands would be owned and occupied by private 
individuals. With a wave of the Berman wand, however, Justice 
O'Connor threw out the public-use argument, stating that 
[w]here the exercise of the eminent domain power is rationally 
related to a conceivable public purpose, the Court has never held 
a compensated taking to be proscribed by the Public Use Clause. 
See Berman v. Parker . ... On this basis we have no trouble 
concluding that the Hawaii Act is constitutional. 167 
Nevertheless, O'Connor thereby gave prominence, beyond public 
purpose, to the question of rational relationship of means to ends. 
In the succeeding two paragraphs, O'Connor then went much 
further into the rational basis inquiry. Having concluded that the 
public purpose of dividing large bloc ownerships was proper, she 
further concluded that the Court could not "condemn as irrational 
the Act's approach to correcting the land oligopoly problem."168 She 
weighed the market demand mechanism by which the statute 
worked, and the reasonable limits on purchasers that avoided the 
creation of new bloc ownerships, and summed up in a series of 
rational basis statements: 
This is a comprehensive and rational approach to identifying and 
correcting market failure . . . .169 
"[T]he [constitutional requirement] is satisfied if ... the ... 
[state] Legislature rationally could have believed that the [Act] 
would promote its objective."17o 
When the legislature's purpose is legitimate and its means are 
not irrational, our cases make clear that empirical debates over 
the wisdom of takings. . . are not to be carried out in the federal 
courts. 171 
167 I d. at 241. 
168 Id. at 242. 
169Id. 
170 Id. (quoting Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 
648, 671-72 (1981) (emphasis in original)). 
171 Id. at 242-43. The Court, echoing the Lochner reaction, noted that the "wisdom" of 
socioeconomic regulation should not be reviewed. Id. at 243. 
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Redistribution of fees simple . . . is a rational exercise of the 
eminent domain power. 172 
703 
This rational basis analysis represents a significant tying together 
of jurisprudential loose ends in the case law. The Midkiff Court was 
clearly deferential to the legislature: public use is to be measured in 
terms of broadly proper public purposes irrespective of private pos-
session and control. Yet, the Court also asserted that judges can 
and should review the rational relationship of legislative means to 
ends and actually consider arguments about whether there was a 
reasonable relationship of statutory means to ends. 173 In addition, 
the majority opinion construed the rationality inquiry in eminent 
domain as a constitutional requirement,174 basing this inquiry on 
precedents drawn from general federal jurisprudence beyond con-
demnation case law,175 including a test (if the legislature could ra-
tionally have believed) that echoes the Universal Camera arbitrar-
iness test in remarkably close terms. 176 Finally, the Midkiff Court's 
combination of rational basis analysis with the public-purpose inquiry 
is significant because it apparently was not mere obiter dicta; it was 
a fundamental part of the holding. 177 
The Midkiff opinion accordingly has opened the door to active 
rationality review in subsequent federal cases in which credible chal-
lenges to the legislative choice of means are presented by condem-
nation defendants. The opinion avoids the anomaly of those courts 
that undertake substantive review of ultra vires and purpose ques-
tions but evade the often more significant question of rationality. 
The Supreme Court demonstrated in Midkiff that such review could 
be done without intruding into subjective legislative questions of 
"wisdom" and "necessity." Though the Court ultimately decided in 
favor of the legislature, it gave the individual condemnees a judicial 
hearing on the full range of substantive challenges. 
Viewed in this perspective, the Midkiff opinion clearly went far-
ther than Carmack, expressly applying the tests that the latter case 
had reserved. The Supreme Court's recent decision in N ollan v. 
California Coastal Commission178 reinforced the tendency. Review-
172 [d. 
173 See supra notes 167-72 and accompanying text. 
174 See Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 24~3. 
175 [d. (citing, inter alia, Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. 456 (1981); Vance 
v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979». 
176 See infra note 224 and accompanying text. 
177 Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 244-45. 
178 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987). 
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ing the rational nexus required between a physical exaction and the 
governmental purpose, Justice Scalia wrote for the Court that the 
judicial standard for testing the abridgement of property rights 
through the police power is the "'substantial advanc[ing]' of a legit-
imate state interest."179 In making that determination and striking 
down the physical exaction, Scalia undertook an extraordinarily de-
tailed scrutiny of whether the exaction in fact rationally served the 
various asserted governmental purposes. Taken together, Midkiff 
and N ollan extend an open invitation to the lower federal courts to 
undertake specific scrutiny of particularized allegations of means-
end irrationality. 
Notwithstanding Nollan's censure of the California taking, how-
ever, it would be disingenuous not to note that in federal cases 
applying substantive means-end review, including Midkiff, virtually 
all past decisions have gone on to uphold the challenged governmen-
tal condemnation decisions. To what extent, then, is the proposition 
here of substantive rationality review weakened by the relative 
absence of cases using it to support negative holdings? 
It is difficult to explain a constitutional basis for allowing substan-
tive review of authority and public purpose without also permitting 
review of rationality.180 Consequently, the dearth of decisions cen-
suring eminent domain takings may be better explained by the 
courts' historical hesitancy to oppose legislative and executive initia-
tives absent Supreme Court support for active review. Now that 
there is not only a series of federal circuit court holdings181 accepting 
substantive rationality review, but also the Midkiff decision's anal-
ysis explicitly including the rationality inquiry in eminent domain 
review, future court reviews can be expected to be more forthright. 
Instead of attempting to slip rationality issues into the purpose 
inquiry, they can address such issues directly, particularly if the 
familiar "rational decisionmaker" judicial formula is applied to the 
usual arbitrary and capricious test. 182 
3. Administrative Procedure Acts 
There is irony and potential, finally, in the prospects for judicial 
review of eminent domain under federal and state administrative 
179 [d. at 3150 (quoting Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)). 
Although N ollan involved an exaction of land rather than a simple condemnation, the nature 
of the question, beyond compensation, was analytically the same, making Nollan an apposite 
and significant holding on eminent domain rationality review. 
ISO See infra notes 276-77 and accompanying text. 
lSI See supra notes 152-58 and accompanying text. 
182 See infra notes211~2 and accompan/ing text. 
1989] EMINENT DOMAIN 705 
procedure acts. The irony exists in the fact that such heavily litigated 
statutes have not yet been used, at least expressly, to secure sub-
stantive rationality review of condemnation takings. The potential 
for such litigation is self-evident: Title VII of the federal Adminis-
trative Procedure Act (APA) , like many of its state counterparts, 
sets forth a broad presumption of reviewability for agency actions, 
and provides specific substantive and procedural tests. 
Section 702, which asserts the broad reviewability of agency 
actionsl83 and has been so interpreted by the Court,l84 provides only 
two areas of insulation: for express statutory exclusions and areas 
"committed to agency discretion. "185 These statutory exceptions do 
not seem to fit the eminent domain case. True, there are some areas 
of eminent domain jurisprudence that do contain extensive discre-
tion-notably the subjective "close-call" decisions about project ne-
cessity noted earlierl86-but many others are straightforward sub-
stantive issues capable of third party review. Nor, clearly, is section 
702(b) a broad insulator of all decisions that involve any discretion, 
because section 706 specifically provides for review of discretionary 
decisions. 187 The areas in which implied preclusions are found include 
national security, diplomacy, and "political" questions,l88 all of which 
seem to be of a much higher order of national import than the 
condemnation of drainage ditches and parking lots, which, as we 
have seen, have nevertheless been effectively shrouded from review 
by the courts. 
Given the clarity of the APA's review sections, it would seem that 
the burden is on the bureaucrats: if an eminent domain controversy 
fits the APA's terms for substantive review-posing issues of arbi-
trary decisionmaking-the courts presumptively must proceed to 
review and resolve them. Agencies would have a tough assignment 
in arguing that the vagaries of condemnation common law over the 
years have constituted a judicial repeal or amendment of the statute. 
Posed in those terms, such arguments would be rather easily an-
swered. The drafting of statutory loopholes is not a job for judges, 
no matter how long they have repeated the conventional wisdom of 
limited eminent domain review. For judges to use the fifth amend-
183 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982). 
184 See, e.g., Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140-41 (1967). 
185 5 U.S.C. § 702. 
186 See text accompanying supra notes 126-27. 
187 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982). "The reviewing court shall ... (2) hold unlawful and set aside 
agency actions, findings, and conclusions found to be--(A) ... an abuse of discretion .... " 
[d. 
188 See supra note 137. 
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ment's public use text as a constitutional limitation on the APA terms 
would again miss the wrong point. 189 Therefore, since at least 1946, 
a clear statutory basis (indeed a statutory requirement) for substan-
tive review of federal agency takings has lain incipient and unful-
filled. 
The scarcity of cases seriously reviewing the rationality merits of 
condemnations under the AP A might conceivably be explained by 
asserting that federal condemnation decisions over the years have 
been universally reasonable. The vast majority of condemnations 
indeed probably are rationally designed. In an area so charged with 
conflicting financial stakes and power positions, however, it strains 
credulity to think that the lack of such court reviews is based on 
federal condemnations' uniform irreproachability. Rather, the dearth 
of claims is probably better explained by the simple failure of lawyers 
to make the unfamiliar AP A eminent domain review argument. That 
kind of failure is easily remedied, and, as the next section of this 
Article demonstrates, the substantive defense is based on substantial 
constitutional as well as statutory roots. 
IV. THE MEANING AND ApPLICABILITY OF THE "ARBITRARY AND 
CAPRICIOUS" TEST 
The foregoing analysis of a particularized judicial rationality re-
view in eminent domain cases does not require any innovations in 
constitutional theory. It draws upon a large body of substantive due 
process jurisprudence that has always been implicit in the notion of 
arbitrariness. The trick is to clarify and assemble a coherent prac-
ticable judicial test out of the unruly jumble of concepts embodied 
in the phrase "arbitrary and capricious." 
Behind the dictionary meanings of arbitrariness lies too broad a 
range of meanings to expect that over the years it would have been 
understood and applied with any precision. Such meanings run from 
"determined by whim or caprice," "despotic," "absolute," and "dic-
tatorial" to "for erroneous reason" and "without consideration or 
adjustment with reference to principles, circumstances or signifi-
cance."190 Thus, it is hardly surprising to find the arbitrariness con-
189 Whatever the fifth amendment was intended to do, it clearly does not provide constitu-
tional immunities from review where statutes fail to so provide. 
190 BALLANTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 88 (3d ed. 1969) (citing Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. of 
Newark v. Welch, 71 Okla. 59, 64, 175 P. 45, 49 (1918); United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 
230,243 n.14 (1946), reh'g denied, 329 U.S. 834 (1947)). 
The meaning of arbitrariness can be found in sources other than case law: 
Thinketh, such shows nor right nor wrong in him nor kind, nor cruel: He is strong 
and Lord. Am strong myself compared to yonder crabs that march now from the 
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cept treated so amorphously and in so many different senses that it 
often seems to lack any particular or useful meaning. By failing to 
define its meaning clearly, however, courts not only end up using 
the same term for different issues, but also confuse issues in the 
process, severely crimping the concept's effectiveness as an analyt-
ical tool. 
Insofar as this hesitancy to provide a clear definition is attributable 
to vagueness, confusion, and amorphousness in the meaning of ar-
bitrariness, clarification currently seems possible. Insofar as it is 
attributable to ideological and jurisprudential concerns, the time 
likewise appears propitious for active acknowledgement of judicial 
review of rationality. 
A. The Four Basic Inquiries in Substantive Judicial Review 
Dividing the areas of substantive judicial scrutiny (beyond partic-
ular statutory requirements) into four separate diagnostic inquiries 
can clarify the arbitrariness test and many other issues of judicial 
review. 191 These four substantive inquiries are discernible through-
out the case law, and appear to encompass all nonstatutory substan-
tive questions typically raised in judicial review of governmental 
action. Zoning cases, which offer frequent and familiar (if homely) 
examples of constitutional challenges, provide an area of litigation 
that helps illustrate issues in all four substantive categories. 192 
1. Authority 
A challenger to a zoning decision can assert the government's lack 
of general or specific authority to act. Such a challenge presents an 
mountain to the sea. Let twenty pass, and stone the twenty-first, Loving not, hating 
not, just choosing so. 
Browning, On the Caban, in POEMS OF ELIZABETH & ROBERT BROWNING 237 (1942). The 
complaint of the twenty-first crab is not that there was no norm or standard being applied to 
it, but rather that the standard applied ("the twenty-first") was not a good, fitting, proper, 
or sufficient reason. 
191 See supra note 12. 
192 See District Attorney v. Board of Trustees of Leonard Morse Hosp., 389 Mass. 729, 452 
N.E.2d 208 (1983); Erie R.R. v. Steward, 17 N. Y. 172,53 A. 118 (1902). Both of the foregoing 
cases consider ultra vires challenges to the exercise of eminent domain power. See also R & 
R Welding Supply Co. v. City of Des Moines, 257 Iowa 973, 129 N.W.2d 666 (1964); Abolt v. 
City of Fort Madison, 252 Iowa 626, 108 N. W.2d 263 (1961); Wayne Village President v. 
Wayne Village Clerk, 323 Mich. 592, 36 N. W.2d 157 (1949) (all cases noting necessary element 
of proper public purpose); cases at supra notes 103-04 (raising questions of a rational means-
end relationship). The fourth area-that of individual burden-is by far the most frequently 
litigated, often in terms of just compensation. 
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ultra vires question, which clearly is constitutional. 193 Ultra vires 
challenges involve substantive inquiry because they dispositively 
review the foundation of the right by which the government con-
strains private interests in the possession, use, and enjoyment of an 
individual parcel of property. 
In the zoning setting, a plaintiff may attack a municipality by 
alleging that it has no power to pass a particular zone regulation for 
lack of sufficient delegated power under the state enabling statute, 
by alleging preemption of local or state authority, or the like. The 
same inquiry, of course, can be found in other kinds of cases through-
out the range of federal and state regulatory actions arising under 
the police power and correlative powers ceded to the federal gov-
ernment. 194 This inquiry is analytically a threshold question, not a 
focus on the particular merits of the governmental act challenged. 
2. Proper Public Purpose 
The second category of challenges addresses proper public pur-
pose. Zoning laws, for example, were originally attacked as not 
fitting within the "general welfare" component of the police power's 
classic triad of basic regulatory purposes: health, safety, and wel-
fare. 195 Once Euclid196 established that the harmony of planned de-
velopment constituted a proper, generalized public-welfare purpose, 
the attacks shifted to attempts to define further improper particu-
larized purposes. 
Such narrower "poison purpose" allegations have included, with 
varying degrees of success, claims that a regulation was "purely 
aesthetic," for "purely private purposes," motivated by a desire to 
drive down land prices for future condemnation, racially exclusionary 
193 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, art. 1, § 3; Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 
(1976) (Civil Service Commission regulation barring noncitizens including lawfully admitted 
resident aliens, from employment in the federal competitive civil service held unconstitutional 
as a deprivation of due process); Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959) (in the absence of 
explicit authorization from either the President or Congress, the Secretaries of the Armed 
Forces were not authorized to deprive petitioner of his job in a proceeding in which he was 
not afforded the safeguards of confrontation and cross examination); Garfield v. Goldsby, 211 
U.S. 249 (1908) (it is a violation of due process of law to deprive one of rights in an adminis-
trative or judicial proceeding without notice or opportunity to be heard). 
194 Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, reh'g denied, 297 U.S. 728 
(1936); Garfield v. Goldsby, 211 U.S. 249 (1908); Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 
U.S. 112 (1896); Federal Trade Comm'n v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643 (1931); Zuber v. Allen, 
402 F.2d 660 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1013 (1970). 
195 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926). 
196 Euclid, 272 U.S. 365. 
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or otherwise invidiously intended to discriminate, or impermissibly 
protected individuals against their own rugged wills. 197 Analogous 
attacks are regularly posed in other regulatory settings as well. 198 
This inquiry as to proper public purpose, too, is a form of threshold 
question, testing the propriety of the governmental objective rather 
than the nature of the actual decision itself. 
3. Merits Review-Means Rationally Related to Ends 
The third category of challenges involves attacking a regulation 
on its merits for lack of a rational relationship of means to ends, 
the area of substantive scrutiny most directly involved in the emi-
nent domain review controversy examined in this Article. Where 
the purposes of challenged governmental actions are perfectly 
proper, the design of an ordinance or the factual reasoning support-
ing a decision may nevertheless be insufficiently, illogically, or er-
roneously related to achieving the purposes. Thus, zoning acts have 
been struck down, as applied to specific parcels, when the lines 
drawn are found to bear no rational nexus to purpose or when the 
pattern of regulation has insufficient supporting data or planning. 199 
For example, a floodplain safety zone cannot rationally be applied to 
197 Corthouts v. Town of Newington, 140 Conn. 284, 99 A.2d 112 (1953); Comer v. City of 
Dearborn, 342 Mich. 471, 70 N. W.2d 813 (1955); Roney v. Board of Supervisors, 138 Cal. App. 
2d 740, 292 P.2d 529 (1956); Kozensnik v. Montgomery Twp., 24 N.J. 154, 131 A.2d 1 (1957); 
cf. Comment, States Power to Require an Individual to Protect Himself, 26 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 112 (1969). 
Note also that in some cases, a particular regulation might be attacked on the ground that 
its purpose lies outside the grant of delegated powers, for example, where a city zones 
innovatively for "greenbelt" or "earthquake safety zone" purposes that are not clearly set out 
in the enabling act, thus involving both the first and second categories of inquiry. 
198 American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Davids, 11 Mich. App. 351, 158 N.W.2d 72 (1968) (Court 
of appeals held that an amendment requiring motorcyclists to wear helmets was unconstitu-
tional since it had no relationship to public health, safety and welfare.). In a later case, the 
Supreme Court of Michigan holds that the legislature may require motorcyclists to wear 
helmets as part of a highway safety program to reduce the consequences of accidents. People 
v. Poucher, 398 Mich. 316, 274 N.W.2d 798 (1976). 
199 The classic Euclid case can be read for the basic proposition that zone districting lines 
were rationally related to achieving public welfare, even ifno particular injury could be related 
to particular lines, if they were based upon an expert comprehensive plan. See Village of 
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386-88 (1926). The comprehensive plan thus 
became the standard requirement for a supportive relationship between means and ends in 
zoning. "Insufficient supporting data" means that the record does not show sufficient evidence 
to allow a court to say that the decision or means are indeed rationally related to achieving 
ends, though further evidence might or might not show a rational relationship. See, e.g., 
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983). 
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hilltop land,20o a residential zone cannot be applied to land that could 
never be used for residences. 201 
Analytically, moreover, this third means-end inquiry may also 
incorporate "least drastic means"202 and equal protection review. 
Thus, when a zone discriminates against poor people or mobile 
homes, its distinctions and classifications can be challenged as not 
rationally related to the purposes of zoning.203 Beyond zoning, this 
third inquiry can be widely discerned in judicial declarations that 
governmental determinations and classifications must "have reason-
able relation to a proper legislative purpose, and [be] neither arbi-
trary nor discriminatory [to satisfy] the requirements of due pro-
cess,"204 and must "rationally advance . . . a reasonable and 
identifiable governmental objective. "205 
4. Burden 
The fourth inquiry, the degree of burden imposed on the individ-
ual, is often the emotional heart of substantive review. Its most 
common manifestation is the individual takings burden in regulatory 
cases, which asks a question basic to justice and democracy: how far 
can the collective power of the majority erode the property of the 
individual for the sake of public well-being? The usual answer in 
regulatory takings cases is what one of the authors has previously 
200 Sturdy Homes, Inc. v. Redford, 30 Mich. App. 53, 186 N.W.2d 43 (1971); Oakwood at 
Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 117 N.J. Super. 11,20-22,283 A.2d 353,358-59 (1971). 
201 See Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 187 (1928) (The master prior to trial 
reported "no practical use can be made of the land ... for residential purposes. "). But cf. 
Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 260 Mass. 441, 448, 157 N.E. 618, 620 (1927) (holding that the 
residential zone did serve a valid purpose, as a low-density buffer zone), rev'd, 277 U.S. 183 
(1928). Nectow should probably have been reviewed under the takings burden test. The 
residentially restricted strip would then have been averaged in with the large contiguous 
industrially-zoned property. As it was, the case reviewed rational relationship, and turned 
ultimately on the definition of which "purpose" was relevant: the literal reading of an R-2 zone 
as intended to promote residential use, or the planners' purpose of using zone sectors as 
buffers and transition zones. 
202 See infra note 242 and accompanying text. 
203 See Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 
A.2d 713, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975); BROOKS EXCLUSIONARY 
ZONING 3 (Am. Soc. of Planning Officials, 1970); Gust v. Township of Canton, 342 Mich. 436, 
70 N. W.2d 772 (1955); Commonwealth v. Amos, 44 Pa. D. & C. 125 (1941). This claim can also 
be cast as an attack on the governmental purpose if it is alleged that regulations impermissibly 
seek to exclude, especially with relation to race, national origin or creed. 
204 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934). 
205 Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 235 (1981). The latter part of the quotation is clearly 
directed at establishing a proper public purpose. 
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dubbed the "residuum" takings tests. 206 According to these tests, 
property owners must be left with a beneficial (or "profitable" or 
"reasonable") remaining use of their regulated property. These var-
ious versions of the diminution test require a fair amount of implicit 
balancing of potential public harms against private property losses, 
but, if such balancing is done, offer a workable and philosophically 
defensible test for application far beyond the field of land-use regu-
lation. 207 Of course, when physical appropriation of property is in-
volved under eminent domain, the fourth inquiry is less a balancing 
than a straightforward measure of governmental payment at fair 
market value rates to compensate the burdened individual for prop-
erty rights taken. 
5. Procedural Problems 
For the sake of comprehensiveness, it should be noted that courts 
also apply at least two different kinds of procedural scrutiny beyond 
strict statutory requirements. One type of scrutiny is the set of 
requirements owed to individuals in the form of procedural due 
process. This flourishing sector of constitutional litigation raises 
questions of notice, hearing, the clarity of legal standards to be 
applied, and the opportunity to review the application of a law to a 
particular case.208 
The second type is that class of procedural requirements owed to 
the courts themselves. In order for federal courts to fulfill their 
article III functions (and state courts their correlative duties), the 
processes of government must be such that they will produce a 
meaningful, reviewable record. Such a record must illuminate the 
basis of official actions and show whether the governmental actors 
206 See Plater, Takings Issue, supra note 6, at 232. 
207 In a contextual vacuum, based exclusively upon losses to the one regulated parcel 
measured exclusively in terms of the marketplace's estimation of profitability. This ignores 
the dangers and external economic costs that might be caused by the unregulated parcel, and 
thus ignores the very reason the police power was applied in the first place. Indeed, in some 
cases where unregulated parcels would impose large public injuries, a total diminution of 
private property value may be rational, fair, and constitutional. Id. at 245-51. 
208 Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327 (1945) (all affected parties must have an 
opportunity to be heard); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (public assistance recipient 
entitled to a pre-termination hearing); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (teacher at 
state college entitled to prove his claim that the non-renewal of his one-year contract was 
without sufficient cause). The Supreme Court's modern approach to procedural due process 
adjUdication is articulated in Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); see infra note 335 
and accompanying text. 
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have at least considered the relevant factors in reaching their de-
terminations. 209 
B. Pinning Down "Arbitrary" 
If indeed courts accept their more-than-theoretical responsibility 
for testing government condemnation actions substantively for "ar-
bitrariness," there remains the question of what that test means and 
how it can be applied. Unfortunately for any attempt to clarify the 
meaning of "arbitrary and capricious," the phrase has not been lim-
ited in practice to the bounds of any of the six basic categories of 
judicial inquiry noted here. 21o Consequently, the delineation of these 
categories does not in itself usefully narrow down the analysis of 
when the phrase is employed. Indeed, judicial use of the "arbitrary" 
rubric, and the parallel rationality concept , 211 can be found in all six 
of the delineated areas of judicial inquiry, procedural as well as 
substantive. 
A brief survey not only demonstrates the uncritically broad range 
of applications given to the arbitrary-rationality concept, but also 
argues by aversive example for use of clearer terms based on clearer 
analysis. 
When the Supreme Court, for example, struck down a federal 
Indian lands regulation as an "exercise of arbitrary power," it was 
clear on closer reading that the justices meant that the regulation 
was ultra vires for lack of authority,212 our first category of substan-
tive tests of governmental power. The Court could well have said so 
directly and been a lot clearer thereby. When, in another case, the 
justices voided as "wholly arbitrary" a Maryland statute that indi-
rectly subsidized farmers and water-users, they were not saying 
that the statute would not accomplish its purpose, or that the pur-
209 Even where he wished to restrict procedures required of agencies, as in Vermont Yankee 
v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978), Justice Rehnquist noted that agencies must supply a sufficient 
record for the courts to review: "[t]he validity of [the] action must 'stand or fallon the 
propriety of [contemporaneous findings] .... If [those] finding[s] [are] not sustainable on the 
administrative record made, then the . . . decision must be vacated and the matter remanded 
... for further consideration.'" Id. at 549 (quoting Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 143 (1973». 
See infra notes 237,250 and accompanying text. 
210 See supra notes 193-209 and accompanying text. 
211 The phrase "arbitrary and capricious" can be seen as the negative formulation of the 
"reasonableness" standard. They are mirror images of the same concept. As the succeeding 
analysis shows, they share a wide range of application. 
212 Garfield v. Goldsby, 211 U.S. 249, 262 (1908). In Garfield, there were also allegations of 
a violation of procedural due process fo,' lack of hearings, but the Court made clear that the 
decision turned on lack of delegated authority. Id. 
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pose was purely whimsical, but rather that the purpose was im-
proper. 213 
Similarly, in the third area of inquiry, in which the basis for a 
regulation does not support the rule, a court may call the regulation 
arbitrary instead of saying that it lacks support.214 In equal protec-
tion cases, the terms are similarly confused. 215 
The fourth area of inquiry, the "takings" issue as it concerns the 
imposition of excessive property burdens on the regulated individual, 
is not much different. Courts have struck down regulations, most 
often in zoning cases,216 as void for "arbitrariness" in circumstances 
in which the court clearly meant that the takings effect weighed on 
the plaintiff in impermissibly burdensome terms, not that the reg-
ulations' purpose or implementation were creatures of caprice. It 
would be far better in such circumstances to describe such results 
as an invalid or excessive regulatory taking rather than to use the 
opaque term "arbitrary." 
Procedurally as well, the word "arbitrary" fuzzily haunts the 
cases. If an individual fails to get proper notice of a proceeding, or 
is denied an opportunity to respond adequately, or if the agency fails 
to consider a relevant issue or to explain its decision adequately for 
the purpose of a reviewing court, in each case the result may be 
termed "arbitrary"217 even if it would be far more illuminating to 
describe the particular procedural fault in its own terms. As a result, 
whenever readers see the phrase "arbitrary" used in a judicial opin-
ion or legal text, including this one, they should attempt to define 
which sense of the word is being used. The task is not always easy. 
In most cases, the "arbitrary" rubric, if not wholly a misnomer, 
serves a much less enlightening denotative function than alternatives 
available. Far better for judges and scholars to use more specific 
and direct terms where possible: terms of ultra vires, impermissible 
purpose, insufficient supporting fact or logic, excessive takings bur-
den, and so on. 
213 Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553, 567 (1931), discussed in Ely, supra note 22, at 1225. 
214 Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 
(1983). 
215 E.g., United States v. Buckeye Steamship Co., 183 F. Supp. 644 (N.D. Ohio 1960), afl'd, 
287 F.2d 679 (6th Cir. 1961). 
216 See, e.g., Symonds v. Bucklin, 197 F. Supp. 682 (D. Md. 1961); Longshore v. City of 
Hoover, 454 So. 2d 954 (Ala. 1984); Griffen Development Co. v. City of Oxnard, 39 Cal. 3d 
256, 217 Cal. Rptr. 1, 703 P.2d 339 (1985); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 157 Cal. 
Rptr. 372, 598 P.2d 25 (1979). 
217 Greene v. McGuire, 517 F. Supp. 1330, 1333 (S.D.N. Y. 1981); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 
U.S. 67, 81, reh'g denied, 409 U.S. 902 (1972); Remm v. Landrieu, 418 F. Supp. 542, 544 
(E.D. La. 1976). 
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In pinning down the most direct and appropriate substantive usage 
of the term "arbitrary," two settings seem particularly apt for its 
application. Both settings lie in the third category of judicial inquiry 
and offer a linkage between rationality and arbitrariness review. 
One setting is when a governmental decision has no guiding stan-
dard, or so vague a norm as to lack a principle for decision. Such an 
agency decision is "arbitrary" in the sense that neither agency nor 
reviewing court can explain its normative basis. The second situation 
is the broader means-end setting, which has particular application 
in eminent domain review. When a governmental entity on the mer-
its has a proper purpose or standard to apply but lacks a rationally 
supportive factual basis upon which to reach its particular normative 
determination, its decision is based on "whimsy, caprice, or error" 
in a truer sense than that encountered in the other noted areas of 
judicial inquiry. 218 
"Reasonableness" and "rationality" are decisional terms that are 
equally perplexing. They not only constitute the mirror image of 
"arbitrary" -so that defining the latter goes a long way toward 
defining them as well-but they are also used in the same promis-
cuously wide-ranging array of applications. The judicial concept of 
rationality will be explored further later on, but at this stage it is 
218 The term "arbitrary" does not accurately fit questions of improper purpose, or of lack of 
authority. An improper purpose renders a government act void precisely because it is im-
proper. It may have been a very deliberate and conscious improper decision; "arbitrary" it 
was not. Where is the caprice or "whimsy" in an allegedly arbitrary ultra vires action of 
government that on its face had a sensible purpose, and a reasonable basis for achieving it, 
yet simply lacked properly delegated power, perhaps due to a technicality? The ultra vires 
question, a separate inquiry from that of rationality "means-end" analysis, involves solely the 
question of whether or not the actor possessed the lawful power to act in a given situation. 
See supra note 193. Even with respect to .a totally benign objective, the ultra vires action 
may nevertheless be invalid for lack of statutory authorization of such action. Presidents may 
choose to "pass" a perfectly reasonable, rational "decree," but clearly they are not vested 
with legislative power. Such a decree will be held unconstitutional, however rationally and 
expediently it may further a legitimate government objective. Conversely, one cannot question 
the fact that the Tennessee Valley Authority possesses the authority to build dams for flood 
control purposes. But let it build such a dam in an area that has never seen flooding, and its 
action is subject to judicial sanction because, while clearly statutorily authorized, it neverthe-
less holds no rational relationship to the stated objective. Thus, the ultra vires issue is a 
threshold question: if resolved in the negative, the ''means-end'' question need not be reached. 
Similarly, it appears to miss the point of "arbitrary" to apply it to deliberate agency failures 
to provide procedures or explanations. 
Moreover, the legal use of the term "arbitrary" should mean more than the layperson's 
concept of inexorable chance. When a desperado who has shot a cowpoke in the Stateline 
Saloon faces either a maximum sentence of life imprisonment, or death, depending upon which 
of two state jurisdictions the victim falls into, that difference in potential penalties may seem 
"arbitrary," but it is not the kind of arbitrariness that the courts consider improper. 
1989] EMINENT DOMAIN 715 
sufficient to note that, like the arbitrary and capricious rubric, ra-
tionality is far more fittingly analyzed and applied to means-end 
inquiries than when it is applied haphazardly to questions of im-
proper authority, purpose, or takings burden. 
C. Defining "Arbitrary" 
1. A Legal Formula 
Deciding that the most appropriate locus for arbitrariness tests 
lies in substantive means-end, merits review does not in itself define 
any terms sufficiently to permit their use by courts and jurists. In 
what terms does the inquiry cast itself when a court seeks to review 
whether governmental "means" are "rationally related to ends?" Left 
in such terms, the inquiry remains fairly amorphous, hence merely 
conclusory. 
Fortunately, the formulation of the terms for a judicial test of 
rationality is not difficult. Decades of administrative law cases re-
viewing governmental actions under the "arbitrary" and "substantial 
evidence" tests have developed an analytical construct based upon 
both constitutional and statutory roots219 that serves judicial needs 
and capabilities. In truth, the substantial evidence test and the 
arbitrary and capricious test are constructed of precisely the same 
logical elements. Only differing degrees of judicial deference to of-
ficial actions separate their application into two disparate lines of 
jurisprudence. 220 
219 The federal APA provides for both standards of review in appropriate cases. There is a 
difference between "scope of review" and "standard of review." The "scope of review" denotes 
the breadth of record on appeal for consideration by the reviewing court. "Standard of review" 
denotes the level of scrutiny and the degree of deference adopted by the court with respect 
to the decision under review-arbitrary and capricious, substantial evidence, clearly erro-
neous, etc. See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 
(1976). As argued below, the judicial review tests have a constitutional as well as statutory 
source. See infra note 276 and accompanying text. 
220 Administrative lawyers and courts, however, have typically treated the two tests as 
different, a supposition reflected in Justice Harlan's statement that the "'substantial evidence 
test' afford[s] a considerably more generous judicial review than the 'arbitrary and capricious' 
test." Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 143 (1967). On the other hand, in 
Associated Indus. of New York State, Inc. v. United States, 487 F.2d 342, 349-50 (2d Cir. 
1973), Judge Friendly repeated the observation in Scalia & Goodman, Procedural Aspects of 
the Consumer Product Safety Act, 20 UCLA L. REV. 899 (1973) that, "try as we may, it is 
difficult to find any separate meaning for ['arbitrary']." The Associated Industries court noted 
that "it is hard to see in what respect we would have treated the question differently if we 
had been applying a 'substantial evidence' test." Commentators have suggested that, in the 
"class of cases in which the ground for challenging the agency action is the inadequacy of its 
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Most agency determinations involving questions of fact are judi-
cially reviewed under either the substantial evidence test or the 
arbitrary and capricious test, depending upon whether or not they 
derive from formal proceedings. 221 Analytically, all agency determi-
nations come down to the same thing: the court must decide that a 
reasonable official could have made a particular governmental deci-
sion, given the factual "record"222 in the case and the particular legal 
norms to be applied to it. 
Mr. Justice Frankfurter established the classic test of substantial 
evidence review in Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB.223 According 
to Frankfurter, governmental decisions must be supported by "such 
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 
support [the] conclusion."224 The arbitrary and capricious test can 
evidentiary basis, it is difficult to imagine a decision having no substantial evidence to support 
it which is not 'arbitrary,' or a decision struck down as arbitrary which is in fact supported 
by 'substantial evidence' .... " Associated Indus., 487 F.2d at 349 (quoting Scalia & Goodman, 
supra, at 935 n.138) (citations omitted); see also Wood v. United States Post Office Dept., 472 
F.2d 96, 99 n.4 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973). The federal APA lists the two 
tests as separate and cumulative. 5 U.S.C. § 706(a), (e) (1982). Thus, in reviewing a formal 
proceeding, a court would first consider whether the decision was arbitrary, then go on to ask 
whether it was supported by substantial evidence. No cases were found, however, where a 
court articulated any substantive difference between the two inquiries. The cumulative syntax 
of section 706 makes no obvious sense and is probably just one of many little flaws in the web 
of administrative law. 
There are procedural situations in which government actions might pass muster under the 
arbitrary and capricious test, yet fail under the substantial evidence test. This result would 
occur when courts required more formalized records under the substantial evidence test, or 
required a greater quantum of facts to constitute sufficient supportive evidence as a matter 
of lessened deference. Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, reh'g denied, 304 U.S. 590 (1938); 
Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d 872 (1st Cir.), cm. denied, 439 U.S. 824 
(1978). But the ultimate test remains the same. 
221 APA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556-557 (1982). Statutes may and often do specify standards of 
review, usually tying formal proceedings to the substantial evidence test, but not always. See, 
e.g., Endangered Species Act, § 7, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(n) (1982) (less-than-formal proceedings 
are to be reviewed under the substantial evidence test). The less frequent standard~learly 
erroneous, review de novo, or trial de novo-are virtually always statutory and always require 
a difficult judicial process of figuring out what exactly they mean. Hence the familiarity of the 
substantial evidence and arbitrary and capricious tests seem to have contributed to their 
increasing dominance of the field. 
222 The ''record'' in informal proceedings is not the same thing as a formal record. Courts 
refer to the record on review as comprising whatever portion of the facts is produced by the 
parties for appellate consideration. 
223 Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487-89 (1951) (updating the definition 
of review set out in Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938». 
224 Id. at 477. As to statutes, the judicial formulations include: "whether ... the legislature 
rationally could have believed that the [Act] would promote its objective." Western & Southern 
Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 671-72 (1981); see also Minnesota v. 
Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. 456, 466, reh'g denied, 450 U.S. 1027 (1981); Vance v. Bradley, 
440 U.S. 93, 111 (1979). 
1989] EMINENT DOMAIN 717 
mean no less. A governmental decision that failed to pass the sub-
stantial evidence test, on a judicial finding that a reasonable mind 
could not have found the facts adequate to support the conclusion, 
must equally well have failed scrutiny on the "lower" standard of 
arbitrary and capricious review. Both tests require that the nor-
mative conclusion as defined by relevant legal standards be sup-
ported by sufficient facts. Under the arbitrary and capricious stan-
dard, lacking facts to support the normative conclusion in a 
reasonable person's mind, the decision likewise fails. 225 
Thus, the operative difference between the substantial evidence 
and arbitrary and capricious tests appears to lie primarily in the 
practical degree of deference each test receives.226 The difference in 
deference does not lie in any analytical dissection of what elements 
constitute a "passing" or "failing" rating for a particular decision, 
but more in the "mood" of the reviewing court.227 The substantial 
evidence test is characterized as possessing a stricter "mood," invit-
ing more vigorous judicial scrutiny of governmental decisions, and 
both judges and litigants act upon that premise. 228 
Semantically, the two tests reflect this difference in presumptions 
of validity. The phrase "substantial evidence" focuses on what quan-
tum of evidence the government must show in order to justify a 
challenged agency decision. The syntax of "arbitrary and capricious" 
focuses upon the citizen challenger's burden in overturning an agency 
226 See Associated Indus. v. United States, 487 F.2d 342, 349 (2d Cir. 1973). 
226 There is often, though not always, a difference in the formality and scope of the "record" 
upon which review is based, but this does not change the elements of the ultimate standard 
of review. See supra note 219 and accompanying text. 
227 Ct. Universal Camera v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951). Justice Frankfurter stated that in 
applying the statutory term "substantial evidence," which was "so elusive that it cannot be 
precisely defined," the courts might have to find its meaning "more by the demonstrable forces 
that produced it than by its precise phrasing." [d. at 489. And in determining what that 
legislative background was, "[i]t is fair to say that in all this Congress expressed a mood . . . 
[that] must be respected, even though it can only serve as a standard for judgment and not 
as a body of rigid rules." [d. at 487. 
228 First Nat'l Bank of Fayetteville v. Smith, 508 F.2d 1371, 1376 (8th Cir. 1974) (record 
failed to establish that Comptroller acted arbitrarily and capriciously in approval of national 
bank application), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 930 (1975). The Fayetteville court further noted that 
"[t]he arbitrary and capricious standard of review ... is more restrictive [of the court] than 
the 'substantial evidence' test." [d. Accord Temple Univ. v. Associated Hosp. Serv., 361 F. 
Supp. 263, 271 (E.n. Pa. 1973) (review under the arbitrary and capricious test more limited 
than under the substantial evidence test). See also Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 141 (1973); 
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971). The requirement of an 
adequate record, featured in both Overton Park and Camp v. Pitts, is a backhanded way of 
establishing the rationality requirement. If courts send decisions back to agencies because of 
insufficient supporting factual records on review, they are implicitly holding that without such 
supporting facts the decision cannot be upheld. 
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decision. In theory, governmental decisions in both cases are favored 
with a presumption of validity, but courts are far more willing to 
undertake vigorous scrutiny of the former. That willingness accounts 
for the difference in deference and in burden of proof echoed in the 
semantic labels of the tests. The "mood" of the substantial evidence 
test has accordingly led in practice to a greater number of instances 
in which agency decisions have been overturned. 229 
A further distinction between the tests is that, in practice, the 
quantum of fact required to support particular decisions may differ. 
Given the lesser degree of deference accorded under the substantial 
evidence test, more facts may be necessary to provide adequate 
evidence to support a reasonable mind's decision thereunder than 
for decisions tested under the arbitrary and capricious formula. This 
distinction is reflected in the differing requirements for an agency's 
record on review. Substantial evidence review usually requires a 
formal record, incorporating all hearing testimony and all evidence 
considered by the agency in making a particular decision.230 The 
"record" in reviews of agency determinations under the arbitrary 
and capricious standard can be far less comprehensive. It need con-
tain only enough facts to show the court that the normative decision 
is rationally based; it is compiled ad hoc by the agency and litigating 
parties as they see fit.231 Nevertheless, there must be sufficient facts. 
An informal decision that is backed by a record on review that fails 
to manifest sufficient supporting facts will be sent back to the 
agency. 232 
Analytically then, the elements of the arbitrariness inquiry come 
down to familiar terms. If a court decides that a reasonable mind, 
229 This tendency was evident from the beginning, starting with Universal Camera. 
230 CI. Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 473 (D.C. Cir. 1974) 
(application of substantial evidence review of informal proceedings explained as a pragmatic 
"legislative compromise"). 
231 E.g., First Nat'l Bank of Fayetteville v. Smith, 508 F.2d 1371, 1375-76 (8th Cir. 1974), 
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 930 (1975). 
232 As noted at text accompanying supra note 19, there is an astonishing dearth of cases in 
which federal courts have actually stricken agency actions as arbitrary and capricious. In 
keeping, no doubt, with their conception of deference, the courts have been far more willing 
to remand to the lower courts, or to the agencies themselves, to supplement the factual record 
so that it can support the agency determination. As in Overton Park and Camp v. Pitts, the 
Court may suspect that the agency has no evidence, and the remand is merely a discreet 
method of nullifying a decision without publicly declaring it arbitrary, as those cases subse-
quently demonstrated. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); 
Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138 (1973). In a few cases the Court has actually declared an agency 
action arbitrary. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 
U.S. 29 (1983). 
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given the legal norm to be applied and the particular facts of the 
case, could not have reached that particular determination, the gov-
ernmental action is void for arbitrariness. 
2. Defining the Rationality of a Reasonable Mind: Benefits, Costs, 
Alternatives 
a. Benefits and Costs 
Extending Frankfurter's Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB for-
mulation of a legal test of irrationality233 to the field of arbitrary and 
capricious reviews does not end the inquiry. It remains to be asked 
how a reasonable mind determines whether facts adequately support 
a particular normative conclusion. The answer is easy if there are 
no relevant facts to support a conclusion, and substantial facts that 
deny it. Such cases clearly demonstrate a total lack of logic. But, in 
the real world, there are almost always some facts that arguably 
have some probativeness. (The fact that a person has a Germanic 
name offers some indication that she might be German, but alone 
clearly would fail to provide a rational basis for such a conclusion.) 
Rational decisions are based upon a comparative weighing of positive 
and negative pieces of information. The question then becomes one 
of proportionality, logic, relevance, contexts, and judgment. 
Defining the meaning of "rationality" or "reasonableness" is an 
awesome task, even if the goal is limited to definitions of govern-
mental rationality in the particular narrow context of judicial review. 
Yet the concept of rationality turns up so often as part of basic tests 
of governmental conduct that a failure to develop a workable defi-
nition for it condemns those tests to perpetual SUbjectivity. 
One useful approach to defining rationality can be found in the 
fact that most human actions, decisions, and determinations are 
made with one or (usually) more goal objectives, norms, or values 
in mind. Governmental actions are no different, and offer the further 
advantage that, when governmental powers are used to constrain 
the rights of individuals, in each case the particular governmental 
purpose that justifies the action must be both delineable and 
proper.234 Accordingly, the rationality question can initially be ap-
proached through the context of governmental objectives, and this 
233 Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 497 (1951). 
234 As analyzed herein, the definition of a proper governmental purpose is basic to the 
judicial review inquiry on its own terms; it also has relevance to the ultra vires authority 
inquiry and logically serves as the basis of any means-end analysis. 
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avenue opens up a further use for the diagnostic categories devel-
oped earlier above. 
Viewed from this perspective, the test of rationality or 
reasonableness235 includes means-end analysis as a basic component. 
Determining whether decisions to require airbags in cars, or to 
prohibit insider trading, are reasonable, means asking whether the 
regulatory terms chosen are rationally related to the achievement 
of defined purposes: auto safety, the fair and open marketplace, or 
whatever. 
Determining whether the governmental choice of means is ration-
ally related to ends also requires an updated exercise in cost-benefit 
analysis. Cost-benefit analysis does not have to mean the dollar-
based balance sheet so beloved of Chicago economists, nor the cor-
porate sector reckoning of modern so-called "regulatory reform-
ers. "236 Rather, judicial review requires a rehabilitated and concep-
tualized overall cost-benefit analysis. According to such an analysis, 
a governmental decision is "rational" when a comparative weighing 
of positive, supportive facts and negative, detractive facts produces 
a net quantum of fact that, on balance, supports the decision. 
This balance is clearly not exclusively nor even primarily financial, 
despite the "cost-benefit" rubric. But, when defined as a balance of 
factual concepts and values as well as dollars, it provides a realistic 
description of how rational minds make decisions. When reasonable 
persons make decisions in their everyday lives-whether to buy a 
new car; whether to vacation in Florida, Tibet, or at home; whether 
to paint the house-they weigh a wide array of factors and values, 
positive and negative. 
Governmental decisionmakers are similarly affected by a wide 
array of considerations beyond finances: questions of practical fea-
sibility, varying statutory mandates, political consequences, pres-
sures from powerful members of the legislature and the chief exec-
utive, the potential effect on the private sector, and so on. Unlike 
the decisions of individual citizens, however, governmental decisions 
are held to a narrow range of proper considerations when subjected 
to judicial review. An agency cannot say "we decided to amend that 
rule because the President and his allies didn't like it," even though 
that reason may indeed have been the primary and dispositive cause 
235 The terms are assumed to mean the same thing. An act is "unreasonable" when it lacks 
rational basis, or basis in a good and sufficient reason. Just any old reason does not make a 
decision "reasonable." Reasonableness is an overall rational conclusion. 
236 See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981); State Farm, 463 U.S. at 49. 
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for the amendment. On Capitol Hill and in the corridors of the 
executive branch, that reason may be good enough, and may even 
be openly avowed. Courts, however, with only a few aberrant dicta 
to the contrary, require agencies to justify their decisions in terms 
of their purported delegated purposes, in terms, in other words, of 
accomplishing their statutory objectives. 
Thus, in Motor Vehicles Manufacturers Association of the United 
States v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance it may well have been, 
as Justice Rehnquist wrote, that the Reagan Administration's scrap-
ping of the automobile airbag regulation was merely a function of 
who had won the election.237 In that case, however, one of the few 
notable recent cases in which a governmental action was found to 
be "arbitrary," the Court nevertheless sent the agency back to pre-
pare a factual record that demonstrated a justification on the merits, 
a means-end relationship showing how the decisional balance of facts, 
in light of the continuing statutory auto safety purposes, had changed 
since the Carter Administration so as to support the new conclu-
sion.238 
N or will the recitation of a bare minimum of one-sided factual 
allegations (that taken alone in a vacuum might tend to support a 
challenged governmental decision) be automatically sufficient to sat-
isfy judicial means-end review. The courts have long been willing to 
consider what facts weigh probatively on the plus/minus, costlbenefit 
sides of the scales, giving to each a "fair estimation of worth" in 
achieving governmental purpose. 239 
237 State Farm, 463 U.S. at 59. Then Justice Rehnquist thus explained the Reagan Depart-
ment of Transportation's reversal of the prior auto safety regulatory decision as "related to 
the election of a new President of a different political party . . . . [T]he responsible members 
of one administration may consider public resistance and uncertainties to be more important 
than do their counterparts in a previous administration . . . . As long as the agency remains 
within the bounds established by Congress, it is entitled to assess administrative records and 
evaluate priorities in light of the philosophy of the administration." I d. at 59 (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting). Rehnquist's comments accepting political pressure sound like unexceptionable 
legal realism-Republican invective had long been focused on the "wasteful" airbag-until one 
recognizes that such a judicial approach would ultimately collapse judicial review into an 
acceptance of power politics decisions without consideration of objective merits. See infra note 
356. 
23B In State Farm, the agency had indeed made efforts (found to be insufficient) to justify 
the new decision with new facts, which demonstrates how the prospect of judicial review does 
in fact encourage agencies to base their actions on a factual record reflecting the merits. State 
Farm, 463 U.S. at 47-51. 
239 This is part of the legacy of Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487-88 
(1951). See also American Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 
522-23 (1981); NLRB v. Baptist Hospital, Inc., 442 U.S. 773, 782 (1979); Beth Israel Hospital 
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Quite apart from the recent controversies over whether or not 
governmental actions are subject to implicit financial cost-benefit 
analysis24°-a proposition that would allow courts to intrude on the 
intimate details of cost-accounting that they probably have been wise 
to avoid241-all judicial reviews of the rationality of governmental 
actions thus involve, at least implicitly, an overall conceptual inquiry 
into the decisions' pluses and minuses. 
b. Alternatives, and the Riddle of Less Drastic Means 
This basic clarification of rationality analysis ultimately identifies 
a further element implicit in cost-benefit logic, but one less widely 
noted. When individual citizens decide what kind of car to buy, the 
question is not isolated on one option, for example, "shall I buy a 
new red Ford Sabretooth, or nothing?" Rather, cost-benefit balanc-
ing by rational individuals takes place in a context: it includes con-
sideration of the costs and benefits of alternative options as well. In 
the automobile example, for instance, a consumer will usually con-
sider other brands, other models, new or used, as well as the option 
of postponing the purchase, or of doing nothing. 
Governmental decisions are no different. A rational agency deci-
sion on auto passenger safety logically will include consideration of 
the overall costs and benefits of all available, practical alternatives. 
If it does not, courts can properly criticize the agency decision as 
irrational, especially where it imposes heavy burdens on private 
interests. 242 Moreover, an agency decision to impose particular bur-
dens on an individual, when the same legislative purposes could be 
as well served by "less-drastic-means," may be scrutinized by the 
v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 501 (1978); Bowman Transp. Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, 
Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 284 (1974), reh'g denied, 420 U.S. 956 (1975). 
240 Justice Powell would have so held in the benzene case, Industrial Union Dept., AFL-
CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 664-71 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting), but 
the Court has not followed his lead. ATMI v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981). See Comment, 
An Inherent Role for Cost-Benefit Analysis in Judicial Review of Agency Decisions: A New 
Perspective on OSHA Rulemaking, 10 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 365 (1982). 
241 See supra note 27. 
242 Unless, of course, the agency has been legislatively restricted in the range of options it 
is permitted to consider. In State Farm, for example, if Congress had said "seatbelt systems 
only," it would have limited the alternatives comparison to seatbelts, at least so long as a 
court could not say the legislative constraint was itself irrational. See State Farm, 463 U.S. 
29. This is where the difference between agency and legislature is likely to be most relevant; 
the elements of judicial rationality review may be the same, but a reviewing court will allow 
a legislature a broader leeway of purposes, goals, or normative considerations. 
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courts and overturned if, on cost-benefit balance, the failure to use 
less drastic means cannot be rationally supported. 243 
Even simple governmental decisions with narrowly restricted 
terms-"do we build Bridge X or not?" -contain several layers of 
alternatives analysis as well: do we build it as a truss bridge as 
designed, or as a suspension bridge, or a draw bridge; do we not 
build it? Each of these questions involves a comparative cost-benefit 
question, balancing facts that support the proposal and those that 
detract from it in the context of reasonably available, alternative 
options. 
The riddle of less-drastic-means analysis is that the concept has 
developed significant recognition in several areas of the law, without 
attracting much scholarly comment upon its generic utility. Less-
drastic-means language regularly occurs in several areas of consti-
tutional law. When governmental actions have weighed heavily on 
fundamental rights, as did the state restriction on voting rights 
struck down in Dunn v. Blumstein, the resulting higher scrutiny 
judicial review has included analysis of less drastic means. 244 The 
concept appears in equal protection cases, too. Some classifications 
are "rational" in the sense that they accomplish their proper public 
purposes, for example, but can be successfully attacked as over-
inclusive because a less-drastic classification would accomplish the 
purpose equally well. 245 
Another line of least-drastic-means case law derives from the 
Court's 1894 Lawton v. Steele decision noted earlier, upholding a 
state conservation agency's destruction of illegal nets to stop poach-
ing.246 The Lawton Court based its decision on the judicial test of 
whether "the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplish-
ment of the [public] purpose and not unduly offensive upon individ-
uals."247 This test specifically accepted judicial review of "necessity," 
a review that would appear to require consideration of governmental 
alternatives,248 and did so in a balance between particular individual 
burdens and governmental efficiency. Lawton's test continues to 
243 See infra notes 252-54 and accompanying text. 
244 405 U.S. 330 (1972). 
245 See infra notes 252-54. 
246 152 U.S. 133 (1894). 
247 [d. at 137 (emphasis added); see also Libertarian Party of Florida v. Florida, 710 F.2d 
790 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 831 (1983); Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist 
Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173 (1979); United States v. Mason, 523 F.2d 1122 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
248 Necessity is another problematic word, considered at length supra at note 121 and 
accompanying text. 
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appear in both state and federal judicial review cases249 though 
its implications for active rationality review are generally unre-
marked. 
The wonder is that this relatively simple judicial act-the consid-
eration of governmental decisions, deferentially, in the context of 
the realistic, available governmental options-has not been explicitly 
undertaken in a wider range of cases. In practice it surely occurs, 
in nonexplicit terms. For example, in State Farm Mutual the Court 
insisted on reviewing the Reagan Administration's seatbelt rules in 
terms of the alternative, passive restraint protective requirements 
available.250 Moreover, the extrapolation of equal protection review 
techniques to due process reviews, in effect reviewing "classification" 
categories of one individual at a time, is not a great leap. Neverthe-
less, perhaps because it raises the troubling specter of reviewing 
SUbjective governmental judgments of "necessity," as noted in the 
eminent domain setting,251 the concept appears only occasionally in 
constitutional reviews in state courts, and even more rarely in fed-
eral courts. 
In one area of judicial review of administrative decisions, however, 
the less-drastic-means test has flourished as an integral part of basic 
arbitrary and capricious analysis. In a long-running series of FTC 
cases, the courts have developed a less-drastic-means formulation 
for testing the rationality of administrative decisions. When a prod-
uct's name has falsely implied that it contains desirable ingredients 
(the name "Alpacuna" for cloth made of cotton and wool, but con-
taining no alpaca and no vicuna)252 or when a company name itself 
has been misleading (The Royal Milling Company did not mill any-
thing),253 the FTC has ordered changes in the corporate or product 
name. The courts, however, have regularly reviewed and occasion-
ally vacated these FTC orders on less-drastic-means grounds. The 
theory of those court decisions was either the substantive imperative 
that, in light of the burdens on regulated parties, agencies must 
249 Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 597 (1957); Air Terminal Services v. United 
States, 330 F.2d 974, 981 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 829 (1964); Gambone v. Common-
wealth, 375 Pa. 547, 551-52, 101 A.2d 634, 637 (1954) ("The question whether any particular 
statutory provision is . . . related to the public good and . . . reasonable in the means it 
prescribes ... is one for the judgment, in the first instance, of the law-making branch of the 
government, but its final determination is for the courts." (footnote omitted)); Commonwealth 
v. Barnes & Tucker Coal Co., 472 Pa. 115, 128, 371 A.2d 461, 467 (1977), cert. denied, 434 
U.S. 807 (1978). 
250 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 48-49, (1983). 
251 See supra notes 121-84 and accompanying text. 
252 Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608 (1946). 
253 FTC v. Royal Milling Co., 288 U.S. 212, 214-15 (1933). 
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adopt the available less-drastic remedies,254 or, more subtly, that 
agencies must explain adequately why they did not order the lesser 
burden. 255 
These less-drastic-means decisions and others like them do not 
appear to be based upon any statute but are a gloss on the basic 
concept of administrative rationality, sounding in due process.256 The 
fundamental assumption is that, when the consequences of an agency 
remedy will weigh heavily on private (particularly corporate) prop-
erty, a rational agency must choose the alternative that is least 
burdensome as well as effective for accomplishment of its purpose, 
or explain sufficiently why it did not do so. 
This existing experience with explicit less-drastic-means judicial 
review suggests several conclusions. First, such reviews are feasi-
ble, despite the undoubted demands of deference. Second, the ex-
tension of typical means-end reviews into the consideration of alter-
natives does not represent a quantum leap into the unknown. (The 
courts reviewing FTC orders do not even seem to realize the ex-
panded nature of their reviews.) Insofar as it accords with common 
sense, moreover, consideration of the contextual reality of available 
alternatives is desirable in those cases in which more narrow means-
end inquiries miss important points. The courts' exercise of less-
drastic-means contextual reviews in such cases appears to be broadly 
accepted by scholars and courts alike, with criticism reserved for 
disagreements over particular applications. 257 Finally, the fact that 
courts do undertake implicit less-drastic-means scrutiny in some 
cases258 argues for further recognition and acceptance of the propri-
ety of this form of rationality analysis. 
D. Substantive Due Process: Caging the Lochner Monster 
1. Lochner 
Substantive due process, especially its economic version, has a 
bad name, well-earned by the protracted run of judicial bad judg-
254 See Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 950 
(1977). 
255 Jacob Siegel Co., 327 U.S. 608 (1946). In this case, the agency got the message, and 
reversed its challenged decision. [d. at 613. 
256 The less-drastic-means FTC cases cite no statutory basis for the fundamental proposition. 
See, e.g., Royal Milling, 288 U.S. at 217. 
257 See Struve, The Less-Restrictive Alternative Principle and Economic Due Process, 80 
HARV. L. REV. 1463 (1967); Wormuth & Miskin, The Doctrine of the Reasonable Alternative, 
9 UTAH L. REV. 254 (1964). 
258 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17, 24 (1968); 
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963). 
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ment associated with it earlier in this century. The substantive 
means-end review discussed in this Article certainly touches upon a 
suspect territory of substantive due process. If the "arbitrary and 
capricious" test is not just a statutory creation, and is not restricted 
to mere procedural applications, then it is a constitutional concept 
sounding in substantive due process. Despite the anathema pro-
nounced upon substantive due process by succeeding generations of 
courts and scholars, however, such process fulfills a valuable fun-
damental role in our system, and, more or less surreptitiously and 
consistently, continues to play it.259 A clarified analysis of what it 
was all about can serve to narrow the criticisms of substantive due 
process review and help it emerge circumspectly from the closet. 
The notorious Lochner decision is perhaps the classic substantive 
due process case, overturning N ew York's protective restriction of 
working hours for bakery workers, ostensibly on behalf of the work-
ers' right to agree to be exploited.260 The Lochner opinion clearly 
had aspects of substantive means-end review. The Court spent time 
examining the degree to which work restrictions related to public 
health, concluding that "the act must have a more direct relation, as 
a means to an end,"261 a phrasing that clearly questioned whether 
the act plausibly served its purpose. 
But the Lochner decision contained much more, in such a motley 
array of issues that it would be ill-advised for scholars to pin the 
results of its holding on simple means-end review. Moreover, the 
opinion is clouded by a double focus, implicitly treating employers' 
rights and workers' rights as parallel, and relying on the constitu-
tional right of contract as well as due process.262 The major ambi-
259 This is not a novel perception. See Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 SUP. 
CT. REV. 85 (1982); Karlin, Substantive Due Process: A Doctrine for Regulatory Control, 13 
Sw. U.L. REV. 479 (1983); P. BREST, supra note 22, at 657-717. 
260 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Probably only Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 
393 (1857), and Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, reh'g denied, 324 U.S. 385 (1944), 
have enjoyed such persistent infamy among members of the legal profession. As of 1984, some 
form of the word "Lochner" occurred in 274 cases, federal and state, a remarkable legacy for 
an overruled and discredited opinion! 
261 198 U.S. 45, 57 (1905). 
262 [d. at 53, 57. 
The statute necessarily interferes with the right of contract between the employer 
and employees, concerning the number of hours in which the latter may l'abor in the 
bakery of the employer. The general right to make a contract in relation to his 
business is part of the liberty of the individual protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment of the Federal Constitution .... The right to purchase or to sell labor is part 
of the liberty protected by this amendment. . . . 
[d. at 53. As with the classic case of Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), which 
also involved a contracts theory as support for the Court's finding of unconstitutionality, the 
substantive due process theory in Lochner has tended to eclipse the contract claim in the 
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guity, however, lies in determining what branch of substantive due 
process was actually applied, because, if one makes categorical dis-
tinctions between the purpose and means-end inquiries, it is the 
former that receives most of the Court's wrath, not the latter. 
The legislature's "end must itself be appropriate and legitimate," 
Justice Peckham wrote. 263 New York's stated purpose in passing the 
regulation was health, a valid purpose. In arriving at the conclusion 
that the act was unconstitutional, however, Peckham made it clear 
that the justices thought the legislature was, as he said, up to 
something. 264 The state's arguments gave rise "to at least a suspicion 
that there was some other motive dominating the legislature than 
the purpose to sub serve the public health or welfare," making it 
appear to the Court "that the real object and purpose were simply 
to regulate the hours of labor between the master and his employees 
... in a private business .... "265 
In fact, it was the suspicious ideological economic purposes that 
lay latent in such governmental activism, not the logic of whether 
the regulation actually achieved its avowed purposes, that inspired 
the Court's antagonistic reaction. The decision also contained hints 
of other purpose problems, including the permissibility of protecting 
workers against their own free choice. 266 The opinion continued be-
yond purpose in means-end terms to say that the Court doubted that 
the act was substantially related to health,267 but the Court's ex-
subsequent assessments of both courts and scholars. As a matter of more current interest, in 
Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978), the contract clause's re-emer-
gence included a Supreme Court test of whether the challenged governmental action was 
"necessary." Allied Structural Steel, 438 U.S. at 247; cf. supra notes 121-34 and accompanying 
text. 
263 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 57. 
264 [d. 
265 [d. at 63-64. The opinion continued on, expressing further doubt about the substantial 
relationship. "[FJrom the character of the law and the subject upon which it legislates, it is 
apparent that the public health or morals bears but the most remote relation to the law. The 
purpose of a statute must be determined from the natural and legal effect of the language 
employed ... and not from [its] proclaimed purpose." [d. 
266 
The mandate of the statute that "no employee" shall be required or permitted to 
work is the substantial equivalent of an enactment that "no employee shall contract 
or agree to work" more than ten hours per day .... The employee may desire to 
earn the extra money ... [and] this statute forbids the employer from permitting 
the employee to earn it. 
[d. at 52-53; cf. supra note 262. 
267 
The law must be upheld, if at all, as a law pertaining to the health of the individual 
engaged in the occupation of a baker. It does not affect any other portion of the 
public than those who are engaged in that occupation. Clean and wholesome bread 
does not depend upon whether the baker works but ten hours per day or only sixty 
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pressed concern about the legislature's purposes was clearly impor-
tant to the Lochner case's outcome. Thus, although subsequent gen-
erations have rejected Lochner and its ilk, the character of the 
backlash has similarly been too blunt and unspecific in response to 
the blunt force of that Court's passion, equating substantive due 
process with the whole panopoly of reactionary arguments and con-
sequences. 
Several major analytical distinctions can be made within Lochner. 
Most importantly, the Lochner Court's scrutiny of purpose was a 
separate inquiry from its means-end scrutiny. As to the first inquiry, 
it surely was legitimate that the Court considered whether the state 
had a proper public purpose. The part of Lochner that has become 
ill-regarded by our legal system, at least until recently, is the Loch-
ner Court's specific view that government's regulatory planning pur-
pose is an illegitimate component of general welfare.268 If this ap-
proach is to be characterized as a means-end review, however-as a 
latent holding that governmental regulatory planning based on eco-
nomic considerations was in general neither a rational nor permis-
sible means to the end of health and welfare-that specific argument 
has long since been overturned. 269 Indeed, the Lochner majority's 
discussions on the subject of means-end relationship support the 
interpretation that the Court held a strong fundamental skepticism 
about the legitimacy of regulation itself. 
The Lochner decision has thus justifiably been subjected to the 
commentators' scathing negative reaction. The fault should not be 
attributed to the alleged illegitimacy of all substantive means-end 
review, however. Rather, it lies in the highhanded, almost total lack 
hours a week . . . . The mere assertion that the subject relates though but in a 
remote degree to the public health does not necessarily render the enactment valid. 
ld. at 57. 
268 In comparing Lochner with West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) 
(upholding a minimum wage law), Professor Tribe writes: 
[If Lochner was wrong, and West Coast Hotel was right], the reason can only be 
that, in twentieth century America, minimum wage laws, as a substantive matter, 
are not intrusions upon human freedom in any constitutionally meaningful sense, but 
are instead entirely reasonable and just ways of attempting to combat economic 
subjugation and human domination. 
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 8-7, at 585 (2d ed. 1988). 
269 Euclid seems to have been the Court's first acceptance of comprehensive planning. 
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926). "Such regulations are 
sustained, under the complex conditions of our day, for reasons analogous to those which 
justify traffic regulations . . . . [The scope of application] of constitutional guarantees . . . 
must expand or contract to meet the new and different conditions which are constantly coming 
within the field of their operation." ld. at 387. 
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of deference the Lochner Court exhibited in its means-end inquiry. 
In virtually taking over the legislature's decision, the Court effec-
tively eliminated any presumption of validity. This tilt can probably 
be best explained by the Court's elemental suspicion of the govern-
ment's purposes, equating the natural course of business decisions 
as an entrepreneurial "fundamental right, "270 a right the Court con-
sidered basic to the structural health of the American polity. 
From this perspective, the means-end review of the Lochner Court 
appears to have been approached in exceedingly rigorous, almost 
unachievable terms, with extreme results. But if the Court had 
reviewed the health purpose and found that the regulation did rea-
sonably relate to that purpose (as in fact it had done in Radice v.New 
York and other economic regulation cases), 271 generations of com-
mentators would not have condemned the Lochner result, though 
analytically the Court would just as surely have been pursuing sub-
stantive due process review. The commentators confuse the partic-
ular results reached by the Lochner Court in applying the test with 
the terms of the test itself. 272 
2. Substantive Due Process in Spite of Lochneys Backlash 
It is hardly new to assert that "generic" substantive due process 
never disappeared from the courts.273 Because of the profession's 
aversions to the excesses of the old "economic" substantive due 
process cases, however, it is rarer to find judges overtly identifying 
270 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53; cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, reh'g denied, 410 U.S. 959 
(1973); Dee v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, reh'g denied, 410 U.S. 959 (1973). Addressing Lochner, 
Professor Tribe writes that 
What was wrong was simply that, as a picture of freedom in industrial society, the 
one painted by the Justices badly distorted the character and needs of the human 
condition and the reality of the economic situation .... [But] there is no escape from 
the difficult task of painting a better-a morally and economically truer-picture 
L. TRIBE, supra note 268, at 455 n.37. 
271 See, e.g., Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292,294-95 (1924) (upholding statute prohibiting 
the employment of women in restaurants during certain hours); Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. 
Interstate Commerce Comm'n. 221 U.S. 612, 619 (1911) (upholding limitations on the working 
hours of railroad employees); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421-23 (1908) (upholding statute 
that limited the workday of factory women); Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426, 438-39 (1917) 
(sustaining ten-hour maximum workday for male factory employees). 
272 The Supreme Court's confusing agglomeration of motives, analyses, and rhetoric in 
Lochner was echoed elsewhere in the Lochner-era due process cases. See, e.g., Coppage v. 
Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908); Adkins v. Children's 
Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923). 
273 Michelman, supra note 22, at 499; see also articles cited in supra note 259. 
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their inquiries as substantive due process.274 Nevertheless, although 
active judicial use of the term "substantive due process" fell off 
drastically after Nebbia and West Coast Hotel, the practical reality 
has continued. 275 
Administrative law decisions again offer a useful analytical per-
spective in defining the constitutional foundation of substantive due 
process. Between the 1937 Supreme Court's "switch in time that 
saved nine," abandoning the Lochner line among others, and 1946 
when the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) was promulgated by 
a virtually unanimous Congress, substantive judicial review of 
agency actions continued unabated, despite that fact that there was 
no direct general statutory authority for it.276 As the 1946 Attorney 
General's Manual on the APA noted, "[c]ourts having jurisdiction 
have always exercised the power in appropriate cases to set aside 
agency action which they found to be ... 'arbitrary, capricious [or] 
an abuse of discretion. "'277 The legal basis of such review analytically 
had to be substantive due process. 
A further coda on LochneFs backlash is that times do change. 
Lochner's reasoning harkened back to the era of American political 
theory when the unencumbered marketplace was the primary engine 
274 Instead, the modern tendency is for the Court to present its review within the framework 
of a "fundamental right" deriving from the so-called penumbras of the Bill of Rights. See, e.g., 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). In Lochner, the substantive due process 
portion of the opinion concerned the "overbreadth" argument: the mere fact that a bakery 
may be somewhat unhealthy does not justify a sweeping interference with liberty. Lochner 
v. N ew York, 198 U. S. 45, 59 (1905). As it compared bakeries to other unregulated businesses, 
the Court made an equal protection argument. ld. As Professor Bice states the distinction, a 
citizen's due process claim is that "[tlhe State may not treat me the same as it does him, for 
we are different," while that citizen's equal protection claim is "the State may not treat me 
differently, for we are the same." Bice, Equal Protection: A Closer Look at Closer Scrutiny, 
76 MICH. L. REV. 771,832--33 (1978). Courts, however, are not always so clear in distinguishing 
between the two concepts, often confusing the "overbreadth" due process concept with equal 
protection. 
275 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 
379 (1937). See, e.g., State Ex. ReI. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, reh'g denied, 303 U.S. 
667 (1938) (striking down an Indiana law repealing teacher tenure rights); Wood v. Lovett, 
313 U.S. 362 (1941) (immunizing landowner from repeal of statute curing tax sale irregulari-
ties). 
276 See Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945); Long Island Water Corp. v. Public Servo 
Comm'n, 23 F. Supp. 834 (S.D.N.Y. 1938); David L. Moss CO. V. United States, 103 F.2d 395 
(C.C.P.A. 1939); Estep V. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946); Markall V. Bowles, 58 F. Supp. 
463 (N.D. Cal. 1945); Marburg V. Cole, 175 Misc. 308, 23 N.Y.S.2d 501 (1940). The APA, 5 
U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1982), was passed in June 1946. Section 10 of the APA provides for judicial 
review of administration decisions, including both "arbitrary [andl capricious, ... abuse of 
discretion" and "substantial evidence" as statutory tests. 5 U. S. C. § 706(2)lA), (E) (1982). 
277 Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act 108 (U.S. Gov't Printing 
Office 1947). 
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of national endeavor. The backlash against Lochner developed in the 
era when government came to be recognized as a legitimate partic-
ipant and counterweight to the excesses of the market. As Professor 
Stewart's classic historical overview illustrates,278 however, America 
has progressed beyond a simple bipolar system of governmental 
power versus business power. Though the old tensions remain to 
some degree, to a greater degree business and government have 
worked out a fairly consistent system of accommodating one another 
(thereby creating the "Establishment" discovered by the Woodstock 
generation), and the legal system has been pushed to allow pluralistic 
intervention by third-party "outsiders": consumers, environmental-
ists, disgruntled veterans, safety nuts, and so on.279 
E. Defining the Basic Governmental "Purpose" 
A process of defining "legislative purpose" or "legitimate ends" 
has been the starting point for judicial reviews of governmental 
action at least since McCulloch v. Maryland. 280 Regulatory objec-
tives must satisfy constitutional requirements in terms of their own 
validity as well as their relationship to other merits on review. 281 
Justice Frankfurter established the proposition that the search for 
such objectives is properly a problem of statutory interpretation.282 
Thus, according to Frankfurter, it is the job of the Court to "'prolif-
erat[e] a purpose,'" in part through a thorough investigation of "the 
demonstrable forces" that produced it. 283 These "demonstrable 
278 Stewart, Reformation, supra note 47; see also Stewart, Regulation, Innovation, and 
Administrative Law: A Conceptual Framework, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 1256 (1981). 
279 Notable examples of "third party" challenges that are generally recognized as legitimate, 
though initially regarded as maverick efforts, include the SST supersonic transport, now 
regarded as a narrowly-avoided economic fiasco; the Trans-Alaska pipeline, which was forced 
into vastly improved technology and design; the identification of health hazards of cigarette 
smoking to smokers and non-smokers; Rachel Carson's identification of the widespread con-
sequences of chemical contamination of the physical environment; nuclear issues; and citizen 
attempts to halt the Teton Dam on safety grounds, etc. Citizens' public interest litigation is 
now a widespread and established part of the judicial docket in both state and federal courts. 
280 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of 
the constitution, and all means ... plainly adapted to that end ... are constitutional." Id. at 
421. This statement incorporates the essential elements of substantive judicial review of 
authority, of proper public purpose, and of a deferential but meaningful consideration whether 
chosen means are "plainly" related to accomplishing ends. 
281 Cantwell v. United States, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940); McQuoid v. Smith, 556 F.2d 595, 
599 (1st Cir. 1977). 
282 Attributed to Justice Holmes, without citation, in Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the 
Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 530 (1947). 
283 Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 481 (1951) (quoting Brooklyn Nat'l 
Corp. v. Commissioner, 157 F.2d 450, 451 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 733 (1946)). 
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forces," however, are not the same thing as the subjective intent of 
legislators. There is a major difference between legislative purpose 
and legislative intent. Attempts to divine the subjective intentions 
of the collective legislative mind represented by "legislative intent" 
may be difficult,284 and may well miss the point. The point is not 
what various individual legislators sought to accomplish through the 
legislation,285 and even less how a majority of those legislators might 
decide a specific case today if they were still alive,286 but what the 
central goal of the legislation was, the "raison d'etre" objectives that 
can be discerned on its face. 287 
The interpretation process usually is based upon express terms in 
the statute itself, in preamble or text, but may also be declared by 
the state through its officers and advocates. With a few dramatic 
exceptions,288 the courts will not step in and create a validating 
purpose where none has been expressed by the legislature. 289 
284 As Max Radin observed in his classic article on statutory interpretation: 
That the intention of the legislature is undiscoverable in any real sense is almost an 
immediate inference from a statement of the proposition. The chances that of several 
hundred men each will have exactly the same determinate situations in mind as 
possible reductions of a given determinable, are infinitesimally small .... Even if 
the contents of the minds of the legislature were uniform, we have no means of 
knowing that content except by the external utterances or behavior of these hundreds 
of men .... It is not impossible that this knowledge could be obtained. But how 
probable it is, even venturesome mathematicians will scarcely undertake to compute. 
Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 870-71 (1930). 
285 For a bemusing case where a court heard conflicting testimony from legislators as to 
what they really had meant when they voted for a bill, see Friends of Mammoth v. Board of 
Supervisors of Mono County, 8 Cal.3d 247, 502 P.2d 1049, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1972). 
286 This inquiry crosses the lines between the role of courts and agencies, on one hand, and 
legislatures, on the other. A legislature ends, as a legal entity, on the day it adjourns, leaving 
its statutory acts to fare on their own merits in courts and agencies until properly amended 
or repealed. See H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE 
MAKING AND ApPLICATION OF LAW 1144-47, 1243-69 (tent. draft 1958). 
287 "This Court need not ... accept at face value assertions of legislative purposes, when 
an examination of the legislative scheme and its history demonstrates that the asserted 
purpose could not have been a goal of the legislation." Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 
636, 648 n.16 (1975). 
288 See, e.g., Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552, reh'g denied, 331 
U.S. 864 (1947). 
289 Bice, supra note 22, at 30. In his dissenting opinion in Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 
221 (1981), Justice Powell wrote: 
Our democratic system requires that legislation intended to serve a discernable 
purpose receive the most respectful deference .... Yet, the question of whether a 
statutory classification discriminates arbitrarily cannot be divorced from whether it 
was enacted to serve an identifiable purpose. When a legislative purpose can be 
suggested only by the ingenuity of a government lawyer litigating the constitution-
ality of a statute, a reviewing court may be presented not so much with a legislative 
policy choice as its absence. In my view, the Court should receive with some skep-
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There is, however, a further problem in defining legislative pur-
pose: at what level of generality must it be defined? The Court in 
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co. upheld a statute prohibiting opticians 
from fitting eyeglasses, based upon a statutory purpose of "promot-
ing health and safety. "290 The Court would have had a much harder 
time doing so if the statute had straightforwardly stated that "the 
purpose of this legislation is to protect optometrists against compe-
tition. " 
The definition of purpose defines the "turf" upon which the strug-
gle of substantive means-end review will be undertaken. Williamson 
is an example of the Supreme Court upholding a regulation by ac-
cepting a definition of purpose posited at a very high level of ab-
straction. Definitional quandaries arise, as Dean Brest has noted, in 
the context of analyzing the level of generality at which the search 
for purpose is undertaken. 291 A regulation prohibiting the throwing 
of soda cans in streams, for example, could be justified by the fol-
lowing objectives: 1) to keep soda cans out of streams; 2) to reduce 
litter and water pollution; 3) to protect the environment; or 4) to 
promote the general welfare. 
Level one is, of course, "self-validating" in that it is tautological, 
and Brest warns that any regulation can be validated at this level 
of perfect congruence between ends and means. 292 Level four is what 
Ely refers to as an "umbrella goal," and its broad, indiscriminate 
terms also serve to insulate what he calls "discretionary choices," 
legislative determinations as to purpose that cannot be effectively 
reviewed by the courts. 293 Ely further warns us about the use of 
"malleable goals": "An infinitely expandable set of subgoals, one to 
ticism post-hoc hypotheses about legislative purpose, unsupported by the legislative 
history. When no indication of legislative purpose appears other than the current 
position of the Secretary, the Court should require that the classification bear a "fair 
and substantial relation" to the asserted purpose. 
[d. at 244-45 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
Powell went on to argue that, when a statute's purpose is unclear, a slightly higher standard 
of review would provide a meaningful litmus test as to the constitutionality of the statute 
with respect to goals, and would result in a review that would be more than a "mere 
tautological recognition of the fact that Congress did what it intended to do." [d. at 245. In a 
sense, Powell is simply suggesting that the Court return to its time-honored task of inter-
preting statutes; that judges should be above accepting mere conclusory, adversarial, after-
the-fact postulations as to the nature and legitimacy of a statutory purpose, and should not 
lightly substitute them for the reasoned art of statutory interpretation. 
290 348 U.S. 483, 486-87, reh'g denied, 349 U.S. 925 (1955). 
291 P. BREST, supra note 22, at 560-61. 
292 [d. 
293 Ely, supra note 22, at 1239-40. 
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fit every choice the political branches will make, is more realistically 
viewed as one umbrella goal: the promotion of the general welfare. 
The relations between such a goal and various legislative choices is 
not amenable to evaluation in terms of rationality. "294 Thus, "ex-
pandable" or "malleable" goals can too easily justify judges' avoid-
ance of tough cases. 
Despite the difficulties of subjectivity, substantive review of leg-
islative purpose occurs regularly in current jurisprudence, and usu-
ally falls more fittingly between the two extremes of tautology, on 
the one hand, and all-inclusive, umbrella-goal formulations, on the 
other. Meaningful judicial review seems to require a reasoned de-
termination of a government's purpose in acting, so as to provide 
some initial reference points or "intelligible principle" to guide ju-
dicial review. 295 
The process of defining governmental objectives, and thereafter 
testing whether they are reasonably related to regulatory measures, 
has been criticized by some as a "divide and conquer" dissection of 
a statute. 296 For such critics, the Court's process in Shapiro v. 
Thompson,297 striking down a one-year state welfare residency re-
quirement by scrutinizing each of seven purported purposes, illus-
trated this fear. By isolating and analyzing each possible public 
purpose in turn, the Court was able to determine that none was in 
fact rationally served by the statute at hand. One critic has argued 
that, although each purpose individually may have failed to with-
stand scrutiny, together they should have been sustained on the 
basis of some penumbral critical mass: "It is only in the context of 
the full statutory scheme that full meaning can be given to each 
legislative objective. "298 
On its face, this argument invites far more deference on the part 
of reviewing courts, but still concedes the requirement that regula-
tory objectives must find support in the regulatory scheme. In either 
294 [d. 
295 Cf. the delegation cases, beginning with J.W. Hampton, Jr. Co. v. United States, 276 
U.S. 394 (1928), which allowed courts to uphold delegations of legislative power if they and 
the agencies had "an intelligible principle" from congressional enactments to guide them. 
296 Note, supra note 22, at 127. 
297 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-34 (1969). The Court examined and rejected 
each of seven separate definitions of statutory purpose for a state statute restricting residence 
definitions for welfare applicants. By considering each goal and sub-goal separately, the Court 
was able to narrow the question whether that purpose had a rational basis, and strike the 
statute down. The Court also matter-of-factly included a "necessity" test in reviewing the 
latter four sub-goals. [d. 
298 See Note, supra note 22, at 127. 
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case, therefore, the process of defining a purpose and seeking its 
support in the merits of governmental determinations remains a 
basic and indispensable part of the judicial review process. 
F. The Rationality Review Debate 
The continuing debate over a revived rationality review can be 
traced back to a spirited series of scholarly jousts between Profes-
sors Raoul Berger and K.C. Davis in the mid-1960s.299 Davis argued 
that some areas of administrative arbitrariness and abuse of power 
were unreviewable by the judicial branch under the terms of the 
AP A; Berger asserted a broad constitutional presumption for re-
viewability arguing that "grave constitutional doubts would be raised 
by the . . . proposal selectively to shield arbitrary action from re-
view."3°O Behind their acidic discussion of whether or not discretion-
ary acts of administrative agencies were largely exempt from judicial 
review for arbitrariness loomed the constitutional due process doubts 
attached to such unreviewability.301 
The debate became focused on arbitrary legislative acts in 1972 
by Gerald Gunther's assertion that courts could and should enforce 
the principle (which he identified as a constitutional norm) that 
legislative means must substantially further legislative ends.302 Sub-
sequent commentaries by Tribe, Brest, Bennett, Michelman, and 
Bice, among others, have argued for a resurgent means-end sub-
stantive review. 303 In contrast, Professor Leedes and Judge Linde 
299 See, e.g., Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness and Judicial Review, 65 COLUM. L. 
REV. 55 (1965); 4 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 28.16 (1958 & Supp. 1976) 
[hereinafter K. DAVIS, TREATISE]; Berger, supra note 15; Davis, Administrative Arbitrari-
ness-A Final Word, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 814 (1966); Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness-
A Rejoinder to Professor Davis' 'Final Word', 114 U. PA. L. REV. 816 (1966); Davis, Admin-
istrative Arbitrariness-A Postscript, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 823 (1966). 
300 Berger, supra note 15, at 785. 
301 As Berger noted: "The due process test of a statute ... is whether it is 'unreasonable, 
arbitrary or capricious.''' Id. (quoting Burnett v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 410 
(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). "Arbitrary application of a statute is as obnoxious ... as 
is a statute that is arbitrary in terms. What is denied to the legislative-principle must be 
withheld from the administrative-agent. '[T]here is no place in our constitutional system ... 
for the exercise of arbitrary power.''' Id. (quoting Garfield v. Goldsby, 211 U.S. 249, 262 
(1908)). 
302 Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Modelfor 
a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 20 (1972). 
303 L. TRIBE, supra note 268, § 8-7, at 585; P. BREST, supra note 22, at 661-83; Bennett, 
"Mere" Rationality in Constitutional Law: Judicial Review and Democratic Theory, 67 
CALIF. L. REV. 1049 (1979); Michelman, supra note 22; Bice, supra note 22. Without advo-
cating direct cost-benefit review process, Professor Bice argues that courts should insist on a 
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have argued that at least the means-end, substantive due process 
inquiry should remain buried. 304 
It would be presumptuous to attempt to summarize the intricacies 
of a debate so marked in quality, depth, and volume, but some 
generalizations emerge: 1) the technical demands of rationality re-
view are not daunting-courts know how to review substantive 
means-end relationships because they currently do so in equal pro-
tection and other cases, and the process could easily be extended to 
due process cases generally;305 2) the job of substantive review re-
quires the courts to engage in a subjective weighing of minimum 
rationality that is based on a careful process of defining degrees of 
deference; and 3) the decision whether or not to engage in substan-
tive review reflects judges' basic philosophical conceptions of the role 
of courts, of checks and balances, of the nature of republican gov-
ernment, and of the social contract. Thus, lying behind substantive 
judicial review is a major philosophical choice that judges make 
directly or by default when they take on or dodge substantive re-
view. 
1. Means-end Review in Contemporary Practice 
The equal protection cases offer the clearest current examples of 
how substantive rationality review is a practical process, a recurring 
illustration of a judicial balance between avowed means-end review 
and deference. In the past several decades, the Supreme Court has 
actively engaged in substantive review of challenged legislative clas-
sifications in what has been called variously a two- or three-tier 
system of scrutiny, but which analytically is simply the same means-
end test applied with differing degrees of deference. 
For example, in Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur,306 a 
"middle level scrutiny" case, the Court gave an unusually articulated 
analysis in striking down portions of two local school board regula-
tions restricting employment of pregnant women. Consider the rea-
critical modicum of "fundamental rationality." I d. at 53-56. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion 
that this too would involve a means-end, cost-benefit review. 
304 Leedes, The Rationality Requirement of the Equal Protection Clause, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 
639 (1981); Linde, supra note 22, at 207-22; see also J. CHOPER, THE SUPREME COURT AND 
THE POLITICAL BRANCHES 59 (1980). 
305 Indeed, the tests employed in equal protection and due process cases are very similar. 
Both kinds of cases employ the "necessary to achieve a compelling state interest" test in 
fundamental rights adjudication, and the "rationally related to a legitimate state interest" test 
for other cases. 
306 414 U.S. 632 (1974). 
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soning: the Court upheld those challenged provisions that required 
pregnant women to give their employers notice of their pregnancies, 
on grounds that the purpose of efficient school planning was proper, 
the notice requirement directly served that purpose, and the burden 
on women teachers was minimal. The Court applied the same ana-
lytical elements, however, to strike down the provisions automati-
cally terminating employment at four months of pregnancy, exam-
ining three purposes claimed by counsel for the state government. 307 
If the purpose was continuity of instruction, a proper purpose, the 
four-month termination was not rationally related, the Court said, 
because it did not per se enhance the "orderly transition between 
the teachers and a substitute,"308 and might actually undercut con-
tinuity, for example, if the school year ended in a teacher's fifth or 
sixth month of pregnancy. 
This case provides a simple example of factual implausibility anal-
ysis: no static termination date directly served the continuity pur-
pose. If the purpose was to screen out physically incapable teachers 
(a proper purpose), it was not rationally related because the irre-
buttable presumption applied "even when the medical evidence ... 
might be wholly to the contrary. "309 This case also provided an 
example of cost-benefit analysis on the over-inclusiveness issue. 
There clearly is some relationship in some cases between being more 
than four months pregnant and working ability, but the Court re-
fused to allow that broad generalization to hold in light of the heavy 
economic and social burdens imposed by such terminations of em-
ployment.310 If the burdens had been trivial, the Court might well 
have permitted such over-inclusiveness for the sake of achieving the 
purpose. In fact, it suggested just that in a footnote, saying that a 
rule automatically terminating employment in the last few weeks 
might be a valid balance even without any individualized opportunity 
for medical screening.3ll 
Similarly, the LaFleur Court rejected the third proffered purpose, 
administrative efficiency, which the Court undermined by an implicit 
benefit-burden test. Though administrative efficiency was considered 
307 The school board in Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. LaFleur attempted to justify their regulation 
in relation to two "overlapping" purposes: continuity of instruction and protection of the health 
of mother and child. [d. at 640-41. The Board also referred to the related goal of keeping 
physically unfit teachers out of the classroom. Id. at 643. 
308 [d. at 642 (quoting Green v. Waterford Bd. of Educ., 473 F.2d 629,635 (2d Cir. 1973)). 
309 [d. at 644. 
310 [d. 
311 [d. at 647 n.13. 
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a proper purpose, and was rationally served by the predictability of 
the four-month cutoff, it was not a sufficiently important purpose in 
light of the grievous burden imposed upon regulated individuals. 
According to the Court, "[t]he Constitution recognizes higher values 
than speed and efficiency. "312 
These analytical elements can be discerned throughout the equal 
protection cases, from cases at the strictest level of scrutiny to the 
lowest basic level of arbitrariness review:313 a process of judicial 
consideration oflegislative purpose, the rationality of means to ends, 
and some judgment of benefit-burden proportionality resembling a 
least-drastic-means analysis. The major analytical demands of this 
approach are defining and establishing which legislative purposes 
are relevant to an action, and how the means-end relationship is to 
be weighed in benefit-burden terms beyond basic factual plausibility. 
On one hand, those commentators who criticize the Court's willing-
ness to examine each alleged purpose as a divide and conquer pro-
cess,314 urge the Court to engage in a less critical, overall lumping-
together review, inviting judicial gut reactions and, ultimately, un-
critical deference. 315 On the other hand, there are justices who accept 
312 [d. at 646 (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1971)); see also Williamson v. 
Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489, reh'g denied, 349 U.S. 925 (1955) (the evils sought to be 
corrected "may be of different dimensions and proportions, requiring different remedies"). 
Other portions of the LaFleur opinion, on post-pregnancy return rules, were similarly 
decided. LaFleur, 414 U.S. at 649--51. 
313 This holds true even at the lowest level of review. See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 
455 U.S. 422 (1982). "At the minimum level, however, the Court 'consistently has required 
that legislation classify the persons it affects in a manner rationally related to legitimate 
governmental objectives. '" [d. at 439 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting Schweiker v. Wilson, 
450 U.S. 221, 230 (1981)). In Zimmerman Brush, Justice Blackmun filed an opinion concurring 
with his own majority opinion, in a case where six of the justices supported the assertion that 
the lowest level of permissible equal protection had been violated. That case apparently 
likewise involved a proportionality balance. 
314 Note, supra note 22, at 127. Another example of the divide and conquer process of testing 
legislative purpose is Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), in which the Supreme Court 
invalidated a Massachusetts statute making it a felony for anyone but a physician or registered 
pharmacist to provide contraceptives to unmarried persons. The Eisenstadt Court considered 
three purposes: discouragement of premarital sex; promotion of health and safety; and the 
prohibition of contraception. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 448--53. The Court found the first two 
goals not to be rationally advanced by the statute, and the third to be impermissible. [d. The 
Court's approach is criticized in the Yale note. See generally Note, supra note 22. 
315 Leedes, supra note 304, at 661. This commentator suggests that: 
Because the Court indicates that ... pure favoritism ... [is] always prohibited ... 
legislatures conceal their true aims with respectable figleaves, government attorneys 
often lack candor, and courts often scan the universe for some hypothetical end the 
legislature may never have considered . . . [B]ut a court obviously deceives itself 
and the public when it holds that the health, safety, and general welfare are intended 
to be furthered by a statute that was actually enacted for reasons unrelated to those 
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the need for specific, reviewable purposes, but are not only willing 
to accept the post hoc rationalizations of government litigators as to 
probable purposes, but also are ready to hypothesize their own 
formulations of what purposes the legislature might have had in 
mind. 316 
As Professor Bice notes,317 this result constitutes an unhelpful 
tautology: judges analyze the means chosen in order to determine 
what the purpose probably was, and then turn around and ask 
whether the purpose was served by those selfsame governmental 
actions that they had used to define the purpose in the first place. 
Such an analysis amounts to an impregnable formula for dismissing 
all such challenges of governmental actions. The only conceivable 
findings of irrationality would then have to be based on the judges' 
retroactive self-criticism of their own logical processes. 318 Rather, it 
Id. 
ends. The mirage is necessary only because the Court's list of permissible ends does 
not include favoritism .... It is my contention that the Court's notions of imper-
missible ends are too strict, counterproductive, and unnecessary. 
316Id. As to the "purposes" supplied by litigators, Justice Brennan noted in Kassel v. 
Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring) (invalidating 
Iowa's prohibition of 65 foot trailer trucks as a burden on interstate commerce): "My brother 
Rehnquist claims that the 'argument' that a court should defer to the actual purposes of the 
lawmakers rather than to the post hoc justifications of counsel 'has been consistently rejected 
by the Court in other contexts.'" Id. at 682 n.3 (quoting id. at 702 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)). 
"Apparently he has overlooked such cases as Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 
522 (1959), ... Wheeling Steel v. Glander, 337 U.S. 522 (1949) ... [and] Weinberger v. 
Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 n.16 (1975) .... " Id. at 682 n.3. 
As to judge-made hypotheses, see Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 
552, reh'g denied, 331 U.S. 864 (1947). See also Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 
422 (1982), in which Justice Blackmun remarked: "[T]he State's method of furthering [its] 
purpose-if this was in fact the legislative end-[must not have] so speculative and attenuated 
a connection to its goal as to amount to arbitrary action. The State's rationale must be 
something more than the exercise of a strained imagination; while the connection between 
means and ends need not be precise, it, at the least, must have some objective basis." 
ZimmerrYlftn Brush, 455 U.S. at 442 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
317 Bice, supra note 22, at 30. 
318 Indeed, the use of post-hoc determinations of purpose in "minimum rationality" review 
has come under increasing attack by scholars, who allege that, when courts engage in intensive 
"ends inquiry," they substitute their own notions of public policy for that of the legislature, 
and contribute to the impotence of rationality review. According to one commentator: 
There is no way to challenge a classification successfully if a court is ready, willing, 
and eager to invent a means-end fit, even when the government does not introduce 
evidence to rebut a challenger's prima facie case, files no Brandeis brief, and does 
not articulate its ends. The Court in such cases shirks its duty by supplying the 
missing end. [The Court has gone] from the extreme of inconsistent, unprincipled 
hyperactivism to the extreme of excessive deference. It failed to establish a 'halfway 
house between the extremes . . . .' 
Leedes, supra note 304, at 644 (quoting McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme 
Court: An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 34, 41 (footnote omitted)). 
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seems the Court has generally settled on a course of reviewing the 
means-end relationship based upon purposes defined by the words 
of the statute themselves, defined by authoritative assertions of 
purpose by responsible state officials, or clearly implied by the struc-
ture of the laws in question. This disingenuous Kotching process319 
fortunately does not appear to be the judicial norm. 
Beyond factual implausibility cases where the means just do not 
suggest the ends, like the four-month cutoff in LaFleur that did not 
logically serve the objective of continuity, lie the more difficult cases 
of benefit-burden balancing where the choice of means offers some 
support for a decision, but arguably not enough. The over-inclusive-
ness, equal protection cases can be understood in this light. For 
example, when a court finds that a statute prohibiting contraceptives 
to all users, including married couples, is over-inclusive and over-
broad in its attempt to prevent promiscuity,320 the court analytically 
is saying that, although the classification serves the purpose by 
incorporating relevant persons, it is void in light of the heavy bur-
dens imposed on others who are not directly relevant to achieving 
that purpose, a benefit-burden analysis. If a classification is upheld, 
it means that only directly relevant persons are included, or that 
the burden on "innocent" includees is sufficiently slight or the pur-
pose so overwhelmingly important, that the over-breadth is marginal 
and, on balance, permissible. This type of testing constitutes a 
straightforward means-end approach to review, and just as clearly 
incorporates conceptual consideration of benefit-burden relativity. 
There is no obvious reason why this longstanding form of logical 
construct as applied in equal protection cases is not equally applicable 
in all substantive reviews of governmental actions. The process of 
defining governmental purpose is no more difficult, the logic of the 
elements of means-end review is the same, the implicit balancing 
likewise. An equal protection review of a legislative "classification" 
comprised of only one individual would be the effective equivalent 
of substantive due process review of a governmental determination 
or act. 
The major difference between the concept of substantive equal 
protection review and other substantive due process seems to lie 
primarily in the fact that the courts have developed a working fa-
miliarity with the character of equal protection. In the community 
319 See Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552, reh'g denied, 331 U.S. 
864 (1947). 
320 See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
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of American jurists, equal protection review has legitimacy because 
its lineage is well-known, with no black sheep Lochners in the line. 
But, if the present analysis is correct, the nature and elements of 
un controversially accepted substantive equal protection review are 
analytically the same as those of substantive due process. Likewise, 
the vaunted differences between strict scrutiny, middle scrutiny, 
and low-level rational basis cases evaporate. In each of these set-
tings, as with the standards of review in administrative law, the 
distinctions seem to come down to distinctions in degrees of defer-
ence rather than substance. The debate therefore should focus more 
on understanding deference. While this observation may clarify the 
process, however, it does not necessarily make it simple. 
2. Degrees of Deference 
On one side is the Scylla of the court as "super legislature," with 
the image of monolithic courts battering down decisions of the other 
branches of government. 321 On the other is the Charybdis of abdi-
cative judicial deference, the whorl of politics swallowing up the 
separate role of the courts as long-term defenders of fundamental 
principles. The perplex of judicial deference posed by Marbury v. 
Madison is that it is difficult to describe the differing degrees of 
deference, much less to objectify them for practical application. Ad-
ministrative lawyers have developed an elaborate spectrum of de-
ference tests for judicial review of questions of facts-from trial de 
novo and review de novo at the lowest level of deference, up through 
"clear preponderance," and "substantial evidence," to "arbitrary and 
capricious," "clearly erroneous," and, finally, nonreviewability-and 
there is yet another spectrum of deference definitions for questions 
of law. 322 Nevertheless, in spite of two-score years of AP A experi-
321 See infra note 351 and accompanying text. 
322 See Frankfurter, supra note 282; see also Jaffe, Judicial Review: Question of Law, 69 
HARV. L. REV. 239, 249-51 (1955). As Professor Gellhorn has noted, 
One method of resolving the difficulty is to state that questions of 'law' are subject 
to full or independent judicial review, that questions of 'fact' are subject to limited 
judicial review, and to classify the question at issue as 'fact' or 'law,' depending on 
whether the scope of review should be independent or limited. This may be termed 
the 'labelling' approach, i.e., after the court decides what scope of review it will 
utilize it attaches the proper label. 
W. GELLHORN, C. BYSE & P. STRAUSS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, CASES AND COMMENTS 297-
98 (7th ed. 1979). Even so, the review of questions of "law" apparently does not rise to scrutiny 
of the "trial de novo" type utilized in Local 777, Democratic Union Org. Comm. v. NLRB, 
603 F.2d 862, 893-96 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
For a sampling of the scholarly debate on this subject, see J. DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE 
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ence in the courts and in journals, Professor Davis can still protest 
that only he understands the meaning of these various deference 
tests. 323 In practice, unless a particular statute clearly specifies oth-
erwise,324 one of two standards of the degree of judicial scrutiny is 
typically applied: "substantial evidence" if it is a formal decision 
being reviewed; "arbitrary and capricious" if it is informal. 325 Though 
they are considered to be quite different, analytically the difference 
between the two definitions lies not in their structural elements but 
in the severity of the scrutiny "mood" with which the courts apply 
them. 326 
The equal protection cases come down to the same spectrum of 
moods. At the level of highest deference are the cases in which the 
Court has said that classifications will be upheld if "any conceivable 
set of facts" could support them,327 a super-deferential test that 
invites a court to stretch to supply both valid purposes and sup-
porting means-end justifications. 328 
At the level of strictest scrutiny, deference is barely discernible, 
for, after a court announces that it is applying that standard, it is 
difficult to find a regulatory survivor. In between are rational-basis 
reviews and middle levels of scrutiny.329 Once a court decides that a 
JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW 55 (1927); J.M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PRO-
CESS 144-46, 152-53 (1938); Brown, Fact and Law in Judicial Review, 56 HARV. L. REV. 
899, 926-27 (1943). 
323 1 K. DAVIS, TREATISE, supra note 299, § 5.09, at 353-54. 
324 See APA § 706, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(0 (1982). 
325 See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 414-15 (1971) (describes 
circumstances where de novo review is appropriate); see also FCC v. National Citizens Comm. 
for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 802-03 (1978). 
326 See supra note 226 and accompanying text. 
327 See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 
U.S. 471, 485, reh'g denied, 398 U.S. 914 (1970). The inherent oxymoron in the terms is 
apparently lost upon the Court. How does one "conceive" a fact? McGowan appears to be a 
straight substantive due process case masquerading as equal protection. In a law prohibiting 
certain activities on Sundays, it is the "Sundayness" of the statute that is being attacked, not 
the classification of certain businesses. But Sundays do not have enforceable rights, so the 
case is pushed into the mold of equal protection. The fact that the law was upheld, of course, 
does not change the point. See L. TRIBE, supra note 268, § 8-7, at 585-86. 
323 Indeed it seems to place an almost impossible burden of proof upon the party seeking to 
challenge legislation, and in fact is arguably similar to the "clearly erroneous" standard of rule 
52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which is the standard that an appellate court 
uses when reviewing the factual determinations of the trial court. FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a). 
When the Court adopts such a posture, it appears willing to entertain any argument that 
might sustain the enactment under review, however attenuated the suggested "reasonable 
basis" may be. See, e.g., Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911) (a 
classification does not violate the equal protection clause "merely because it is not made with 
mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality"). 
329 See, e.g., Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), reh'g denied, 401 U.S. 903 (1971); 
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case involves fundamental rights or suspect categories, the level of 
test is automatically designated as, consequently, are the results. 330 
The choice of test formulae, based on gut judgments of the affected 
interests, is a semaphore for what will follow. 
How to mal~e sense out of this semantic chaos? One method would 
be to say that the self-fulfilling choice of which test to apply is merely 
an indicator of organic judicial decisionmaking in which the choice of 
test, and a court's consequent activism or deference, is made ac-
cording to whose team is at bat. 331 For the sake of the integrity of 
the legal system, however, it is important to seek further rationales 
to explain and guide the courts' actions. 
The equal protection cases suggest the way in which the courts 
can define such a rationale. The difference between the strict scru-
tiny and low scrutiny code-word tests is not that in the latter situ-
ations irrationality is avowedly tolerated up to the limit of lunacy, 
but, rather, that judicial perceptions of what is at stake differ. In 
strict scrutiny situations, the courts accept the proposition that dis-
criminations based upon certain constitutionally suspect criteria per 
se impose drastic and highly significant burdens on individuals af-
fected. 332 That recognition implicitly foretells an ultimate tilt toward 
the individual. Where low-level arbitrariness reviews are applied, 
the courts implicitly are looking ahead to the balance and saying that 
the burden on the individual is not much, in comparison to legitimate 
governmental interests. 333 In between-as in gender and illegitimacy 
cases where courts feel subjectively that the classes are not exactly 
suspect, but that the rights involved are rather important-the most 
difficult balancing takes place. Here, the code words and semaphores 
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 1124 (1977). In the gender cases, 
the Court has carved out an "intermediate" standard of review, which requires that a classi-
fication be substantially related to important purposes. Craig, 429 U.S. at 197-98. 
330 See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 
479 (1965); Carey v. PopUlation Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Griffin v. County School Bd. 
of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218 (1964). 
331 This danger currently shadows the judicial nomination process, as noted in Shapiro, Mr. 
Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 HARV. L. REV. 293 (1976). 
332 In suspect classification cases, the question of the severity of the individual burden is 
related to the Court's implicit recognition of the immutability of race. See Brown v. Board of 
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The Court has also noted the stigmatization associated with a 
classification based upon such an unalterable (and ultimately erroneous) criterion. Strauder v. 
West Virginia, 100 U.S. (10 Otto) 303 (1879). When weighed against the imposition of such a 
significant and drastic burden upon the citizen, the governmental interest requiring such a 
classification must be compelling indeed. 
333 See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, reh'g denied, 450 U.S. 
1027 (1981). 
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do not provide a clear understanding of how the interests of the 
individual should be gauged in comparison to those of the state. 334 
It is not enough, however, to say that the judicial choices are shaped 
by a court's view of what is at stake. Such a position merely restates 
the semaphore phenomenon. 
Analytically, however, the courts at every level of scrutiny seem 
to be applying a benefit-burden, means-end balance that is directly 
analagous to the modern three-part procedural due process formula 
established in Mathews v. Eldridge. 335 In that case, the procedural 
balancing of interests weighed: 1) the substantiality of the affected 
individual's interest measured in terms of the procedural burden, 
loss, or effect attributable to the government's choice of how much 
process to give; 2) the government's interest in proceeding in the 
particular chosen manner that so affects the individual; and 3) the 
risk of error involved in that choice of procedure. 336 
Application of the Mathews test to equal protection decisionmak-
ing in substantive terms explains how, even at the highest level of 
scrutiny, with a racial classification, the courts could well uphold a 
clearly discriminatory statute. Take for example a law requiring that 
all black American school children be inoculated for sickle-cell ane-
mia. The courts would consider the burden on black school children, 
including the burden posed by the racially based setting-apart, and 
would weigh it against the government's interest in avoiding a ter-
rible disease, along with the risk that this classification was erro-
neous or illogical (sickle-cell strikes only black children).337 The stat-
ute thus would probably survive this balancing because: 1) the racial 
classification does not weigh so invidiously as in other contexts; 2) 
the state's interest in preventing disease is significant; and 3) the 
applicable scientific data is reliable. 
334 Although the phrase "compelling state interest" gives a pretty good indication, the 
signals are clear enough in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (applying "strict 
scrutiny" to invalidate a sex-based classification). The Court, however, has retreated from 
this position, adopting the "intermediate standard" of review for gender cases. In Craig v. 
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-98 (1976), reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 1124 (1977), the Court noted that 
a classification based on gender "must serve important governmental objectives and must be 
substantially related to achievement of those objectives." Id. at 197. 
335 424 U.S. 319 (1976); see also Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 112-13 (1977). The three 
elements offer a simpler way of implementing the analytical review set out in Simson, A 
Method for Analyzing Discriminatory Effects Under the Equal Protection Clause, 29 STAN. 
L. REV. 663, 680 n.95 (1977). 
336 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335. 
337 This balancing also would appear to include a weighing of less drastic means against 
"necessity" considerations. 
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This balance also explains why the LaFleur Court indicated that 
it might well sustain an irrebuttable governmental rule terminating 
pregnant teachers for the last few weeks before delivery, even with-
out individual medical hearings.338 In such cases, the burden of near-
term termination was slight and the school's interest in certainty of 
planning for hiring substitutes was more substantial, given the rel-
atively low risk of error in predicting (even without medical exams) 
that women teachers past their eighth month are likely to need 
substitutes very soon.339 
The Court, in other words, has not been reluctant to apply the 
useful elements of the Mathews balance in contexts far removed 
from that case's purely procedural setting. In 1982, for instance, the 
Court followed the elements of the Mathews analysis, applied to a 
substantive setting, in Logan v. Zimmerman Brush CO. 340 In that 
case, the majority of the Court (in a combination of opinions) was 
willing to strike down a state statute's restrictions on hearing cutoffs 
at the lowest level of review, based in part on benefit-burden, means-
end reasoning. Not only did the dismissal of filed claims (where the 
agency itself had failed to call a required timely hearing) impose a 
heavy burden on the individual petitioner, but the interest of the 
state in cutting down caseloads or expediting processing (clearly 
proper purposes) was not sufficiently significant (indeed trivial) in 
light of the risk of erroneous deprivations in a system amounting to 
chance. Like the over-inclusiveness analysis,341 this balancing struck 
down the determination not because it might not actually serve a 
purpose, but because its "arbitrary" randomness was not sufficiently 
related to a valid purpose, in light of less drastic and more consis-
tently logical means available to achieve the purpose. 342 
338 Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 647 n.13 (1974). 
339Id. 
340 Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 434-35 (1982). Note that Zimmerman 
Brush also looks very much like a substantive due process case rather than an equal protection 
decision. The government-imposed burden involved a single party in idiosyncratic circum-
stances. The Court certainly felt that the statute was substantially unfair to Logan, but used 
equal protection instead of substantive due process. In all likelihood, this analysis reflected 
the Court's traditional aversion to the latter term. 
341 See supra note 320 and accompanying text. 
342 This is similar to the reasoning in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971). Of course, a 
fundamental problem with the agency's interpretation in Zimmerman Brush was that it 
treated similar individuals dissimilarly for no good reason, a familiar definition of under-
inclusiveness. In our present terms, it could be said that the individual burden on Mr. Logan 
was not only that he was being deprived of his right to administrative process, but also that 
he bore the burden or stigma of being singled out for loss with no fault or causation nexus. 
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There is a very real danger that the Court's use of "cost-benefit 
analysis" will also become a self-fulfilling prophecy of deference, 
because the governmental interest so readily conjures up judicial 
visions of the needs of millions to weigh against the paltry interest 
of one. 343 Beyond shifting to the benefit-burden phrasing of the con-
cept,344 one answer is to say that the Court has in practice been able 
to give substantial weight to the interests of individuals. Another is 
to pose the challenge of intellectual integrity. If the Court is going 
to decide cases according to organic inclination and gut semaphores, 
nothing will deter it; but if the analysis is presented in terms of its 
constituent elements by counsel, with explicit balancing of explicit 
considerations, then the colloquy between bench and bar in each case 
will necessarily be targeted at a higher and more articulated level, 
with consequent improvement in judicial process as a matter of 
course. 
Abdication is rather to be feared: the entropic tendency of judges 
to zone out when they encounter the issues of deference and official 
discretion. That is a real danger of semaphore thinking. 
Courts, if they acknowledge their structural role as integral parts 
of government rather than mere appendages of the current political 
marketplace, must then confront the fact that their definitions of 
deference will have systemic political implications whether or not 
they exercise a substantive review function. 345 A blunt decision to 
abstain-as in Dandridge where Rehnquist used the language of the 
anti-Lochner backlash to achieve a Lochner resulp46-can be more 
343 In Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U.L. REV. 865 (1960), Justice Black noted: 
The great danger of the judiciary balancing process is that in times of emergency 
and stress it gives Government the power to do what it thinks necessary to protect 
itself, regardless of the rights of individuals. If the need is great, the right of 
Government can always be said to outweigh the rights of the individual. If"balancing" 
is accepted as the test, it would be hard for any conscious judge to hold otherwise in 
times of dire need. And laws adopted in times of dire need are often very hasty and 
oppressive laws .... 
[d. at 878. 
Justice Black further noted that these concerns are not unique in time or place to the 
modern constitutional state: "Misuse of government power, particularly in times of stress, has 
brought suffering to humanity in all ages about which we have authentic history." [d. at 879. 
344 See supra notes 236-41 and accompanying text. 
345 As Professor Tribe notes: 
[W]holesale abdication [by the Court] to the political process [is unjustified], since 
there exists no type of legislation that can be guaranteed in advance to leave impor-
tant constitutional principles unimpaired ... and there is ... no way for courts to 
review legislation in terms of the Constitution without ... making difficult substan-
tive choices .... 
L. TRIBE, supra note 268, § 8-7, at 583-84. 
346 Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, reh'g denied, 398 U.S. 914 (1970) (where the state 
regulation provided for a $250 per month family limit on AFDC grants): 
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"political" than a court's straightforward decision to exercise its 
review role in a substantive manner. 
The challenge indeed is one of judicial integrity. If judges can be 
trusted to act more often than not according to the high ethical 
principles expected of the watchdog branch of government, the only 
branch charged with maintaining a rational continuity of principles 
despite the storms and tides of popular majoritarian politics, then 
there is no danger in allowing them to apply, with due deference, 
the traditional tests of validity for governmental actions. If, as some 
have argued, even the highest court in the land has abandoned all 
but a pretense of principled analysis, then the danger is great with 
or without substantive review, because the Court will abstain, or 
scrutinize without calling it substantive review, depending on the 
Justices' organic political inclinations in each case. 347 
Given the fact that all courts and commentators appear to agree 
that courts ultimately must be able to censure the most extreme 
cases of substantive arbitrariness, the burden would seem to be on 
those who would limit substantive judicial review to show logically 
where the boundary lies-not an easy task. 348 Failing such a line-
drawing, it is far more fitting for members of the legal profession to 
hold to the operating presumption that courts will be guided by 
principle rather than politics, avoiding both the anti-state politics of 
the Lochner Court's review and the establishment politics of latter-
day abstention decisions. 349 From that presumption, a coherent sys-
tem of democratic checks and balances can flow. If there is to be an 
irrebuttable presumption in judicial review of governmental action, 
let it be that one. 
For this Court to approve the invalidation of state economic or social regulation as 
"overreaching" would be far too reminiscent of an era when the Court thought the 
Fourteenth Amendment gave it power to strike down state laws "because they may 
be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought." That 
era long ago passed into history. 
[d. at 484 (citations omitted). The rhetorical "ghost of Lochner' will not go away. See Ferguson 
v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731---32 (1963). 
347 See supra note 304, and accompanying text. 
348 Professor Tribe writes: 
[E]ven deferring to others ... [entails an assumption of deciding] when to intervene, 
as the Court obviously has done throughout its history. As long as judges do not 
fully and irrevocably repudiate the mission of occasionally rejecting majoritarian 
political choices, there is no honest way for them to escape the burdens of substantive 
judgment'in every case. 
L. TRIBE, supra note 268, § 8-7, at 585 (emphasis original). 
349 In some cases, this may amount to the presumption that "the Emperor must be wearing 
clothes." 
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3. The Bench's Vision of Democracy 
A court's stance on review in part reflects its conception of what 
a legislature is. If the court regards government, especially legisla-
tive decisionmaking, as an intricate and legitimate brokerage system 
for the array of competing market forces and pressure groups, visible 
and invisible, that constitute modern democratic process, then every 
decision can be seen as so complex and multi-purposed that mean-
ingful judicial means-end review seems analytically impossible350 un-
less the courts straightforwardly take on the role of a superlegisla-
ture, a role that most agree is not fitting and proper. 351 Accordingly, 
some jurists have argued that courts should accept the results of 
legislative action as given, without scrutiny as to purpose or means-
end review. This "marketplace" characterization of governmental 
process has much basis in reality to support it. Noone who has 
watched the legislative journey of an agricultural commodity credit 
bill, say, or proposals for immigration reform, veterans preferences, 
auto safety, or environmental regulation can have any illusions that 
the numerical majority of legislators who come together to pass a 
particular bill have any unity of vision, purpose, or interest with 
regard to a proposal,352 not even illusions that the discrete merits of 
each bill have a necessary part to play in its passage.353 Yet, if the 
350 As Dean Bice describes it, the brokerage model "is rooted in skepticism about the reality 
or even the possibility of public values. It posits that the only intelligible conception of the 
'public' good is the maximum feasible satisfaction of individual preferences. Thus, assuming 
that the legislature operates as a proper market, legislation is, by definition, an accurate 
expression of that maximum satisfaction." Bice, supra note 22, at 19 n.37 (citation omitted). 
Confronted by such a legislative system, any attempt by the Court to divine a unitary 
legislative "purpose" or "intent" is hopeless. Thus, any meaningful means-end rationality 
review is unrealistic, if not futile. 
351 The term "superlegislature" apparently originated in Day-Brite Lighting v. Missouri, 
342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952) ("Our recent decisions make plain that we do not sit as a superlegis-
lature to weigh the wisdom of legislation nor to decide whether the policy which it expresses 
offends the public welfare."). It has since flourished to the point of becoming a thorn in the 
side of those who would challenge "arbitrary" legislative action, and is rapidly growing into a 
member of the "judicial buzzword" genus of semantics. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 
U.S. 726, 731 (1963); New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976); Minnesota v. Clover 
Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. 456, 478-79 n.2 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Hodel v. 
Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 332-33 (1981); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 242-54 (1982) (Burger, 
C.J., dissenting). 
352 To this extent, it is useful to distinguish between "purpose" and so-called "legislative 
intent," consisting of the subjective intention of individual legislators, who together constitute 
the "collective legislative mind," a mind the depth of which many scholars feel cannot be 
plumbed. See Frankfurter, supra note 282, at 530; Radin, supra note 284, at 869. Purpose is 
the aim of the legislation; intent is the aim of the legislator. 
353 See Leedes, supra note 304, at 644. 
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courts do not insist that government's actions be rational, at least 
in the sense of achieving a purported public end, judicial review 
makes little sense. 
An alternative model less cynically pictures government much as 
it is taught in eighth grade civics, as a "social-good" mechanism 
designed and motivated to accomplish particular purposes for the 
public good. 354 If this model were true, then substantive means-end 
review would make sense, because the courts' role in means-end 
review would simply be to hold the government to its own avowed 
objective. 
The choice left to the courts, however, is more subtle than to 
decide which model of governmental action is more realistic, the 
marketplace arena or the social-good model. Making such a decision 
is a fit job for political scientists (who usually follow the brokerage 
analysis).355 The day-to-day coin of the legislative marketplace, they 
argue, is comprised of money, media attention, votes, deals, and 
alliances, and only a Pollyanna could reduce the process to the bland 
caricature reflected in the civics books. Although it is difficult for 
the men and women who sit on the bench to believe in the day-to-
day accuracy of the social-good model, it should be harder still for 
them to adopt the brokerage model as the acknowledged basis of 
their judicial review activity. 
In practice, courts seem destined to choose a pragmatic paradox: 
while the political process may be merely an arena of contending 
forces, judges must presume, sometimes against the evidence of 
their senses, that each law is intended to achieve some particular 
modicum of public good, and is to be reviewed accordingly.356 Thus, 
the courts fulfill a real check-and-balance role that lifts the whole 
structure above the mire of the political battlefield. If the courts 
surrender their expectation of governmental rationality, however, 
then there is no focus within the system for enforcement of first 
principles, except where particular specific provisions fortuitously 
exist in constitutions, or in statutes which can be changed at the 
stroke of a legislative clock. If the courts persist in acting as if laws 
354 As posited by Professor Michelman, the "social good" model involves the legislature as 
"the forum for identifying or defining [objectives], and acting toward those ends. The process 
is one of mutual search through joint deliberation .... Moral insight, sociological understand-
ing, and goodwill are all legislative virtues." Michelman, Political Markets and Community 
Self-Determination: Competing Judicial Models of Local Government Legitimacy, 53 IND. 
L.J. 145, 149 (1978) (footnote omitted). 
355 See, e.g., J. CHOPER, supra note 304. 
356 See supra note 349 (the "Emperor presumption"). 
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were written in order to accomplish their purported ends, then the 
potential of substantive review keeps the whole system honest. 
Those who argue that legislatures are too complex to be reviewable, 
and that legislative means-end choices are political questions, im-
plicitly consecrate the result of political combat in which might makes 
right.357 They also disrupt the delicate fundamental balance of de-
mocracy between respect for the individual and the grant of other-
wise overwhelming power to the machinery of the majority. 
4. Will of the Wisp, and Other Tests 
Despite the often-repeated judicial aversion to substantive ration-
ality review, even the most deferential judges would probably admit 
that some governmental irrationalities in the extreme case must be 
substantively reviewed. Thus, decisions based on bad faith,358 or 
bordering on lunacy, will be judicially scrutinized and invalidated. 
The courts that declare that governmental decisions based on "will 
of the wisp reasoning" would be void359 are accepting a standard of 
invalidity based upon means-end rationality. 
The will of the wisp is not a question of procedural due process, 
but of the lack of sufficient relationship between facts and some 
determining principle established to achieve the public purpose. 360 
Analytically, the basis for judicial acceptance of substantive reviews 
in such extreme cases is not some free-floating, exceptional form of 
sui generis, constitutional review jurisdiction, but just a recognition 
of substantive due process in particularly vivid circumstances. The 
acknowledgment that such extreme cases deserve substantive re-
view, however, thereby concedes the fundamental existence of a 
substantive rationality review jurisdiction. 
When surveyed analytically, the extensive case law of judicial 
review, as indeed the constitutional structures that lie behind article 
III review of governmental actions, both repeatedly affirm the ex-
357 "The simple plan, That they should take who have the power, And they should keep, 
who can." Meeker v. City of East Orange, 77 N.J.L. 623, 638, 74 A. 379, 385 (1909) (quoted 
with aversion). This is the problem invited by the Linde, supra note 22, and Leedes, supra 
note 304, analyses. 
358 See, e.g., United States v. Board of Educ. of Chicago, 744 F.2d 1300, 1308 (7th Cir. 1984) 
(alleged bad faith of Department of Education for failing to fund desegregation order). 
359 United States v. 2,606.84 Acres of Land, 432 F.2d 1286, 1290 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 
402 U.S. 916, reh'g denied, 403 U.S. 912 (1971); United States v. 49.79 Acres of Land, 582 F. 
Supp. 368, 373 (D. Del. 1983) (quoting United States v. 2,606.84 Acres of Land, 432 F.2d 
1286, 1290 (5th Cir. 1970». 
360 2,606.84 Acres of Land, 432 F.2d at 1290. 
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istence of some kind of meaningful judicial backstop against arbitrary 
governmental decisions. The judicial protection would be superficial 
and feckless if it were limited to purely procedural matters, abdi-
cating review of substantive merits through an excess of deference. 
Instead, viewed over the years, the arguments over substantive 
rationality review repeatedly devolve into discussions merely over 
the degree of deference, not over the question of whether basic 
reviewability exists. Presented in those terms, rationality review 
becomes more straightforward, less mysterious and suspicious, and 
eminently practicable. 
v. SUMMARY 
The "arbitrary and capricious" test is so widely recognized in 
general terms as an ultimate limit upon governmental actions that 
it is surprising how little it has been analyzed in specific terms. What 
is its source, statute or constitution? Where does it properly apply? 
What are its components and logic? How can courts take on the job 
of actually applying the test without upsetting separation of powers? 
These questions may well explain why courts have been so hesitant 
in undertaking straightforward applications of the arbitrary and 
capricious test in substantive judicial reviews. 
This Article attempts to pin down the arbitrary and capricious 
test through the vehicle of eminent domain. Using administrative, 
constitutional, and eminent domain cases in which the concept of 
arbitrariness can be scrutinized and tested, this Article has sought 
to demonstrate the constitutional status of the arbitrariness test, as 
it exists with or without particular statutory authority. The analysis 
splits substantive judicial review into different diagnostic cate-
gories-inquiries into the authority for governmental action, proper 
public purpose, a means-end analysis, and the assessment of indi-
vidual burdens in the takings area, as well as procedural review 
issues. This analysis narrows down the arena in which the arbitrary 
and capricious standard can be applied most usefully, and demon-
strates its practical application through an inquiry into the rational 
relationship between means and ends. 
Eminent domain case law reflects the haziness in our general 
understanding of substantive judicial review. Police power condem-
nation is one of those areas in which the arbitrary and capricious 
test is regularly acknowledged as an element of judicial review, but 
rarely actively applied. Review of eminent domain case law through 
the perspective of the diagnostic categories developed here provides 
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a foundation for substantive rationality review of conflicts between 
public power and private rights. 
The analysis therefore addresses fundamental issues of democratic 
governance. On one hand, judicial deference to official decisions is a 
necessary feature of stable tripartite government. Courts should not 
arrogate to themselves the role of final decisionmaker except in 
extreme cases. On the other hand, if courts elevate deference to the 
level of substantive nonreviewability, they abdicate the equally im-
portant principle of judicial limits on public power. Between the two 
extremes lies a practical middle ground. Courts must recognize both 
the presumption of validity of governmental decisions, and the real-
istic possibility of rebutting it. The arbitrary and capricious test, as 
a democratic backstop against occasional erratic excesses of govern-
ment, represents a functional and balanced opportunity for striking 
that balance. 
If, as analyzed in this Article, federal courts are willing to allow 
individuals a realistic opportunity to raise serious particular ques-
tions about the substantive rationality of governmental condemna-
tions under the terms of the arbitrary and capricious test, they 
thereby implement in practice a longstanding and important precept 
of American jurisprudence. Such substantive review fits logically 
into the fabric of judicial review, including the patterns of constitu-
tional review in recent federal cases and practical but unused pro-
visions of the federal Administrative Procedures Act. If, however, 
judges continue to treat the arbitrary and capricious test as an 
amorphous totem inappropriate for active judicial use-in effect pre-
venting individuals from meaningfully litigating the allegation of 
substantive irrationality of governmental decisions-the long-term 
consequences within our legal system are likely to be felt far beyond 
their effects on certain parcels of land. ' 
